[Tischrede beim Festessen der Nation Associates, 1945] (Fischer Klassik Plus) (German Edition)

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This was his baby, he worked incredibly hard on this, and straight after the launch in , you see signs that Koestler is being got rid of and he is disposed of quite thoroughly. He was the first CIA link man. He funnelled the CIA dollars in these brown envelopes handed over at these gay night clubs in Paris. He financed the Congress until the CIA was able to get a proper cover and a proper financing apparatus in position. There are all sorts of stories, very well researched by Tony Carew, about how Brown himself was a loose cannon and he was going off with his own agenda and Brown loved stirring CIA triangles.

It is a fascinating story, full of tension and distrust and suspicion and all those things. His role at the beginning of the Congress is absolutely crucial. Again, I do not think Brown is saying, you have to get rid of Lasky in The guy was organizing thuggery in Marseilles. I almost feel like apologising for descending to the level of character and motivation to the degree that I am, but actually this is a story about, for me, what motivated these people, what their psychological backgrounds and make-up were, why they made the decisions that they did. I think that personalities may be very unfashionable in academic histories, but I think personalities are hugely important.

I do not think that there is any doubt that Josselson was not going to take any advice from Brown. He had a heart attack at one point, he has such a ferocious row with these guys who are trying to tell him what to do and he knows that they are wrong. WSL: The book seems to be very sympathetic to Josselson. FSS: Yes. WSL: You actually seem to like Josselson. FSS: There was one criticism, I cannot remember by whom, one reviewer who said that it was too sympathetic to Josselson, and that this was because I was relying too heavily on Diana Josselson as a source, which I suppose is true.

And I did. I showed her some pieces and she made valuable corrections. Factual errors I had made, whatever. I think that Josselson was in an impossible position. If you read his testimony, it is very moving, his 20, 30 pages that he left in his personal papers which are now in the Harry Ransom Center at the University of Texas.

He wrote that for future consumption, obviously. He confesses to his gross disillusionment with the misdirection of US foreign policy in the mid to late s. And he says, we started with a great sense of—he never uses the crude terms of manifest destiny—this great promise, a manifest sense of the good that could be achieved.

We end with reckless, misguided, wanton mistakes in US foreign policy. I think he was an idealist, and I think he was naive in lots of ways. WSL: To take it back to control, it is not simply that Washington is handing down the guidelines and they are implemented just like that. Josselson is interpreting or trying to interpret. FSS: Braden is a very good delegator. He gets replaced by someone called Cord Meyer who cannot work like that, who issues directives left, right, and centre, who is known as being a kind of ruthless operator.

And this is where the problem starts for Josselson. FSS: Well, Josselson starts playing a game. So they can report back to Washington and file their secret report and everything else but he is just giving them a bit of pablum to chew over, so he is a clever operator. You know, if anyone should be identified as difficult to control, in a sense it was Josselson. Do not forget that Josselson is not the only one, Lasky is involved.

Lasky is answering to Washington, there is no doubt in my mind about that. Why else would the CIA man who recruited him tell me he recruited him? I do not understand why the CIA would bother to invent the recruitment of Lasky. WSL: But is Lasky a contract officer? WSL: So you call it contract in the sense whether it is on a rolling basis or whether he is on a more permanent basis, Lasky is definitely being paid. He is a CIA officer. WSL: More generally, beyond the Encounter case, I am wondering if the CIA moves more aggressively in the late s to put its own people inside organizations.

FSS: Another very interesting thing about control, this whole idea about patronage and what does it mean. International PEN, an organization promoting the freedom of the writer, exists. It is not parti pris, it is there to defend freedom of expression, writers regardless of their political, ethnic, religious, or whatever hue. They, the CIA, are all over it like a rash. Suddenly they want to get Arthur Miller elected President.

He suspects, he says in his memoirs, that they were using him as a kind of bridgehead to get into the Eastern Bloc, which they failed to do. Because when the Congress has tried to do it, they have got these. Quite rightly so, the Eastern European representatives say we do not want to talk to these guys, these are not genuine representatives of our intellectual brothers behind the Eastern bloc, behind the Iron Curtain. So what PEN offers is a way in that the Congress has not been able to achieve and Arthur Miller is a perfect figurehead for that, because he has good credibility.

WSL: Just to be clear. Is Miller witting or unwitting? FSS: I believe he is unwitting and he expresses reservations about it in his memoirs and he reflects that he had reservations at the time. It is interesting that he never goes back to them. Go back for one second to Hugh Wilford. What is his argument in his work on British intellectuals in the Cold War?

What I think he is doing is two things: one, he is making the argument that certain officials who were instrumental in liaising with the British were not in fact CIA, so he is saying there were other levels of government co-operation… FSS: Overt? The second level is to argue that there is an autonomy on the part of the British and that those people, whether they be British politicians, whether they be British writers or whatever, did maintain a level of their own interest and that they could… FSS: But that is not controversial.

But it is also quite clearly defined, that if the autonomy takes people into areas of direct conflict with American interest, then that autonomy should in some way be curtailed. Of course there is autonomy and it was built in from the beginning. I do not want to contribute to that overall agenda.

WSL: So the parameters of opinion are set? FSS: I think so. It is not just about the words you put on paper. WSL: You would have no problem with it? FSS: No problem with it. If intellectuals wanted to, as Dwight Macdonald said, choose one lesser evil over the other, I choose the West—fine.

And those options were available. So those forms are out there, they are available. FSS: Yeah, he does, and I think that you could make that argument. I think I am fairly magnanimous in giving voice to or reflecting, as much as I can, the view that in those early years that it was important to do it and that, if the only way to do it was covertly, then it had to be done covertly, because otherwise nothing would be done at all and everyone was a Cold Warrior then.

My argument and my problem is that no one ever sat down and really considered the philosophical, the moral, not to mention the practical kind of dyslexia that was built into the whole proposition, the Jesuitical means justify the ends argument. He was trying, from quite an early date, to keep his CIA colleagues and paymasters at bay, from putting their grubby hands all over the Congress. Having defended it so vigorously, they had to make sure their investment, intellectual and otherwise, in this operation was closely protected, but secondly, at a time when the CIA was just losing quids down on everything and its public image was black, this was the only operation they had, at least internally, that they could be proud of, that they thought was working.

WSL: You can understand what Braden does. I assume you do not really have a problem with an unwitting intellectual who is in CCF or Encounter, but is it safe to say then that you have problems with the witting intellectual? I do for a whole variety of reasons. Saying they are two separate things and that an autonomous aesthetic has to be defended by any freedom-loving democracy, this is essential and this is the opposite to what totalitarian structures do. So there you go, they give him the Bollingen Award for Poetry in This guy.

Neruda was apparently using his poetry to celebrate the values and agenda that we were fighting against tooth and nail, therefore, it was absolutely fair to smear the man and his poetry and to link the two. I just do not think you can think both ways. I think you either have an absolute standard whereby you say the aesthetic is autonomous or you do not.

There is a kind of opportunism there which makes me distrust those kinds of intellectual. This is what they were wittingly engaged in doing, they knew when they sat down at the table with CIA people that the CIA people were at the very least hoping to have that guidance acted upon in the magazines. The money did not come unconditionally. There is plenty of evidence for that. FSS: Definitely, yeah. Loved it, yeah, wanted to be in the game. WSL: Raymond Aron? WSL: Denis de Rougemont? The kind of deal is that the French have been allowed to put two people in the Congress, but I cannot think of either of their names at this moment.

Because the problem for him was that his reputation in French cultural and political spheres was now seriously undermined…. Hunt left me in no doubt that Aron knew, but whether he knew from Day One I do not know. WSL: The new book by Giles Scott-Smith, if I read it correctly, seems to make a slightly different argument on the control and autonomy issue, that there was a genuine wish to defend the cause of intellectual freedom amongst European intellectuals. FSS: I can see that there is some justification to this point. I said early on that this book was a corrective to the official history of the Congress for Cultural Freedom by Peter Coleman.

He had access to the Congress for Cultural Freedom papers and the Encounter papers, which have never surfaced by the way. I have to make an assumption that Melvin Lasky has a lot of the Encounter papers. You know, his loft was broken into.


I found some papers in Reading University, which Coleman does not refer to, and which provide a link with Warburg. Coleman says, almost in his opening page, that having tried to investigate the CIA link and got nowhere with the Freedom of Information Act, this was in any case immaterial because the Congress existed in and of itself and has to be viewed on its own merits. Does it denigrate the CCF? I do not know. I think this reveals a great degree of sensitivity. All I say is look at it and read it in the context that it was published by its managers and its backers.

FSS: Financially it was never ever self-supporting. Lots of magazines can stumble on for years. Encounter might have gone on with some official sponsorship from the British Government openly. It might have been one of those magazines that received an Arts Council grant or a Ford Foundation grant. WSL: And if it had been supported by the British Government openly, it would have been a different magazine? In defence of intellectual freedom? FSS: What do you think? I think so. The testimony is there of the people who did object to funding mechanisms even without having any notion or idea of control.

Nonetheless, had I known I would not have been played for a sucker, I would not have written for this magazine. FSS: Exactly. I admire, am kind of bolstered by those very intellectuals who make the case for autonomy because they say, nonetheless, they would have preferred to have gone somewhere else. I got fobbed off by everybody on that, everybody, that it was a badly-written truculent piece of anti-Americanism of the worst kind, because Dwight was drunk on olive oil and his romantics of the moment. Nonsense, it was all about the repetition, a reprise of the Kincaid Report on US prisoners in the Korean War, which they were desperate to bury, deeply embarrassed by.

But to me, he said, no, no, no, no, no, the suppression of the Macdonald essay had nothing to do with that. I have him on film saying that. I completely understand the context, at least at the beginning of the Cold War, of the pressure, often self-induced, on the part of intellectuals to feel that they had to fight for the right side, that they had to speak up for the right causes.

But I unequivocally say you can not have it both ways, you can not say nigh on 20, 25 years, that it is possible to go on pumping money and support into an apparatus which is claiming to be free and independent and privately sponsored. They were clear deceptions. I feel really unhappy about it. You can wriggle around as much as you like and be very very academic about it—I do not mean that as a slight on academics, but you can be academic about how those principles can be diluted or changeable or subject to different conditions.

If you make the principled stand, well, stand by it! I think that was the most important thing, the best advertisement for American intellectuals or intellectuals on the side of the West, for Pax Americana, would have been to be honest. WSL: If I can raise a qualm about that, which has come from certain authors you have raised, you may question in retrospect the motives of the organization, but the CIA did facilitate, did foster intellectual and cultural life in Europe. Are you arguing that the CIA distorted the intellectual cultural environment? What he expresses much better than I do is that it fostered an antiCommunism that did contribute to Vietnam, an anti-Stalinism that became so rigorous and so dogmatic once it set that it made intellectuals, except those that had abandoned it dramatically, unable to accept the possibility that US foreign policy in Vietnam and China was wrong, simply wrong.

WSL: But is that a distortion in Europe as well? FSS: Well, yes. I think the bridgehead that had been built provided US apologists with the kind of European consensus that it would not have had otherwise or would not have been so sustained and so well-nurtured and so graciously appointed, if you like.

These were very, very well-established, strong journals and institutions of some public opinion by the time we get to the disastrous departures in American foreign policy, no not departures, culminations if you like. It confused, muddied the intellectual rules. What I saw in Germany was really fascinating, the talks I gave, the questions that were asked, and the kind of response in the press. The Cold War is definitely still being fought there in a way that is only comparable to the way it is still being fought by a tiny, tiny calcified intellectual group in America.

The Cold War is sustained still by Horowitz, Kristol, et cetera, et cetera. In Germany, unlike Spain, or France, or Italy or the UK where there is already a kind of historical resolution, the Cold War is, for the older generation certainly, still vividly felt and lived. Arguments would start between very elderly, articulate, feisty people about who did what, what it meant, and about all these issues, still very contemporary, about patronage and government support, the idea and possibility of projecting a nation through culture, et cetera, et cetera.

FSS: No, no, and I think the two are totally inter-linked and, crucially, I do not think you can ignore one at the expense of the other. But I wanted to just kick the door in on this story and then leave the building open for everyone else to glance at the archives and come with histories of their own. Whether you agree with the line I take in the book or not, it opens up the possibility of doing these other bits of research that need to be done.

I could have written exactly the same book on Latin America, on Japan, on Africa. I realized as I went on that I was writing a kind of incitement for publication. There is still this huge gap in the examination and analysis of how intellectual ideas in Europe developed post-war because nobody has, apparently, gone through every issue of Der Monat, gone through the careers of the individual writers. FSS: The danger of this kind of operation, of course is that it attracts the kind of people who want to go in for a bit of derring-do.

Koestler certainly had a bit of experience in this area, but Nabokov never really made the grade so he gets the next best thing. So they had this kind of urge, after the war, to get in there and do something. Some of the strategies employed by the Congress were guerrilla strategies. In a sense I think I may have deferred to or been cowed by the prestigious research that Tony Carew has done, and others. And I think Malcolm Bradbury made a very good point in his review, and he wrote the sequel to my book in his review. A sequel which was the relationship between the US government and popular culture at the time, all the jazz and all the jazz tours and that stuff.

So that dimension was sort of missing. WSL: The reason I put up the labour case is for a specific question. I have already read the labour case differently from what you set out in the book in that it was the private sphere, it was the boys in labour who were pushing the government to do something, give us money, do something and the government only slowly came around to respond. And I know that he was marginalized and after that went off all over the place, going off to South America. So I think he was a bit of a buccaneer and that there were moments and actually a cut-off point, there were a couple of times when his backer—the CIA, US government—said no.

WSL: But no sequel from you? I had the huge advantage of having no past, no back story, no obvious axe to grind, and frankly I must have looked like a complete idiot to the people I met, at least the first time round. And what happened was that, when the book came out, people like Kristol and Lasky and various others, they were really taken aback. I do not know if they thought I would ever pursue it or was serious about it. And anyway, what happened as a result was, just before the book was published and I was seeking permission to quote and everything else, people suddenly realised that I was serious and I had finished this work and so they started withholding permission and then they wanted to see everything that I was writing and it was six months of really difficult, bitter struggles to get vital permission.

John Hunt went from being incredibly frank and open. Suddenly he clammed up and would not allow me to quote direct from his papers—in fact, he was the only one who would not and I had to go and paraphrase. There was a body of letters going to various interviewees who it was felt by other people had been too co-operative, had told me too much, and they were frankly at times quite intimidated. It was such a mess that, to be honest, when I finished it I swore to myself that I would never ever go through that again. And they refused to acknowledge or deny any existence of any files, blah, blah, blah.

It is very much an ongoing thing but there is not a sequel in the offing yet. And also my interest in this was not the CIA and how it works and who these people are. I do not find them interesting or attractive enough. My interest was in the point at which, the moment at which politics and culture and patronage collide, and the complications they cause.

That to me was the fascination as well as the individual motivation. It is a people history. It is about people who I just wanted to find out more who they were. WSL: I get the impression that the book was generally well received in Europe. FSS: In Germany it was loved or hated. I was accused of British anti-semitism, which I think was due to Lasky and his mates. It was an observation from Washington that there was some kind of difficulty at times in dealing with cosmopolitan, ruthless European intellectuals like Josselson, like Lasky, by the WASPish elite, Protestant elite in Washington.

It certainly was not the same in Spain. There was not really a Cold War feel. It is now burgeoning. Now just five years later, under Cold War, it says see labour. It is just interesting to see how the Cold War as a historical exercise is taking shape. And the response in America was that it has still got a long way to go because it is still so polarized and much more now since 11 September when we have had a huge revival of the kind of pious polarities which were dominant in the Cold War. One thing I wanted to say about the National Security Council. The National Security Council Directives and the definitions of propaganda and all that early manual stuff, none of them have been replaced yet, none of them have been seriously challenged.

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These institutions that were set up in the late 40s and these foreign policy plans, none of this structure has been dismantled since the end of the Cold War. All these things have been reinforced, in terms of just the basic grammar but also in terms of how these bodies work. WSL: The book closes with really interesting conclusions with the sense of tragedy, the personal tragedy of Josselson, the sense of betrayal by the intellectuals.

But chronologically, it closes down in the late 60s. FSS: That was my gravest misgiving, having to close it down there. And I did because I had got that far with that many pages. So definitely someone else should write that book. FSS: The Katzenbach report is important. But in the international field we have to re-double our efforts.

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On the contrary, there seems to be encouragement that they should keep on doing it. WSL: They simply could not support domestic organizations, even if they had international activities. FSS: No, I think it is clear that they could support the international operations even of American groups but they could not provide any kind of funding or support to USbased initiatives.

You cannot continue to fund them, but you could continue… FSS: You could perhaps pay the mortgage on an office. WSL: I am interested about the extent that, in the s, the National Endowment for Democracy, quasi-public, fills that gap with domestic organizations. You see, there is one crucial pattern to this book. People were on the whole quite open and quite easy to talk to if I could produce, from archives or from other interviews, evidence.

But whenever I touched on USIA or abstract expressionism or control, the denials were vigorous and unequivocal. The issue of control I think bruised the image but there is tons of stuff you should look at which suggests a much greater degree of CIA infiltration of USIA although they said they had nothing to do with it at all. All that Peace Corps stuff as well, unless they just cut it straight off, which I do not believe they did. I think they would have gone through probably other channels that were already there, where they already had some sort of inroad and simply expanded their presence.

Those are the things I would look at. It is supposedly a new era. Do we have that same kind of involvement by the American state in trying to manipulate or control foreign opinion? And this is a vivid demonstration of exactly what we were trying to curtail or diminish or erode. There is naturally a kind of an envy of the US and this has built itself up now to a head of steam—what we were doing was trying precisely to project the very best of who we were and what we had to offer. So whether or not Bush formally lifts the ban on assassination is immaterial now because the precedent has been established.

It is alright to go and kill individuals. And at a time where it has the capacity to police the world with less opposition than ever before, it is exactly the time when intellectuals and monitors and historians and whoever they might be…. I think that for those who want to sort of do something, there should be an honourable form. You have to be sure that there are certain kinds of mechanisms whereby America is held up to its own exalted standards.

The same for the British government, the French government, and everyone else. It just happens to be that America needs it more than anyone else because America is bigger and more powerful than anyone else. I think a lot of the anti-Americanism is the kind that so exacerbated Cold Warriors in the s and 50s, that kind of fashionable Left Bank sort of excrescence that all Americans are bad. And the fact is that America does not seem to know its enemy. It seems to be profoundly ignorant of who its enemies are. They should have access to it—if you put the CIA in, you are guaranteed to get into trouble, so do not make the same mistake again.

Put the money where it is needed and where people overtly and honestly are able to state what they are doing, which is trying to project a positive national image. FSS: Yes, absolutely. That great moment, that great opportunity. I have no problem with cultural warfare if it is open, and no problem in saying we will attack you with Mark Morris [Dance Group] or Boston Symphony Orchestra. There is nothing wrong with culturalism if the artists are cognizant and willing.

They did it wittingly, knowingly, and they could stand up to the criticisms.

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  • It is their choice, their choice, no problem with that. In addition to a series of revelations about Soviet espionage, the last ten years have seen a steady drip of new information about American covert operations in western Europe during the early Cold War period. In the small amount of literature published on this subject to date, the tendency has been to portray the CIA as fatally compromising the independence of the British left, reducing it to a state of tame ideological obedience in the Cold War.

    A close examination of the impact of American covert operations on the British left, however, reveals a rather more complicated picture. Clearly Britain was a less important target of this campaign than countries such as Italy and France, where economic and political conditions were more unstable. The first and, arguably, most effective of these was Samuel Berger, who had come to London earlier as a student at the London School of Economics in the s, returned in wartime as the labour expert in W. Thanks to his previous experience of British labour affairs, Berger now enjoyed better access to the leadership of the Trades Union Congress TUC and members of the Attlee cabinet, including the Prime Minister himself, than any other American diplomat.

    Perhaps not surprisingly, this has led to speculation that one or other of them was a CIA officer operating under cover. The evidence for this is inconclusive, but in an important sense the question is academic anyway.

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    As later decades of industrial unrest would attest, neither British labour nor management ever paid anything more than lip-service to the positive,. To the extent that British industry did buy into the American model, it was probably as much the result of growing dependence on Marshall aid and private American investment as any conversion to the methods or goals of productivity policy. Turning to the negative, anti-communist mission of the labour diplomats, however, the balance sheet appears more favourable: the British labour movement entered the s with communism under control and the Atlanticist Gaitskellites to the fore.

    How much this had to do with American labour diplomacy, though, is debatable. The right-wing leadership of the TUC and Labour Party was probably capable of keeping its own house in order without US assistance; certainly anti-communist British unionists were no less ready than their American cousins to resort to covert political warfare against communism when circumstances seemed to demand it, as is shown by evidence of links with the Information Research Department and private anti-communist bodies such as Common Cause and Industrial Research and Information Services.

    It too was prompted by a growing awareness of the power of the left in post-war Europe, in this instance left-wing intellectuals, who were viewed not only as important opinion-formers but also as particularly vulnerable to Soviet propaganda. Second, the cultural campaign had a positive as well as a negative aspect: pointing out the dangers to intellectual freedom posed by communism, but also celebrating the cultural life of the western democracies.

    Finally, although the effort was focused mainly on the continent, there was sufficient neutralist sentiment in the UK for British intellectuals to become targets as well. Founded in at a conference held in Berlin with secret backing from the CIA, and subsequently headquartered in Paris, the intellectual citadel of European neutralism, the CCF engaged in an extraordinary array of activities, including festivals, seminars and concerts, all designed to demonstrate to intellectuals the cultural advantages of political freedom. A British affiliate, the British Society for Cultural Freedom, was established in January under the leadership of such prominent literary intellectuals as Stephen Spender, Malcolm.

    Muggeridge and Fredric Warburg. Throughout it remained financially dependent on secret subsidies from the CIA. The initial response of British intellectuals to these cultural blandishments was one of resistance. The British Society for Cultural Freedom never really got off the ground, hampered as it was by internal doctrinal and factional conflicts, and was effectively replaced as the CCF base of operations in Britain by Encounter in For one thing, such a verdict overlooks evidence of British intellectuals attempting to use the US cultural apparatus for their own domestic selfish purposes.

    Finally, one needs to take into account the possibility of collaboration, that is British intellectuals co-operating with the American Cultural Cold War effort because they naturally shared its values and goals. Muggeridge were in on the secret, as they later made plain. Indeed, Muggeridge helped arrange counterpart funding for Encounter from British Intelligence, a fact which hints at the extent of behind-the-scenes collusion between the US and UK secret services. In sum, then, the British response to the cultural campaigns of the CIA was more complex than some accounts would have one believe, involving as it did resistance, appropriation and complicity.

    As has recently been revealed by intelligence historian Richard J. The sterling area, the Commonwealth and, ironically, a growing attachment to the concept of Atlantic union: all these strategic preferences caused the Attlee government to reject federalism in favour of a loose form of confederation in which member states retained their sovereignty.

    For example, despite feeling pressurized and isolated, the British delegation to Strasbourg in strongly opposed-and eventually succeeded in wrecking—the Mackay Plan. Such an interpretation, however, fails to take into account several factors. First, the CIA subsidy of the meeting was a oneoff—the funds for later conferences came from genuinely private sources—and was granted only after sustained European lobbying. Indeed, there were suspicions among the Americans that Bilderberg was the brain-child of the British intelligence services: C. In , for example, C. They were, after all, out of government at home and therefore, understandably, did not want to be excluded from a powerful new international forum.

    Finally, there were the high standards of hospitality on offer, a not unimportant consideration for a group of politicians which included such celebrated bon viveurs as Tony Crosland and Roy Jenkins. As the evidence has emerged, it is not perhaps surprising that some commentators have leaped to the conclusion that the CIA succeeded, by dint of Machiavellian cunning, in reducing the left to a state of ideological subjugation in the Cold War.

    Clearly, the secret sponsorship of bodies ostensibly devoted to the ideal of cultural freedom raises deeply troubling ethical questions. Similarly, the realization that the CIA was active in so many fields on the noncommunist left invites some fascinating but disturbing counterfactual speculation. Had it not been for secret American support, for example, would the Gaitskellites in the British Labour Party have seen off the ideological challenge of Bevanism as easily as they did?

    Still in Britain, but on a more cultural front, would such Bloomsbury literati as Stephen Spender, who had first come to prominence in the s, still have wielded the literary authority they did in the s without the covert backing of the CIA? This was in fact an extremely complex historical situation.

    For one thing, the American campaign was itself ridden with internal contradictions, its public and private elements conflicting as much as they cooperated. More importantly, the British response to the US intervention, far from being one of passive subordination, was characterized variously by willing collaboration, creative appropriation and straightforward resistance. It might well have been the case that the CIA tried to call a particular tune; but the piper did not always play it, nor the audience dance to it. See Saunders, Who Paid the Piper?

    Thomas W. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. William P. See Aldrich, Hidden Hand p. Jackson to Edward Littlejohn, 5 August , C. Jackson Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. Jackson, diary log, 29—31 May , Jackson Papers; C. In the last decade, they have belatedly considered a conflict which was more than geopolitics and military deployments, more than Presidents and General Secretaries, summits and treaties, economic competition and the Bomb. It has broadened the Cold War to include Abstract Expressionism, basketball, and tourism amongst other activities.

    Nor is it in the interests of many US-based historians to consider these issues. On the contrary, intellectuals and the educated bourgeoisie of Europe have long joined in its enjoyment. Even dissident scholars are not safe. Amidst the domestic. DuBois from the NAACP leadership and the prosecution of the Civil Rights Congress, civil rights at home would continue to have a high place in overseas psychological strategy throughout the early Cold War.

    The book not only posed a serious challenge to easy assertions of US victory in the past; it threatened to expose the political motives of present-day historians. What then is to be done to prevent this elision of the cultural crusade from historical debate and, equally important, from consideration of current issues? We get them to conceive of their material, and to write it up, in a certain way—our way. The CIA would always be essential to this cultural crusade.

    Throughout our history, private American citizens have banded together to champion the cause of freedom for people suffering under oppression…. Our proposal is that this tradition be revived specifically to further American national interests in the present crisis. Under the counterpart provisions of the Marshall Plan, millions of dollars were available for propaganda and covert operations, first by the Economic Cooperation Administration, then the Office of Policy Coordination, the specialist agency established in for covert operations.

    Kennan and his assistant, Robert Joyce, liaised both with upstanding citizens and former government officials such as Dean Acheson, Allen Dulles, and Joseph Grew and with the Office of Policy Coordination to set up the venture. With the State Department reluctant to pursue an aggressive strategy, implementation was left to the private sphere, supported by some ad hoc arrangements with benefactors within the government.

    CIA funding for a full campaign was not arranged until Any new field we will enter, we will do so without them. In a somewhat sinister tone, he sharply rebuffed the editor: [You say] that the Congress is in the publishing business to just give readers what they want to read… Your theory is absurd… You will remember that at our Executive Committee meeting everyone was in agreement that the period spent so far by Encounter in overcoming covert and overt resistance…was time well spent, but now it [is] time to go one step further.

    Private initiative was not produced by a state puppet-master pulling strings; the mobilization of culture in the Cold War came through negotiation. The significance of the state was not in creating the cultural crusade but in providing a strategic vision and the organization for a crusade which went beyond the efforts of any individual or group. Consider the development of the National Committee for Free Europe.

    We are neither conveying America, nor freedom for the future, and all we will eventually succeed in doing is get some damn good guys killed. The intervention of the Office of Policy Coordination not only shaped the US delegation for the founding conference of the Congress for Cultural Freedom in Berlin in , but also removed potentially troublesome leaders such as Arthur Koestler and, for a time, Melvin Lasky.

    Even the 12 women of the Committee of Correspondence received. Whatever the level of co-operation between the US government and its private allies at home, the cultural crusade would come to nothing if it had no effect overseas. As early as leading executives as well as the government were fretting: We have failed to recognize that we must advertise and sell the American economic system as well as the products of that system.

    It is our job to explain and sell the rightness of private competitive enterprise both at home and abroad. What made American culture globally irresistible was its acquisitive vices, not its civic virtues. A difference in perspective might bring far different conclusions. The CCF did not hold another major gathering in the developing world until and, on that occasion, it focused on the less contentious issue of economic development. The pretence is maintained that culture is freely transmitted, rather than being mobilized and manipulated for goals which are perhaps not so innocent or laudable.

    James Miller, Irving Wall, David Ellwood, and Frank Costigliola have described aspects of the American campaign but the development and reception of culture as political warfare is not considered. Ninotchka, the film starring Greta Garbo, may have been re-released thanks to the campaign of anticommunism, but did its distribution have any impact? Plans were still active in the s, and their legacy may have been long-lasting. Marc Lazar has evaluated the politico-cultural relationship between a Soviet-defined communism and local parties and institutions in France and Italy.

    The approach is needed not only for national but also for international and transnational movements such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Once again, a not-so-subtle battle for hearts and minds is invoked, as in President George W. As the Congress for Cultural Freedom soon found in India in , the complex cultural negotiation, with its religious, ethnic, racial, and gendered aspects, is beyond any simple imagery of America and the world. The survey found more than two-thirds of British consumers are concerned the world is becoming too Americanized.

    The press were informed at length about Charlotte Beers, the former director of the advertising company J. It is one thing to welcome American cultural products, a far different matter to embrace an entire cultural and ideological system. Unwillingly our free society finds itself mortally challenged by the Soviet system. No other value system is so wholly irreconcilable with ours, so implacable in its purpose to destroy ours, so capable of turning to its own uses the most dangerous and divisive trends in our own society, no other so skillfully and powerfully evokes the elements of irrationality in human nature everywhere, and no other has the support of a great and growing center of military power.

    The CCF could point to immediate advances amongst an intellectual vanguard and initiatives such as the Bilderberg conferences could extend the state-private network across the Atlantic. Both these resentments he takes out on a mythicized image of all he hates, which he calls America. After the bombing of Afghanistan began in October , a leading CNN anchorman was lost for words when a correspondent informed him that 81 per cent of Pakistanis polled favoured the Taliban in the military conflict vs.

    They have never had the experience of a secular regime which is open and free by which they can understand the United States for what it is. There is the old American bias toward seeing Europe as tired, flaccid and hopelessly parochial. For there is a tension, never to be resolved, between American exceptionalism and a universal ideology.

    In this situation, we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity without detriment to our national security…. We need not deceive ourselves that we can afford the luxury of altruism and world benefaction…. We should cease to talk about vague objectives such as human rights, the raising of living standards and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts.

    The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better. Scott-Smith, Politics note 3 p. In addition to the detailed account of financial arrangements in Saunders, see Scott-Smith, Politics, I am grateful to Barbara Sussex for these references. See Scott-Smith, Politics note 3 p. Scott-Smith, Politics note 6 p. Lasch in Bernstein ed. They will be asked to give up some of the benefits which they have come to associate with their freedoms.

    Nothing could be more important than that they fully understand the reasons for this. The risks of a superficial understanding or of an inadequate appreciation of the issues are obvious and might lead to the adoption of measures which in themselves would jeopardize the integrity of our system. After months of trying to figure it out, we have yet to land upon a set of nefarious actions or deeds that would justify such sentiments.

    A CNN official denied that the timing of the initiative had anything to do with US government efforts.

    Hans Frank

    Private information, 4 Dec. Embarrassed by the leak of the plans, the Bush Administration emphasized in the following days that the plans had not been approved. Perhaps the most egregious conflation of cultural product and system occurred in The Times of London in Feb. Foremen have watched workers. Engineers have measured workers. Personnel technicians have cajoled workers.

    Industrial psychologists have tested workers. And the latest group, the psychiatric sociologists have brought psychoanalytic techniques to the workbench and, where others have failed, they now offer to mesmerize workers. It involves looking at the American agenda for Europe and the European reaction to this. It also means examining the differences within the American labour movement over how communism should best be fought. Maier describes an approach that was plainly visible within the Marshall Plan and its successor aid programmes which ran throughout the years — Its initial emphasis was on sharing technical know-how in the interests of efficiency, though it was to become much more than this.

    But it was in the second half of the Marshall Plan, with rearmament following the start of the Korean War in , that an increase in productivity throughout Europe became a general objective. Productivity in Europe had been on an upward trend between and , largely as a result of the re-imposition of managerial discipline that was made possible by conservative financial disciplines.

    Now a more concerted approach was needed, one that would involve the active support of workers. It was no longer good enough simply to increase production, it was essential to produce more with greater efficiency. A new productivity and technical assistance department PTAD was created within the Marshall Plan with a budget rising from four million dollars in to 43 million in and earmarked for technical assistance—the transfer of technology and know-how.

    This was the period when American productivity consultants and efficiency experts began to descend on Europe in numbers, of them by It was also the period when study visits to America by European workers and managers moved into high gear, with 7, people crossing to the United States over the next three years.

    The productivity programme that ran for most of the next decade had a variety of elements that could be broadly grouped into three categories. At the forefront were schemes intended to increase the productivity of labour through the reorganization of the labour process and the wage system. Central to these were campaigns to spread the use of work study. Thirdly there was a broad education and information programme with a highly ideological thrust involving study visits, publications, films, and training courses designed to instil into Europeans an awareness of the virtues of a consumer oriented, mass production, managerially driven free enterprise system on the American model.

    The driving force behind the launch of the NPCs was the Benton-Moody programme under the Mutual Security Act, commonly known as Conditional Aid, which earmarked million dollars for purposes of nurturing in Europe American concepts of free enterprise. Funded largely by Marshall Plan counterpart funds, these centres were the partner bodies of the US aid. In Britain, there was no great difficulty in the transformation of the AAPC into the British Productivity Council BPC , and here the productivity programme proceeded reasonably smoothly across the full range of activities.

    Much of the teaching material used was straight from the work study courses developed by ICI, a firm not noted for its embrace of trade unions. Even so, the TUC continued to support this programme and only drew the line when the BPC proposed to introduce a work study advisory service for individual firms. For Exhibitors. For Visitors. Direction, Accommodation, Visa. Press Releases Images and Media Press contact. Basecamp of Inspiration. ISPO Brandnew.

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