The handbook of conflict resolution: theory and practice. World encyclopedia of peace. Democracy, accountability and representation. Karl, Kaiser, John J.
Shaping a new international financial system: challenges of governance in a globalizing world. John, Eatwell and Lance, Taylor, Global finance at risk: the case for international regulation. World energy assessment: energy and the challenge of sustainability. The liberalisation of Europe's electricity markets: is the environment paying the price for cheap power? North Sea offshore wind: a powerhouse for Europe: technical possibilities and ecological considerations.
German Wind Energy Institute for Greenpeace. Power for the new millennium: benefiting from tomorrow's renewable energy markets. Forum for the Future for Greenpeace. Solar energy: from perennial promise to competitive alternative. Bureau voor Economische Argumentatie for Greenpeace. David G. Kate, O'Neill, Waste trading among rich nations: building a new theory of environmental regulation. Elizabeth R. Patrick, Camiller, Transl.
The African dream: the diaries of the revolutionary war in the Congo. Sandra, Lavenex, Safe third countries: extending the EU asylum and immigration policies to central and eastern Europe.
Citation Styles for "Ballots and bullets : the elusive democratic peace"
Norbert, Both, From indifference to entrapment: the Netherlands and the Yugoslav crisis, — Daniel S. Richard N. Honey and vinegar: incentives, sanctions and foreign policy. Martha, Honey and Tom, Barry ed. Global focus: US foreign policy at the turn of the millennium. Judith, Clifton, The politics of telecommunications in Mexico: privatization and state—labour relations, — Open regionalism and the future of regional economic integration in South America.
Volume 77 , Issue 2. If you do not receive an email within 10 minutes, your email address may not be registered, and you may need to create a new Wiley Online Library account. William E. The ideas of Hans Morgenthau dominated the study of international politics in the United States for many decades.
He was the leading representative of Realist international relations theory in the last century and his work remains hugely influential in the field. In this engaging and accessible new study of his work, William E. Edward N. This is Edward Luttwak's third and arguably fi nest collection of essays.
In a challenge to the intellectual backbone of those who write about peace as something one wishes into existence through mediation and good will, Luttwak's view of warfare is bracing: "An unpleasant truth, often overlooked, is that although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political confl icts and lead to peace. He shares his thoughts in essays covering America at war and the new Bolshevism in Russia, ranging in place from the Middle East to Latin America and stops along the way to Byzantium.
Luttwak examines military reform, great powers grown small, and drugs, crime and corruption as part of the common culture of the West. Th ough his message is sometimes delivered in a light tone, he is never foolish and never trivial. Luttwak develops the bracing thesis that cease fi res and armistices in states of war, while sometimes inconclusive, are lesser evils than prospects for a nuclear meltdown. Even in arenas of geopolitical antagonism, neither Americans nor Russians have been inclined to intervene competitively in wars of lesser powers.
As a consequence, intermittent war persists; and greater dangers to the world are averted. It is no exaggeration to compare Luttwak to Clausewitz in the nineteenth century and Herman Kahn in the twentieth century. Th is volume deserves to be read and digested by all who would understand contemporary geopolitics. Similar ebooks. Who Rules the World? Noam Chomsky. Immanuel Kant. In this short essay, Kant completes his political theory and philosophy of history, considering the prospects for peace among nations and addressing questions that remain central to our thoughts about nationalism, war, and peace.
Margaret MacMillan. The century since the end of the Napoleonic wars had been the most peaceful era Europe had known since the fall of the Roman Empire. In the first years of the twentieth century, Europe believed it was marching to a golden, happy, and prosperous future. But instead, complex personalities and rivalries, colonialism and ethnic nationalisms, and shifting alliances helped to bring about the failure of the long peace and the outbreak of a war that transformed Europe and the world. The War That Ended Peace brings vividly to life the military leaders, politicians, diplomats, bankers, and the extended, interrelated family of crowned heads across Europe who failed to stop the descent into war: in Germany, the mercurial Kaiser Wilhelm II and the chief of the German general staff, Von Moltke the Younger; in Austria-Hungary, Emperor Franz Joseph, a man who tried, through sheer hard work, to stave off the coming chaos in his empire; in Russia, Tsar Nicholas II and his wife; in Britain, King Edward VII, Prime Minister Herbert Asquith, and British admiral Jacky Fisher, the fierce advocate of naval reform who entered into the arms race with Germany that pushed the continent toward confrontation on land and sea.
Here too we meet the urbane and cosmopolitan Count Harry Kessler, who noticed many of the early signs that something was stirring in Europe; the young Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty and a rising figure in British politics; Madame Caillaux, who shot a man who might have been a force for peace; and more. With indelible portraits, MacMillan shows how the fateful decisions of a few powerful people changed the course of history.
Taut, suspenseful, and impossible to put down, The War That Ended Peace is also a wise cautionary reminder of how wars happen in spite of the near-universal desire to keep the peace. The War That Ended Peace will certainly rank among the best books of the centennial crop. Those looking to understand why World War I happened will have a hard time finding a better place to start.
Elegantly written, with wonderful character sketches of the key players, this is a book to be treasured. Most studies have looked only at who is involved in the conflicts and ignored the question of who initiated the conflict. In many conflicts both sides argue that the other side was initiator. Even so, several studies have examined this.
Personalistic and military dictatorships may be particularly prone to conflict initiation, as compared to other types of autocracy such as one party states, but also more likely to be targeted in a war having other initiators. Most of this article discusses research on relations between states. However, there is also evidence that democracies have less internal systematic violence. For instance, one study finds that the most democratic and the most authoritarian states have few civil wars , and intermediate regimes the most. The probability for a civil war is also increased by political change, regardless whether toward greater democracy or greater autocracy.
Intermediate regimes continue to be the most prone to civil war, regardless of the time since the political change. In the long run, since intermediate regimes are less stable than autocracies, which in turn are less stable than democracies, durable democracy is the most probable end-point of the process of democratization Hegre et al. He finds that democide has killed six times as many people as battles.
Statistically, a MENA democracy makes a country more prone to both the onset and incidence of civil war, and the more democratic a MENA state is, the more likely it is to experience violent intrastate strife.
Moreover, anocracies do not seem to be predisposed to civil war, either worldwide or in MENA. Looking for causality beyond correlation, they suggest that democracy's pacifying effect is partly mediated through societal subscription to self-determination and popular sovereignty. Note that they usually are meant to be explanations for little violence between democracies, not for a low level of internal violence in democracies. Several of these mechanisms may also apply to countries of similar systems.
The book Never at War finds evidence for an oligarchic peace. One example is the Polish—Lithuanian Commonwealth , in which the Sejm resisted and vetoed most royal proposals for war For a description, see Frost , esp. Another that a belief in human rights may make people in democracies reluctant to go to war, especially against other democracies.
In addition, he holds that a social norm emerged toward the end of the nineteenth century; that democracies should not fight each other, which strengthened when the democratic culture and the degree of democracy increased, for example by widening the franchise. Increasing democratic stability allowed partners in foreign affairs to perceive a nation as reliably democratic.
The alliances between democracies during the two World Wars and the Cold War also strengthened the norms.
- Adrenalin Rush.
- Book Reviews - - International Affairs - Wiley Online Library.
- Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace | Foreign Affairs.
He sees less effective traces of this norm in Greek antiquity. He refers in particular to the Swiss practice of participatory democracy. In less developed countries individuals often depend on social networks that impose conformity to in-group norms and beliefs, and loyalty to group leaders. When jobs are plentiful on the market, in contrast, as in market-oriented developed countries, individuals depend on a strong state that enforces contracts equally. Cognitive routines emerge of abiding by state law rather than group leaders, and, as in contracts, tolerating differences among individuals.
Marketplace democracies thus share common foreign policy interests in the supremacy—and predictability—of international law over brute power politics, and equal and open global trade over closed trade and imperial preferences. When disputes do originate between marketplace democracies, they are less likely than others to escalate to violence because both states, even the stronger one, perceive greater long-term interests in the supremacy of law over power politics. By examining survey results from the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, the author demonstrates that liberalism in that region bears a stronger resemblance to 19th-century liberal nationalism than to the sort of universalist, Wilsonian liberalism described by democratic peace theorists, and that, as a result, liberals in the region are more , not less, aggressive than non-liberals.
Among the latter would be: having to fight, having to pay the costs of war from their own resources, having painfully to repair the devastation war leaves behind, and, to fill up the measure of evils, load themselves with a heavy national debt that would embitter peace itself and that can never be liquidated on account of constant wars in the future.
Democracy thus gives influence to those most likely to be killed or wounded in wars, and their relatives and friends and to those who pay the bulk of the war taxes; Russett , p. This monadic theory must, however, explain why democracies do attack non-democratic states. One explanation is that these democracies were threatened or otherwise were provoked by the non-democratic states.
Studies show that democratic states are more likely than autocratic states to win the wars.
One explanation is that democracies, for internal political and economic reasons, have greater resources. This might mean that democratic leaders are unlikely to select other democratic states as targets because they perceive them to be particularly formidable opponents. One study finds that interstate wars have important impacts on the fate of political regimes, and that the probability that a political leader will fall from power in the wake of a lost war is particularly high in democratic states Ray Survey results that compare the attitudes of citizens and elites in the Soviet successor states are consistent with this argument Braumoeller Moreover, these constraints are readily apparent to other states and cannot be manipulated by leaders.
Thus, democracies send credible signals to other states of an aversion to using force. These signals allow democratic states to avoid conflicts with one another, but they may attract aggression from nondemocratic states. Democracies may be pressured to respond to such aggression—perhaps even preemptively—through the use of force.
In disputes between liberal states, the credibility of their bargaining signals allows them to negotiate a peaceful settlement before mobilization. An explanation based on game theory similar to the last two above is that the participation of the public and the open debate send clear and reliable information regarding the intentions of democracies to other states.
In contrast, it is difficult to know the intentions of nondemocratic leaders, what effect concessions will have, and if promises will be kept. The risk factors for certain types of state have, however, changed since Kant's time.
In the quote above, Kant points to the lack of popular support for war — first that the populace will directly or indirectly suffer in the event of war — as a reason why republics will not tend to go to war. The number of American troops killed or maimed versus the number of Iraqi soldiers and civilians maimed and killed in the American-Iraqi conflict is indicative. This may explain the relatively great willingness of democratic states to attack weak opponents: the Iraq war was, initially at least, highly popular in the United States.
The case of the Vietnam War might, nonetheless, indicate a tipping point where publics may no longer accept continuing attrition of their soldiers even while remaining relatively indifferent to the much higher loss of life on the part of the populations attacked. Coleman examines the polar cases of autocracy and liberal democracy. In both cases, the costs of war are assumed to be borne by the people. In autocracy, the autocrat receives the entire benefits of war, while in a liberal democracy the benefits are dispersed among the people. Since the net benefit to an autocrat exceeds the net benefit to a citizen of a liberal democracy, the autocrat is more likely to go to war.
The disparity of benefits and costs can be so high that an autocrat can launch a welfare-destroying war when his net benefit exceeds the total cost of war.
Browse more videos
Contrarily, the net benefit of the same war to an individual in a liberal democracy can be negative so that he would not choose to go to war. This disincentive to war is increased between liberal democracies through their establishment of linkages, political and economic, that further raise the costs of war between them. Therefore, liberal democracies are less likely to go war, especially against each other.
Coleman further distinguishes between offensive and defensive wars and finds that liberal democracies are less likely to fight defensive wars that may have already begun due to excessive discounting of future costs. There are several logically distinguishable classes of criticism Pugh Note that they usually apply to no wars or few MIDs between democracies, not to little systematic violence in established democracies. But see List of wars between democracies. However, its authors include wars between young and dubious democracies, and very small wars.
For example, Gowa finds evidence for democratic peace to be insignificant before , because of the too small number of democracies, and offers an alternate explanation for the following period see the section on Realist Explanations. However, this can be seen as the longest-lasting criticism to the theory; as noted earlier, also some supporters Wayman agree that the statistical sample for assessing its validity is limited or scarce, at least if only full-scale wars are considered. According to one study Ray , which uses a rather restrictive definition of democracy and war, there were no wars between jointly democratic couples of states in the period from to Assuming a purely random distribution of wars between states, regardless of their democratic character, the predicted number of conflicts between democracies would be around ten.
So, Ray argues that the evidence is statistically significant, but that it is still conceivable that, in the future, even a small number of inter-democratic wars would cancel out such evidence. Douglas M. Gibler and Andrew Owsiak in their study argued peace almost always comes before democracy and that states do not develop democracy until all border disputes have been settled. The hypothesis that peace causes democracy is supported by psychological and cultural theories. Christian Welzel's human empowerment theory posits that existential security leads to emancipative cultural values and support for a democratic political organization Welzel This is in agreement with theories based on evolutionary psychology.
Several studies fail to confirm that democracies are less likely to wage war than autocracies if wars against non-democracies are included Cashman , Chapt. Some authors criticize the definition of democracy by arguing that states continually reinterpret other states' regime types as a consequence of their own objective interests and motives, such as economic and security concerns Rosato For example, one study Oren reports that Germany was considered a democratic state by Western opinion leaders at the end of the 19th century; yet in the years preceding World War I, when its relations with the United States, France and Britain started deteriorating, Germany was gradually reinterpreted as an autocratic state, in absence of any actual regime change.
Some democratic peace researchers have been criticized for post hoc reclassifying some specific conflicts as non-wars or political systems as non-democracies without checking and correcting the whole data set used similarly. Supporters and opponents of the democratic peace agree that this is bad use of statistics, even if a plausible case can be made for the correction Bremer , Gleditsch , Gowa A military affairs columnist of the newspaper Asia Times has summarized the above criticism in a journalist's fashion describing the theory as subject to the no true Scotsman problem: exceptions are explained away as not being between "real" democracies or "real" wars Asia Times Some democratic peace researchers require that the executive result from a substantively contested election.
This may be a restrictive definition: For example, the National Archives of the United States notes that "For all intents and purposes, George Washington was unopposed for election as President, both in and ". Under the original provisions for the Electoral College , there was no distinction between votes for President and Vice-President: each elector was required to vote for two distinct candidates, with the runner-up to be Vice-President. Sometimes the datasets used have also been criticized. For example, some authors have criticized the Correlates of War data for not including civilian deaths in the battle deaths count, especially in civil wars Sambanis These criticisms are generally considered minor issues.
The most comprehensive critique points out that "democracy" is rarely defined, never refers to substantive democracy, is unclear about causation, has been refuted in more than studies, fails to account for some deviant cases, and has been promoted ideologically to justify one country seeking to expand democracy abroad Haas Most studies treat the complex concept of "democracy" is a bivariate variable rather than attempting to dimensionalize the concept. Studies also fail to take into account the fact that there are dozens of types of democracy, so the results are meaningless unless articulated to a particular type of democracy or claimed to be true for all types, such as consociational or economic democracy, with disparate datasets.
Recent work into the democratic norms explanations shows that the microfoundations on which this explanation rest do not find empirical support. Within most earlier studies, the presence of liberal norms in democratic societies and their subsequent influence on the willingness to wage war was merely assumed, never measured. Moreover, it was never investigated whether or not these norms are absent within other regime-types.
Two recent studies measured the presence of liberal norms and investigated the assumed effect of these norms on the willingness to wage war. The results of both studies show that liberal democratic norms are not only present within liberal democracies, but also within other regime-types. The peacefulness may have various limitations and qualifiers and may not actually mean very much in the real world. Democratic peace researchers do in general not count as wars conflicts which do not kill a thousand on the battlefield; thus they exclude for example the bloodless Cod Wars.
However, as noted earlier, research has also found a peacefulness between democracies when looking at lesser conflicts. Liberal democracies have less of these wars than other states after Related to this is the human rights violations committed against native people , sometimes by liberal democracies. One response is that many of the worst crimes were committed by nondemocracies, like in the European colonies before the nineteenth century, in King Leopold II of Belgium 's privately owned Congo Free State , and in Joseph Stalin 's Soviet Union.
The United Kingdom abolished slavery in British territory in , immediately after the Reform Act had significantly enlarged the franchise. Of course, the abolition of the slave trade had been enacted in ; and many DPT supporters would deny that the UK was a liberal democracy in when examining interstate wars. Hermann and Kegley, Jr.
Rummel argues that the continuing increase in democracy worldwide will soon lead to an end to wars and democide , possibly around or even before the middle of this century Democratic Peace Clock n. The fall of Communism and the increase in the number of democratic states were accompanied by a sudden and dramatic decline in total warfare, interstate wars, ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, and the number of refugees and displaced persons Center for Systemic Peace One report claims that the two main causes of this decline in warfare are the end of the Cold War itself and decolonization ; but also claims that the three Kantian factors have contributed materially Human Security Report Economic historians Joel Mokyr and Hans-Joachim Voth argue that democratic states may have been more vulnerable to conquest because the rulers in those states were too heavily constrained.
Democratic peace theory is a well established research field with more than a hundred authors having published articles about it Rummel n. Imre Lakatos suggested that what he called a "progressive research program" is better than a "degenerative" one when it can explain the same phenomena as the "degenerative" one, but is also characterized by growth of its research field and the discovery of important novel facts. In contrast, the supporters of the "degenerative" program do not make important new empirical discoveries, but instead mostly apply adjustments to their theory in order to defend it from competitors.
Some researchers argue that democratic peace theory is now the "progressive" program in international relations. According to these authors, the theory can explain the empirical phenomena previously explained by the earlier dominant research program, realism in international relations ; in addition, the initial statement that democracies do not, or rarely, wage war on one another, has been followed by a rapidly growing literature on novel empirical regularities Ray , Chernoff , Harrison Many democracies become non-democratic by war, as being aggressed or as aggressor quickly after a coup , sometimes the coup leader worked to provoke that war.
Every state provides, therefore, some kind of formula for the declaration of an internal enemy. One general criticism motivating research of different explanations is that actually the theory cannot claim that "democracy causes peace", because the evidence for democracies being, in general, more peaceful is very slight or non existent; it only can support the claim that " joint democracy causes peace".
Perhaps the simplest explanation to such perceived anomaly but not the one the Realist Rosato prefers, see the section on Realist explanations below is that democracies are not peaceful to each other because they are democratic, but rather because they are similar. This has led to the hypothesis that democratic peace emerges as a particular case when analyzing a subset of states which are, in fact, similar Werner Or, that similarity in general does not solely affect the probability of war, but only coherence of strong political regimes such as full democracies and stark autocracies.
Autocratic peace and the explanation based on political similarity is a relatively recent development, and opinions about its value are varied. He concludes that autocratic peace exists, but democratic peace is clearly stronger. However, he finds no relevant pacifying effect of political similarity, except at the extremes of the scale. To summarize a rather complex picture, there are no less than four possible stances on the value of this criticism:. The capitalist peace, or capitalist peace theory, posits that according to a given criteria for economic development capitalism , developed economies have not engaged in war with each other, and rarely enter into low-level disputes.
These theories have been proposed as an explanation for the democratic peace by accounting for both democracy and the peace among democratic nations. The exact nature of the causality depends upon both the proposed variable and the measure of the indicator for the concept used. A majority of researchers on the determinants of democracy agree that economic development is a primary factor which allows the formation of a stable and healthy democracy Hegre , Weede Thus, some researchers have argued that economic development also plays a factor in the establishment of peace.
These studies indicate that democracy, alone, is an unlikely cause of the democratic peace. A low level of market-oriented economic development may hinder development of liberal institutions and values. He argues that it is not likely that the results can be explained by trade: Because developed states have large economies, they do not have high levels of trade interdependence Mousseau , p. In fact, the correlation of developed democracy with trade interdependence is a scant 0. Both World Wars were fought between countries which can be considered economically developed.
Conversely, the risk of civil war decreases with development only for democratic countries. Several studies find that democracy, more trade causing greater economic interdependence , and membership in more intergovernmental organizations reduce the risk of war. This is often called the Kantian peace theory since it is similar to Kant's earlier theory about a perpetual peace; it is often also called "liberal peace" theory, especially when one focuses on the effects of trade and democracy. The theory that free trade can cause peace is quite old and referred to as Cobdenism.
Many researchers agree that these variables positively affect each other but each has a separate pacifying effect. Weede also lists some other authors supporting this view. None of the authors listed argues that free trade alone causes peace. Even so, the issue of whether free trade or democracy is more important in maintaining peace may have potentially significant practical consequences, for example on evaluating the effectiveness of applying economic sanctions and restrictions to autocratic countries.
He argued that a pacific union of liberal states has been growing for the past two centuries. He denies that a pair of states will be peaceful simply because they are both liberal democracies; if that were enough, liberal states would not be aggressive towards weak non-liberal states as the history of American relations with Mexico shows they are. Rather, liberal democracy is a necessary condition for international organization and hospitality which are Kant's other two articles —and all three are sufficient to produce peace.
Other Kantians have not repeated Doyle's argument that all three in the triad must be present, instead stating that all three reduce the risk of war. Immanuel Wallerstein has argued that it is the global capitalist system that creates shared interests among the dominant parties, thus inhibiting potentially harmful belligerence Satana , p. Toni Negri and Michael Hardt take a similar stance, arguing that the intertwined network of interests in the global capitalism leads to the decline of individual nation states , and the rise of a global Empire which has no outside, and no external enemies.
As a result, they write, "The era of imperialist, interimperialist, and anti-imperialist wars is over. Examples of factors controlled for are geographic distance, geographic contiguity, power status, alliance ties, militarization, economic wealth and economic growth, power ratio, and political stability. These studies have often found very different results depending on methodology and included variables, which has caused criticism.
It should be noted that DPT does not state democracy is the only thing affecting the risk of military conflict. Many of the mentioned studies have found that other factors are also important. Several studies have also controlled for the possibility of reverse causality from peace to democracy. So they argue that disputes between democratizing or democratic states should be resolved externally at a very early stage, in order to stabilize the system.
Another study Reiter finds that peace does not spread democracy, but spreading democracy is likely to spread peace. A different kind of reverse causation lies in the suggestion that impending war could destroy or decrease democracy, because the preparation for war might include political restrictions, which may be the cause for the findings of democratic peace. So, they find this explanation unlikely. Note also that this explanation would predict a monadic effect, although weaker than the dyadic one [ dubious — discuss ].
This in his view makes it unlikely that variables that change more slowly are the explanation. Weart, however, has been criticized for not offering any quantitative analysis supporting his claims Ray Wars tend very strongly to be between neighboring states. He believes that the effect of distance in preventing war, modified by the democratic peace, explains the incidence of war as fully as it can be explained.
Supporters of realism in international relations in general argue that not democracy or its absence, but considerations and evaluations of power, cause peace or war. Specifically, many realist critics claim that the effect ascribed to democratic, or liberal, peace, is in fact due to alliance ties between democratic states which in turn are caused, one way or another, by realist factors.
He acknowledges that democratic states might have a somewhat greater tendency to ally with one another, and regards this as the only real effect of democratic peace. One of the main points in Rosato's argument is that, although never engaged in open war with another liberal democracy during the Cold War, the United States intervened openly or covertly in the political affairs of democratic states several times, for example in the Chilean coup of , the coup in Iran and coup in Guatemala ; in Rosato's view, these interventions show the United States' determination to maintain an "imperial peace".
Ray also argues that the external threat did not prevent conflicts in the Western bloc when at least one of the involved states was a nondemocracy, such as the Turkish Invasion of Cyprus against Greek Junta supported Cypriot Greeks , the Falklands War , and the Football War. Some realist authors also criticize in detail the explanations first by supporters of democratic peace, pointing to supposed inconsistencies or weaknesses.
Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace - Lexile® Find a Book | MetaMetrics Inc.
Arguments based on normative constraints, he argues, are not consistent with the fact that democracies do go to war no less than other states, thus violating norms preventing war; for the same reason he refutes arguments based on the importance of public opinion. Regarding explanations based on greater accountability of leaders, he finds that historically autocratic leaders have been removed or punished more often than democratic leaders when they get involved in costly wars.
Finally, he also criticizes the arguments that democracies treat each other with trust and respect even during crises; and that democracy might be slow to mobilize its composite and diverse groups and opinions, hindering the start of a war, drawing support from other authors. He finds no evidence either of institutional or cultural constraints against war; indeed, there was popular sentiment in favor of war on both sides. Instead, in all cases, one side concluded that it could not afford to risk that war at that time, and made the necessary concessions. Rosato's objections have been criticized for claimed logical and methodological errors, and for being contradicted by existing statistical research Kinsella Finally, both the realist criticisms here described ignore new possible explanations, like the game-theoretic one discussed below Risse n.
A different kind of realist criticism see Jervis for a discussion stresses the role of nuclear weapons in maintaining peace. In realist terms, this means that, in the case of disputes between nuclear powers, respective evaluation of power might be irrelevant because of Mutual assured destruction preventing both sides from foreseeing what could be reasonably called a "victory". Some supporters of the democratic peace do not deny that realist factors are also important Russett Research supporting the theory has also shown that factors such as alliance ties and major power status influence interstate conflict behavior Ray The democratic peace theory has been extremely divisive among political scientists.
It is rooted in the idealist and classical liberalist traditions and is opposed to the dominant theory of realism. In the United States, presidents from both major parties have expressed support for the theory. In his State of the Union address, then-President Bill Clinton , a member of the Democratic Party , said: "Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don't attack each other" Clinton In a press conference, then-President George W. Bush , a member of the Republican Party , said: "And the reason why I'm so strong on democracy is democracies don't go to war with each other.
And the reason why is the people of most societies don't like war, and they understand what war means I've got great faith in democracies to promote peace. And that's why I'm such a strong believer that the way forward in the Middle East, the broader Middle East, is to promote democracy. In a speech, Chris Patten , the then- European Commissioner for External Relations, said: "Inevitable because the EU was formed partly to protect liberal values, so it is hardly surprising that we should think it appropriate to speak out.
But it is also sensible for strategic reasons. Free societies tend not to fight one another or to be bad neighbours" Patten Some fear that the democratic peace theory may be used to justify wars against nondemocracies in order to bring lasting peace, in a democratic crusade Chan , p. Woodrow Wilson in asked Congress to declare war against Imperial Germany, citing Germany's sinking of American ships due to unrestricted submarine warfare and the Zimmermann telegram , but also stating that "A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations" and "The world must be made safe for democracy.
Rummel is a notable proponent of war for the purpose of spreading democracy, based on this theory. Some point out that the democratic peace theory has been used to justify the Iraq War , others argue that this justification was used only after the war had already started Russett Also, research shows that attempts to create democracies by using external force has often failed.
Those attempts which had a permanent and stable success, like democratization in Austria , West Germany and Japan after World War II , mostly involved countries which had an advanced economic and social structure already, and implied a drastic change of the whole political culture. Supporting internal democratic movements and using diplomacy may be far more successful and less costly.
Thus, the theory and related research, if they were correctly understood, may actually be an argument against a democratic crusade Weart , Owen , Russett Michael Haas has written perhaps the most trenchant critique of a hidden normative agenda Haas Among the points raised: Due to sampling manipulation, the research creates the impression that democracies can justifiably fight nondemocracies, snuff out budding democracies, or even impose democracy.
And due to sloppy definitions, there is no concern that democracies continue undemocratic practices yet remain in the sample as if pristine democracies. According to Azar Gat's War in Human Civilization , there are several related and independent factors that contribute to democratic societies being more peaceful than other forms of governments Gat :.
There is significant debate over whether the lack of any major European general wars since , is due to cooperation and integration of liberal-democratic European states themselves as in the European Union or Franco-German cooperation , an enforced peace due to intervention of the Soviet Union and the United States until and the United States alone thereafter Mearsheimer , or a combination of both Lucarelli n.
Related Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace
Copyright 2019 - All Right Reserved