Gibt es die libanesische Diaspora? (German Edition)


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The consequences are grave: The ease of access to information and communication tools has been proven to affect the development of national economies.

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According to the Worldbank, in a developing country every mobile phone per people will add 0. Digital participation is not an add-on; it is the precondition for development [6]. Digital participation means that people are able to access independent sources of information freely and without obstacles. Digital participation, however, not only requires that everybody can access information, and that people are not arrested, threatened, or interrogated for voicing their views online, digital participation also requires that people know how to use the information gleaned.

For online information to result in greater freedom, more accountability, and increased pluralism users everywhere need certain skills. In many regions of the world media savvy lags far behind the pace of technical progress [7]. With such a skill set — and despite limitations and manipulation — everybody will be able to use online information as a learning tool, for their personal growth, to build networks, and to become an active member of civil society.

Once people are able to distinguish between what is true and what is not true, the promise of the internet will come true — and everyone will have the opportunity to participate digitally! It is responsible for issues to do with information and communication technologies.

Imagine a no-name land anywhere in Africa where women and men are heavily persecuted by maroding? Nothing extraordinary, only a very realistic example of how human rights are violated and neglected. On 14th of March , Boko Haram gunmen attacked the Giwa military barracks in the Later the military regained control again.

More than people, mostly unarmed recaptured detainees were murdered. Captured in a seconds-clip of an unknown mobile user was what happened to one of the victims: The video showed a Nigerian soldier murdering an unarmed man in broad daylight. This clip came across the mailbox of Amnesty International. This user generated content, attentively verified by metadata and content analysis was used as the basis for the Amnesty International Report putting light in the atrocities in Nigeria.

Imagine an African regional powerhouse with a political, social and religious gapping between North and South. A small hate-message, a cartoon or a blasphemic comment could cause violent attacks in certain regions. This country stands in the middle of a controversial election campaign where a new president should be elected. Bad times for journalists and media?

Of course not! The current elections in Nigeria proved that the opposite is true: the quality and the way digital content is distributed makes a significant difference. It is not by hazard that those two examples come from Nigeria, a country with one of the fastest growing Internet penetration rates in Africa. The dimension of what social media could do became evident during the recent recognizable power shift. The presidential elections in Nigeria went well — for journalists, media users, and for the voters: Long before the Independent National Electoral Commission INEC shared any official polling numbers, Nigerians who had volunteered among the , electoral officers shared the regional voting results of their polling stations.

In this case, the high percentage of active and educated media users contributed to a peaceful, accountable and transparent voting process. These examples show: Citizen media and user generated content could raise political participation and accountability and simplify human rights fact-finding. Digital communication and Information is opening new ways to participate in political and social processes. It allows people to share and to connect. Non-governmental structures and journalists could use these potentials: They could directly include these new methodologies in their research process.

In addition to that, digital communication offers new opportunities to learn and to increase knowledge. In its basic structure digital communication is inclusive. It could be an effective tool to enhance development. All this is possible right now, not tomorrow.

So far the general assessment — let us take a closer look at African media reality and the current global trends which put this inclusive development target under challenges and risks. The biggest risk is censorship. The differences among African states when it comes to press freedom are tremendous. The ranking of reporters without frontiers puts Namibia on rank 17 — quite better than a lot of European states.

These countries courageously developed, shaped and liberalized their media markets. They offer a diverse and rich variety of media outlets. And they are all Middle-Income countries! Many African media outlets suffer from serious structural weaknesses: no sufficient publicity markets, no economic basis for media outlets, interferences of owners, politicians and the lack of professional skills. Those factors create certain dependencies — be it by oligarchs or politicians. This makes African media fragile in many regions: A situation that becomes even worse during conflict or war times. We have to acknowledge some alarming trends in Africa, especially in the zones of current conflicts.

Take Burundi : The political and not-yet ethical conflict there is also a war against the independent media. Since the first protest against a third turn of president Nkurunziza, the. Burundian government is offending journalists. These professional and independent media-houses are now voiceless.

During the same period the number of aggressive and violent voices in the social media grew. Voices that escalate the conflict. The head of the independent Media Association OPB Observatoire de la presse au Burundi , Innocent Muhozi, reported that journalists have been physically threatened and intimidated before this attempted putsch.

He also reported the existence of black lists with names of critical journalists. Since that day only the state broadcaster is able to broadcast — all other FM-radio-Voices have been silenced by government. In some of these countries, where religious clashes and fundamental Islamist movements grow, new legislation decision block media freedom. There is a trend to put antireligious comments and reports under the suspicion of apostasy. He also criticised some parts of the Koran. It was the first time since independence that the death penalty was applied because of apostasy. Fundamentalist groups like this, the IS, Boko Haram or others are using digital communication to a new extent.

These new asymmetric wars and conflicts pose new challenges for the affected society, the international community as well as for media development. And in Zimbabwe? On the 9th of March , the human rights activist Itai Dazamara disappeared. The EU and the African Union requested clear efforts of the Zimbabwean government to bring light to his case and to stop increasing violations of human rights in the country.

Quite remarkably, it also proves the failure by his government to provide clear and tangible solutions to an economy battered and bruised by policy ambiguity, policy inconsistency and lack of imagination. A war of Web 2. These new players question our political system, operate in a networked manner and across borders. Both use hybrid methods: they rely on traditional means of waging war, highly modern weapons, on gaining territory, military aggression.

However, propaganda and subversion, fright and publicity are likewise means of waging hybrid war. There is another new trend: creating so-to-say media. What does that mean? Multiply your media and create modern, technically attractive media. The forerunner of this global trend is Russia, where all audiovisual media are under the control of the Kremlin. There is even a new law on the access of information, also protecting whistleblowers. Nevertheless it is not possible to report critically on the policy of president Kagame.

It is not possible to critically discuss or comment his wish to prolong his mandate to a third term. The result of media-policies in hybrid and semi-authoritarian systems becomes obvious when watching or reading local media: censorship by state authorities is quite rare, intimidations and mainstreaming of people sitting in responsible media positions occur more often — and self-censorship is part of the daily life in media and among journalists. Web 2.

But on the other hand it is obvious: These Web 2. The DNA of democracy consists of structures, institutions and political parties but not of tweets, likes and shares. There is no Facebook revolution! The build-up of a multiparty democratic system is still a quite analog challenge.

Social media could be the first step towards a change but not the last — the hardest part of constructing a new order comes after the display of the cellphone went dark. The Arab Spring showed the possibilities of social media but also the weaknesses in achieving long lasting political change. But his authoritarian habits leave Egypt in the same condition as before the Arab Spring, when Mr Mubarak, another military man, ruled with an iron fist.

Many say that the repression is even worse now. The consequence is clear: Information today has a greater influence than ever on social, economic and political developments. Why is media development the key? Firstly, people can only demand their rights in a political sphere if they have access to information. And how many reports do you remember about the lack of health care in rural areas of your country? There are many social groups who do not have a voice in national media — and neither do their major concerns such as education and health. And there are still a lot of official political and unofficial social taboos: Gays and lesbians in Uganda are politically sidelined, ignored or even harassed by the media.

And in many countries reports on the health of the president or the battle of power in the second row of the state party are impossible. To free information, we — the journalists — are obligated to get our users, readers and listeners engaged — to invite them to participate in content-production.

The journalist of tomorrow will rather be a wise and neutral moderator, a curator and aggregator of content than a world-explainer. The public sphere is now operated by a small number of private companies based in Silicon Valley. And another short reminder of the facts: Facebook has 1. The social network has more than million monthly active users in Africa. According to Ericsson, a communication infrastructure company, the number of mobiles in Africa will rise to m by YouTube has a billion users and a hundred hours of video are uploaded to the platform every minute.

Twitter does now have over million users. Instagram, Snapchat, WhatsApp and WeChat are rapidly becoming default platforms for younger audiences. Internet use on mobile phones in Africa will likely increase fold in the next five years. And journalism today and tomorrow will no longer control or own the means of production or routes to distribution. For Africa this global trend creates special tasks:. How does this young generation — around 20 years — use media? What we know is: they like videos, but they do not watch TV.

And they do not read newspapers. A vast majority of them gets their news from social media — especially from Facebook. Whoever wants to get news, information or messages to these younger audiences must use web 2. It is time to wake up: this trend is a tremendous challenge for African journalists, media and media policy.

The most serious effect is that the digital gap could become deeper. And it is not only existing between the global north and the global south. To overcome these gaps means to not only work on the technical access to the Web, to create ICT-Labs and expand broad-band networks. It needs a multi-level approach: We have to work on the capacities to use media — be it the capacity to write and read or to navigate in the global jungle of sources to find the relevant ones.

And we have to work on the capacities of the producers, be it journalists or civil society to raise their voices in an effective manner to reach their audiences. And we should continue to work on the quality of journalists, with the aim that they could compete and interact in this new competition of Digital Communication. The Internet has fundamentally changed journalism at every stage: from research to production to choosing multimedia formats to tell the stories.

This requires new skills and is the reason why partners all over the world are increasingly asking for digital training. Which interactive journalism formats are the best? How can journalistic contents be better presented online? How could we integrate user generated content in our programming? These are questions which need progressive, flexible answer which are appropriate for conditions under which African media work. Having understood this link, the global North started to invest more in media development. It needs a fundamental effort to enhance independent and professional media production and to strengthen journalists, users and communities to deal with the opportunities of the new media.

Independent and pluralistic media are of paramount importance to ensure that people know their rights and are also able to claim and exercise these rights. This is why KAS and also the institution for which I work, DW-Academy, work a broad strategic approach taking the digital development in the specific region into account.

We support press councils, professional associations and media organizations so that they can clearly represent and protect their interests in discussions with political decision makers. If they all understand themselves as involved and requested in the challenge of media development, then we will get sustainable results. We share a deep conviction: media development is the key to more democratic, free and inclusive societies. Digital communication is offering new fields of action — and journalists and media should know how to deal with them!

New players are keeping world politics on edge. What role do the media play? A current perspective from Ute Schaeffer:. New asymmetric wars and conflicts pose new challenges both for the international community as well as for media development. A war of information in which media are deployed as a weapon: to publicize and frighten, to recruit and spread targeted misinformation.

Whereas from a strategic and operational standpoint, ISIS militants tend to move in the direction of statehood, Russian forces charted a different course: they showed up not as conventional troops but rather as non-state combat groups, in order to be invisible and flexible. But both use hybrid methods: they rely on traditional means of waging war, highly modern weapons, on gaining territory, military aggression.

This information offensive is the main explanation for why each month, 1, new fighters from around the world move to ISIS battlefields to offer their support. Some 15, fighters from more than 80 countries are said to be represented there — and not just from Saudi Arabia or Tunisia but also from China, Russia, Australia, and Europe. The targeted media campaign is the main reason why the Russian view of the Ukraine conflict predominates in Western media. New players like ISIS are stepping out onto the field. Other players, like the Russian state, have for several years been modifying their methods since they have come to understand: War is decided in the mind — meaning targeted media work and the viral dissemination of information and disinformation as a key weapon.

These conflict actors still use regular media, television even print products. But their information campaign relies predominantly on social media and its community-based structure and functionality. They tweet and share, they comment and communicate in order to strengthen their community and recruit new supporters.

And they use the credibility, dynamics and ubiquity of the social platforms in their aim to reach these target groups worldwide or in the conflict region itself. For the actors in the current hybrid wars there are good reasons for using the functions of the Web 2. What do the dissimilar players in these two asymmetric conflicts have in common? They rely on narratives. They need a good story in order to establish and legitimize their ideology, their course of action in the conflict, their world view.

They need models with perpetrators and victims, stories with winners and losers. These can be found in YouTube videos, in Facebook posts, in the massive numbers of polemic comments by pro-Russian trolls on media portals. Both have short-term and long-term goals: in the short term, they count on achieving narrow victories in the conflict and on gaining power and influence and enlarging their base. In the long term, however, they rely on the emergence of a new value system, a new self-understanding, aiming ultimately at an alternative identity.

Like any communication and marketing strategy they have to create a unique selling point which must be able to prevail in competition. Therefore, it has to be distinguishable and profile-endowing, attractive and joinable. And Al Qaeda did not use media and information to that extent as a weapon. Such narratives are key for the new conflict players. And to convey the message to quite different target groups; be it frustrated young users in Arab countries, or Muslims in Western Europe. A battle of narratives has started — which is not limited to the conflict regions in Syria and Iraq or in Ukraine and Russia, but is transmitted worldwide by broadband connections, Facebook communities and trolls.

Russia is waging war in Ukraine without having declared one. The Internet platform stopfake. Another fabricated report produced by the Russian media claimed to be showing a U. Army tank with a Ukrainian trident iin Eastern Ukraine. Shortly after the publication of this picture, stopfake.

Army showing the tank being tested in Texas in The original picture has no Ukrainian trident. In its propaganda campaign, the Kremlin started lumping together all players under one roof as early as the Maidan protests: it was said that the demonstrations were the work of fascists and outlaws and Ukraine must not be left to the Nazis. We see the rampage of reactionary forces, nationalist and anti-Semitic forces going on in certain parts of Ukraine, including Kiev.

The democracy movement on Maidan Square as a deadly threat of war which however can be overcome by Russia just like it did before. Such interpretations spread quickly on the Internet. An anti-Russian junta. It is impossible to negotiate with the new power in Ukraine or to agree on anything. Even during Soviet times, there was never such a massive propaganda campaign as that unleashed against Ukraine. What is missing are journalistic fundamentals — among journalists themselves and among the broadcasters and media outlets for which they work.

Just one obvious example of this: in order to verify the official numbers of victims or wounded, journalists would only need to research at hospitals, but instead the reporting of official statements is predominant. This is accompanied by a false understanding of patriotism. And this is why most Ukrainians live in a virtual reality which is a far cry from the one in Donbass, Eastern Ukraine.

And if someone dares to say anything different, they risk paying a high price — like the famous Ukrainian TV presenter, Savik Shuster. In terms of their structure and intent, the Ukrainian responses are as unilateral, aggressive and exclusive as their Russian counterparts — but their content, technical quality and distribution cannot compete with the dominant Russian TV.

Official communication and media in Ukraine are responding to the Russian military campaign by imitating the Russian formats and structures. In a year we have created a strong army which courageously protects us in Donbass. Moreover, in November , Ukraine set up a Ministry for Information. The media has become the key player in this information war which started long before the first shots were fired. Media coverage paved the way for the military operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine that followed shortly after the Maidan protests. Independent online media like Lenta. The Russian social-networking website Vkontakte made the same experience.

The mainstreaming and censoring of the Web and Web 2. However, all this changed dramatically in The Kremlin has increased censorship, prohibited the free flow of data and undermined freedom of expression. But what is defined as being extremist? No one has provided a comprehensive definition yet. Several months later, another law was passed which requires all web-based writers with posts that exceed 3, page views to register with the government. And that by using media, politics can be accomplished and that domestic and foreign policy interests can be enforced.

All wide-reach channels are in line with the Kremlin, all independent voices efficiently suppressed. And outside the country, the media campaign is based on high-gloss products like Russia Today — and on an effective propaganda army — the trolls — using the Web 2. The headquarters of this armada are situated in St.

It currently employs about people. This is exactly how the Russian trolls act: they comment on reports by Western media — in English, German or French. The Kremlin has invested a lot into these Web 2. The Web 2. This second target aims at demoralizing the enemy, be it Western media, Western policy, Western public opinion.

In the programs of Russia Today, conspiracy theories and simple disinformation co-exist peacefully with professionally-produced journalistic products. This makes it difficult for users to differentiate between truth and fiction. This is one example of how intensively planned and coordinated information and disinformation is used. Using one-way regular media it is quite easy to create a persuasive, dominant and attractive image: this role is played by glossy TV channel Russia Today targeting foreign audiences and by the video agency Ruptly which was created in Using these media, the Kremlin disseminates to the world its view of things: it influenced Western reporting about the Ukraine crisis to fit its needs, and via its Russian media won the propaganda war in the eastern areas of Ukraine.

An investment that is paying off: In the nine years since it was founded, Russia Today has surpassed CNN in its reach. With nearly 1. Weiss describes this propaganda as a crucial tool used by Russia to conduct its foreign policy. This strategy is working, as can be seen in the reporting by German media on the war in Ukraine. Here, there are persistent images and stories claiming that radical right-wing individuals in Kiev run the government, that the Maidan protests were nothing but a campaign by Western countries, not to mention the blanket opinion that Ukrainians are incapable of statehood.

These are all assertions and narratives that have their roots in Russian sources, whether public media or users on social media. The globalization of ISIS was only possible because of the digital communication we have today. Take the year-old Arid Uka, a young man from Kosovo living in Frankfurt, working as a temporary worker at the airport.

He carried out the first terror attack in Germany in March that could not be prevented by security forces. In this attack Arid Uka killed two men. How could that happen? How can we tell who is likely to turn in a short space of time from a normal next-door guy into a home-grown terrorist supporting the ideas of ISIS or other radical organizations? These are people who feel discriminated and marginalized in their own societies, they feel misunderstood and isolated. Their only way out of this is the Internet.

So they seek out like-minded people in chat rooms, connect with peer groups on Facebook, Twitter and other platforms. The group dynamics develop a virtual reality in which young people easily become receptive to ISIS propaganda. Terrorism is a form of persuasive communication. Digital media play a key role for ISIS — being a persuasive form of advertising. Over the years they have learned to use them very professionally. While they once used VHS and audiotapes to convey their messages, they now harness the power of modern technology.

Their messages are tailor-made for different target groups. And they use all Web 2. The narrative is clear: You live in an unjust society which offers you no perspective. Join us. Here you can become someone. This is the common rhetoric they use beyond their boundaries. However, within their scope of operations they use a different language and different topics including their claim that Saudi Arabia is not sufficiently Islamic as well as their fight against this shift in the society towards Western values and life-styles. Another topic is their fight against the Shiites which they proudly present in videos, one showing prisoners kissing the hands and feet of ISIS fighters who freed them from captivity in the Syrian city of Idlib.

What we need to realize in order to understand the importance of media for ISIS is that ISIS is more than a group of terrorist militants or a run-of-the-mill terror organization. On the contrary, it is a novel attempt to form a state in accordance with jihadist ideology. This is extremely important for understanding the complex structures of ISIS and particularly its media tools.

For ISIS, media are an integral part of its jihadist undertaking to form a state. ISIS deploys a lot of money and know-how for its information campaigns and furnishes itself with an array of its own media companies:. If you look at the media trends, it is obvious that Web. There is a constant increase in the usage of social media by young people. The current Reuters Institute Digital News Report comes to the result that the use of smartphones and tablets has jumped significantly in the past year, with fewer people using their computers for news.

The ISIS media makers understand the global accessibility and attractiveness of social media for young people — and they understand that those young people are frustrated, fascinated with violence, and yearn for support and belonging, and they deploy the power of images in a targeted manner. This is why social media play such an important role. In this virtual community they attain the social relevance they do not have in their real social surroundings. This is explains why social media are becoming a dominant source of news among young users.

ISIS media makers understand these effects and they adapt their media strategy, using all functionalities of Web 2. ISIS content is distributed by their own media and shared by social media — like the news on the liberation of a prison in Bagdad in April , or video testimonials on war progresses in Syria or Iraq or on general video channels like Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or others. Make information snackable: adapt your content to different target groups The information strategy of ISIS is extremely dynamic and is constantly being enhanced.

Their media makers are adaptive and highly professional when it comes to successfully disseminating digital information: Use the media of your target group, speak to them in their language, be open to connecting, create a community and get it involved! The message is packaged differently for each user group: clean and bloodless for Western users, brutal and bloody for users in the embattled countries.

The video showing the execution of James Foley in captivity since November which has so far been viewed 1. Dressed in an orange Guantanamo jumpsuit, Foley declared the U.

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Then the image went dark. Not one drop of blood was to be seen. The beheading in front of a live camera was probably simulated. In the videos targeting Arabic users, the language is completely different: as in the video showing the murder of rebellious members of the Sheitat clan near the Syrian city of Deir al-Zour — and their brutality is unmatched.

Here, the aim is: fear and subjugation. That worked well — in many Syrian and Iraqi villages, people surrendered to the terrorist militants even though they outnumbered them. ISIS uses social networks in way that no other terrorist group has done before. It has long overcome the language barrier in these media campaigns, content can be found in all important languages, including German and English.

Using the hashtag mujatweets, not only Arabic but also German fighters talk about the supposedly wonderful life at the front. And role models like the Berlin rapper Denis Cuspert who became an Islamist and jihadist role model on the Internet, reinforce this. Radicalization today no longer occurs in mosques but rather in front of the home computer. Social networks create a new public space on the Internet. Whereas these communities play only a marginal role in the social life of society and often live on its verges, an isolated, extremist community is emerging on the Internet.

The common assumption was that this is not a general problem but a case for the police. Asymmetric wars are the wars of the future. They call into question the international order and state integrity. The election model of Republic of Macedonia was subjected to several changes, converting from majority through combined model up to purely proportional election model. Until the election of members of the Parliament of RM was carried out according to the majority model, which is disputed today as a model according to which the diaspora votes for its representatives in the National Parliament of RM.

The majority election model was used in the first two election cycles in independent RM. Because of the noted increase in newly formed parties, the following elections were conducted according to the combined model majority — proportional , before finally the proportional model was implemented being used even today Biljali In the short period of 23 years independency, Macedonia did not use just one election model, so there was no enough time and opportunities for weaknesses and qualities of these election models to be indicated.

Defining the election model and the method of appointment of mandates is of great significance for a democratic state. It is even more significant for a new state which strives toward democracy as Republic of Macedonia does. The election model may provide answers to the following challenges:. Every election model does not fit every society and it is hard to compare experiences of other states with completely different constitution in order to select the right election model.

The State Election Commission of RM is important for implementation of the election processes and bearer of many responsibilities. The Ministry of Justice of RM is a state administration authority with the following competencies:. In the category obligations and tasks of the Ministry of Justice, among others, is the obligation of building and conducting effective and modern election system in the frames of legal society in which the citizens of RM can realize their rights and freedoms Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Justice - It is also a representative body comprised of — representatives elected by the citizens of Republic of Macedonia through direct, general and free elections.

The Parliament as a legislative house brings, i. It has the potential to influence the election policy and actively act in the consideration of the election policy instruments as well as the defining of the budget needed for its implementation. In view of the elections, the act of announcing elections which defines the terms and course of the electing activities is brought by the President of the Parliament Daskalovski and Risteska ; Electoral Code; Constitution of RM; Parliament of RM.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of RM has important role in terms of implementation of the elections in the diaspora that, through the diplomatic missions abroad, contacts with Macedonian migrants with regard to provide information about the elections, manner of registration and voting etc. The Macedonian diaspora is comprised of migrants who left their homeland due to economic, political or various other reasons.

The emigration happened in several major waves, which are actually continuous and have not finished even today. The first major waves of emigration happened within the ethnic frames of Macedonia beginning at the end of the XIX and the beginning of the XX century during the Balkan Wars , then in the period of the two world wars.

At the time of Ottoman rule at the Balkans, ethnicity was an unfamiliar concept, so the term Macedonia, i. Macedonians refers to a geographical term Kostov Macedonia in that period is a geographic region, comprised of Vardar, Aegean and Pirin Macedonia. There are files in the USA about the wave of Macedonian migrants where they declare as Macedonians, listing Macedonia, Bulgaria, Turkey as their country of origin Makedonska Nacija The second phase of emigrating waves started in and continues even today, among which the biggest are in the period of s and s as well as s immediately after RM seceded from SFRY in the period of transition Migracionen profil na RM The data on the number and structure of Macedonian migrants are not precise and concrete.

The scarcity of data about the emigration of Macedonian citizens is due to the length of the process of emigration of Macedonian citizens. Namely, the emigration lasts for more than a century. Republic of Macedonia, even within the frames of SFRY and today, maintains an active contact with its migrants. Usually the link between the migrants and their homeland is carried out through the establishment and registration of Macedonian Migrant Associations, which participate in preserving Macedonian tradition, language and culture among the migrants in the accepting states.


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With respect to the political activity of the Macedonian diaspora, the enthusiasm for voting at the referendum of independence of RM is obvious. Der Emir gibt Gas. Qatar und Medien. In: HR2 Kultur, Carola Richter. Juli findet keine Sprechstunde statt. In der vorlesungsfreien Zeit: Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Konstanz: UVK. Norderstedt: BoD. Jugend im Nahen Osten und Nordafrika. Die FES-Jugendstudie.


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  5. Bonn: Verlag J. Transnationale Zirkulationen im Kontext von Kolonialismus und Globalisierung. In: Averbeck-Lietz, Stefanie Hrsg. Transnationale Perspektiven. Wiesbaden: VS, S. Eine Region im Umbruch. In: Niehoff, Mirko Ed. Berlin: Wochenschau-Verlag, S. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, S. Grenzen neutraler Berichterstattung. In: Sonntag, Karlheinz Ed. Konstanz: UVK, S. In: Guaaybess, Tourya ed. Houndmills: PalgraveMacmillan, pp. Theorie, Prozess, Politikfelder, Regionen.

    Opladen: UTB, S. Observations, portraits and commentary on a newly emerging media landscape. Berlin: MICT, pp. Means, objectives and effects. In: Johannsen, Margret et al. In: Jecker, Constanze Eds.

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    Analysen und Perspektiven. Konstanz: UVK, pp. In: Sieprath, Maud E. In: Hafez, Kai ed. Power and Weakness. New York: Continuum, pp. The U.

    Gibt es die libanesische Diaspora? (German Edition) Gibt es die libanesische Diaspora? (German Edition)
    Gibt es die libanesische Diaspora? (German Edition) Gibt es die libanesische Diaspora? (German Edition)
    Gibt es die libanesische Diaspora? (German Edition) Gibt es die libanesische Diaspora? (German Edition)
    Gibt es die libanesische Diaspora? (German Edition) Gibt es die libanesische Diaspora? (German Edition)
    Gibt es die libanesische Diaspora? (German Edition) Gibt es die libanesische Diaspora? (German Edition)
    Gibt es die libanesische Diaspora? (German Edition) Gibt es die libanesische Diaspora? (German Edition)

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