Like Doug Zawisza, Djeljosevic was impressed by Stuart Immonen's ability to effectively render different subjects, from sleepy seaside Canadian towns to superhero battles, and remarking, "Immonen is easily the most versatile artist in comics, who will surely go down as one of the greats with his striking layouts and dynamic, varied panel to panel storytelling.
Immonen reminds me of the old-school Marvel Comics artists, who were capable of delivering strong, consistent work every month with little need for fill-ins. Just sit back, relax, and enjoy the mayhem. Schedeen also thought Immonen's wide, cinematic panels were "top-notch", and Laura Martin's colors "characteristically lush and beyond reproach", but thought Wade von Grawbadger's inks were thicker and slightly less precise than on his previous New Avengers work. However, Schedeen rated three of the following four issues a "Good" or "Okay" 6.
Evans felt the book utilized its scene-jumping structure to properly explore the expansive, global impact of the Worthy as a legitimate threat, and that both Bucky 's death and Loki's humorous dialogue were well-handled. However, Evans decried the too-straightforward treatment of Sin's setup, and the lack of Fraction's usual subtext in issue 3 which he graded "B-". Stell called it a "crappy" series based on a "thin" concept that warranted neither seven issues nor the copious tie-in books. The reviewers thought the art and colors were vibrant and detailed, and Immonen the perfect choice for the series, though Stell thought it looked a bit rushed in issue 6, and not up to Immonen's usual standards in issue 7.
Jesse Schedeen of IGN gave Fear Itself: Sin's Past 1 a "Mediocre" rating of 5 out 10, saying that the issues chosen for reprinting were not the ideal ones from which readers could learn about the character , as the character's first appearances did not feature her disfigured, skull-like appearance, did little to flesh out her character and the modern and because the bold, modern coloring did not mesh with Al Milgrom 's soft pencils, whose detailing of Rich Buckler 's layouts issue were inconsistent in quality to begin with.
Schedeen gave Fear Itself: The Worthy 1 an "Okay" rating of 6 out of 10, opining that while the origin stories, they were not particularly memorable, owing to their limited page space, that Sin's segment was a rehash of the Book of the Skull prologue, and that while the Hulk and Thing segments were outstanding in terms of the writing by Greg Pak and Roberto Aguirre-Sacasa and the artwork by Lee Weeks and Javier Pulido , the entire book was available for free on Comixology. He called the first four issues "brilliant", repeatedly lauding their consistent excellence from month to month, and naming the series one of Marvel's best comics, saying the first issue was the best one of the year thus far.
Evans described Gillen's child Loki story as "perfection", and hailed Gillen's ability to tie in seemingly digressive elements as thematically relevant, his issue structure and his facility for narration and dialogue, as well as the humor, adventure and characterization. Arsenault cited Loki's "heroically comic" scene-stealing, and aside from not enjoying the visuals in the flashback sequence as much whose purpose he conceded he understood , he thought the book a "hoot" that new readers would enjoy.
Lindsay of Comic Book Resources gave 4 out of 5 stars to issues , and , and 3. The reviewers praised the intelligence, structure and "cerebral" narrative of Gillen's of Thor and Loki's new relationship set against Asgardian politics, calling it a "glorious tale", and an improvement over his previous Thor work. Also mentioned were Gillen's whimsical captions, "tight dialogue" and his ability to plant narrative seeds and follow through purposefully with winding plot twists. They also noted Braithwaite's "intricate", "amazing art" and Arreola's colors, and how this lent itself to depicting Loki's various moods.
Johnston praised the book for the complexity in which it elevated Loki as a more impressive character than Thor. He compared it to the "Wiz Kids" segment of the Simpsons episode " Treehouse of Horror XII ", and applauded its humor, emotion, the rendition of the different sides of Volstagg's personality, and the manner in which guest artist Rich Elson's refined, precise pencils addressed the previous problems Schedeen perceived in the series.
In addition to the book's appropriately non-colloquial dialogue among the gods, Colombo felt that because of the much-needed characterization to the Serpent, which Colombo felt the main miniseries lacked, he would be more invested in re-reading that miniseries. He felt Pasqual Ferry's art was hit-or-miss, however. Norris felt the transition from a young Odin to aged one was handled poorly, criticized the rendition of the Worthy as the contemporary characters that are possessed by them in the miniseries.
Alex Evans, reviewing New Avengers 14 and 15 for Weekly Comic Review, graded them "A-" and "B", calling the first issue the best since the series' first story arc, due to writer Brian Michael Bendis' intimate character work with Mockingbird , and artist Mike Deodato 's ability to capture the most subtle nuances of emotion in facial expressions.
Regarding the next issue, Evans thought that while it was not as compelling as the previous one, Bendis nonetheless fleshed out Squirrel Girl into a "fully realized, sympathetic character", disproving his initial expectations upon learning that it focused on Squirrel Girl. Though he was impressed with the story's ability to stand on its own without requiring reading a different title, he did not care for its reliance on coincidence.
McElhatton also enjoyed Scot Eaton's pencils, in particular his rendition of Beast and of the fight scenes, but noted that Adi Granov 's cover to the book included a number of characters not in it. Evans also called Scot Eaton's art "incredibly polished, detailed, and high budget", as seen in both the attack on Washington, DC and the character's reactions to it. Evans said the book fulfilled all the criteria for a good tie-in book, including a message that avoided being overly sentimental or silly. Ray Tate gave 5 out of 5 bullets to Avengers Academy 15, but only three bullets to issue Conceding he was disinterested in the crossover's core miniseries, he nonetheless liked Christos Gage 's exploration of Tigra in Academy 15, but thought issue 16 to be a "mixed bag", saying that while the creative team succeeded in making the Veil story resonant, the drama of the Absorbing Man and Titania did not engage him, despite being technically good.
He also thought the art was effective, but was not enamored of what he thought was an overly-highlighted coloring style. Schedeen felt the series overall suffered from lack of focus on the entire team. Ray Tate of Comics Bulletin gave 2 out of 5 bullets to Fear Itself: Youth in Revolt 1, attributing this to confusing plotting, implausible behavior on the part of bit characters and lack of independence from the core miniseries.
Schedeen likened the depiction of the low point of the Initiative's crisis to the classic Marvel Team-Up 41 in which Spider-Man was trapped under tons of rubble. Schedeen consistently had kind words for Norton's "clean, expressive pencils". Though he advised readers that it was not essential to the crossover, he enjoyed it more than the first two issues of the core miniseries. He felt the riots, however, marred the story, as he did not think them a believable reaction to "fear".
He also said that Norton's art was a "recipe for success". Also singled out was his tying up of the Detroit Steel rivalry from the "Stark Resilient" storyline, and the development of Potts and Cabe. Evans questioned, however, the pacing in issue , and the use of runes for dwarven profanity in Stell also took notice of Bettie Breitweiser's colors and lighting, which she felt were the only ones that depicted the Worthy in a way that they did not appear to be " Tron -rejects".
Joshua Yehl of IGN gave Fear Itself: Hulk vs Dracula 1 an "Okay" rating of 6 out of 10, citing the dull, formulaic nature of the conflict, which was already seen in numerous other tie-in books. While Yehl thought Ryan David Stegman 's settings were solid and featured intricately detailed backgrounds, the character work failed to inspire awe or fear.
Reviewing Fear Itself: The Black Widow , Kelly Thompson of Comic Book Resources criticized the in media res structure, saying that instead of the payoff demanded by such an approach, the result is an "eye-rolling deus ex machina-like cheat that in any movie-theater would illicit [ sic ] vocal groans. Tate attributed the narrative's fluidity to Peter Nguyen's character designs, which he compared to Peter Chung 's Aeon Flux , and also applauded Veronica Gandini's colors.
Despite thinking that the citizens depicted were a bit too archetypal, he felt issue 1 properly covered the effects of the Serpent on the populace that were ignored by Fear Itself 2 that week, including those inflicted on Spider-Man that formed a classic set of insurmountable circumstances for him that rivaled his fight with Morlun in the " The Other " storyline.
Schedeen felt Mike McKone's art was clean and cinematic, but varied between his familiar style and a flat, minimalist one in issue 1. Though issue 2 improved on this, he felt aspects of it were flat and rushed in issue 3. Jonah Jameson. He nonetheless perceived problems in continuity and in the behavior of the mob attacking the Iranian cabbie. He also thought McKone's art was solid and effective, despite occasional problems in body proportions. Though Hunt questioned the book's choice of villain, he was interested enough to see how the story's use of that villain would develop.
He criticized the destruction of New Atlantis, without any mention of Utopia , which was supported by New Atlantis. He also thought that the development of Namor, while potentially interesting, did not entirely work. Though he suggested that Defenders fans would enjoy the book's improvised incarnation of that team, and Lee Garbett's art clear and enjoyable, there was little to either complain about or distinguish it.
Tate also liked the creative team's design of the demons, and their rendition of the cast and their heroics. While Schedeen thought Garbett's art was "functional, if a little cramped" in the underwater scenes, he perceived a sharp divide in quality between his cover and interior work, and the colors to be too dim. Zawisza criticized the Speedball story for a too-weighty collection of elements that threatened to stall it, and for artist Mike Mayhew 's over-reliance on photo reference. Zawisza criticized Peter Milligan 's Agents of Atlas story for lacking "pizzazz", a clear direction and consistent characterization, but found Elia Bonetti 's art a nice transition between Mayhew's and Howard Chaykin 's.
Zawisza found the J. Jonah Jameson story "little more than a one-page filler", though useful in reminder the reader of Jameson's presence in the Marvel Universe. Zawisza found Pepe Larraz 's art in the Broxton, Oklahoma story to be energetic and clean, and his characters believable. Overall, Zawisza felt the book did not add to "Fear Itself", but was a "nice" read, even if not a "must-read".
Schedeen also enjoyed the story and art of Agents of Atlas, thought the inclusion of the J. Jonah Jameson tale was "bizarre", and felt Jim McCann's Broxton story explored the human element, if not memorably, and that overall, the book was not essential reading. Stell consistently denounced Greg Land 's art, which, despite exhibiting good linework and a cinematic style, suffered, according to Stell, from over-reliance on photo reference, and constant reuse of a limited number of poses and facial expressions, in particular the same face used for all the female characters.
Stell also was unimpressed with Land's storytelling, his questionable choice in depicting Cyclops with beard stubble and putting Emma Frost in a cowgirl outfit for no discernible reason, and with Justin Ponsor's color palette and overabundance of highlights. Regarding the writing, he thought the first issue had an average story, and the next two were "pretty good", but disliked the final issue.
Although he loved the thrashing that Colossus gave Juggernaut after decades of stories in which the latter dispatched the former, he disliked the Namor - Emma Frost romance, the Kitty -Peter drama, and Cyclops' haughty demeanor toward the Mayor of San Francisco. Hunt felt that Fear Itself: Uncanny X-Force 1, however, was one of the stronger tie-in books, opining that writer Williams, Rob lived up to the standard set by regular X-Force writer Rick Remender , exhibiting a similar density of ideas, well-pitched character work, and the same "fun" of that book, without aping Remender's writing style.
However, Hunt felt the story suffered from being almost unrelated to the core "Fear Itself" storyline, and criticized the lack of clarity over the identity of the "unknown superhero" in danger, stating that it failed to invest the reader in his fate. Hunt also felt that Simone Bianchi 's art was looser than on his Astonishing X-Men run, and criticized his lack of backgrounds, but enjoyed his intricate visuals and his restrained rendering. Hunt was pleased with Fear Itself: Wolverine 1, in particular its depiction of Wolverine and Melita's relationship, and their contrasting views on informational freedom.
Though he saw potential in the otherwise generic S. While Hunt felt artist Roland Boschi made writer Seth Peck's heavy exposition effective, and found Dan Brown's colors serviceable, he found little inspiring about the book artistically. Nonetheless, while he felt that Peck's focus on the power of fear over rationality, and the buildup of Melita's panic were well-done, he felt her journey through Manhattan to be somewhat aimless, a major plot point dispensed with via a poor plot device, and the final page a letdown.
Stell also opined that all of the stories by different creators in the anthology issue were good Parker's Underbolts story in particular. However, he criticized the rehashing of material in issue that was covered in the main miniseries, and Marvel editorial, however for inconsistency in Man-Thing's appearances in different books of the crossover. Stell enjoyed Kev Walker and Declan Shalvey's illustration of individual issues, an improvement over pre-crossover attempts on their part to share the duties, citing Walker's inking in particular, but was slightly disappointed by Valentine de Landro and Matthew Southworth's art, whose storytelling clarity was not substandard in areas, and whose overly buxom depiction of Moonstone clashed with Walker and Shalvey's.
Nguyen appreciated that the minor connection to the crossover did not hijack the book's in-progress storyline, which was filled with action and humor, though he felt the writing in the latter two issues was hurried and underdeveloped. Nguyen praised penciler Neil Edwards' clean, detailed art, and how his design of the mythic characters, combined both classical and modern elements. He also complimented Scott Hanna's inks and Jesus Aburtov's colors.
Regarding issue 2, he thought Montclare's exposition of Frankenstein's whereabouts since the s was intelligent, and Ryan Bodenheim's art strong, but thought Montclare's characterization of Nighthawk gratuitous and implausible, and found Bisley's art "scratchy, unattractive and often confusing". Danny Djeljosevic and Nick Hanover of Comics Bulletin gave 3 out of 5 bullets to Alpha Flight 1, seeing its tie-in to "Fear Itself" as a forced way to use the crossover to gain attention for that team, while only paying lip service to the crossover's storyline.
They also complained about the heavy handed opening scenes, the lack of exposition that would make "Fear Itself" aspects of the story confusing to readers of the trade paperback and problematic characterizations of Shaman and Snowbird. The reviewers were both disappointed with the art, with Hanover criticizing Dale Eaglesham for "the worst artistic interpretation of Vancouver I've ever seen". Norris also praised Fraction's handling of Spider-Man.
He was disappointed with Adam Kubert 's art, however, in spite of the fact that he is a fan of Kubert, finding the artist's choice of panel layout and composition perplexing. Joey Esposito of IGN gave a 7 out of 10 "Good" rating to Fear Itself: The Fearless 1, saying that while it is not essential reading, nor an enticement to read the crossover, it provided a fun, enjoyable setup for ongoing stories featuring Sin and Valkyrie, despite some instances of flat dialogue.
Esposito also noted the strengths and weaknesses of artists Paul Pelletier , Danny Miki , Matthew Wilson and Mark Bagley , saying, "Neither artist completely nails it out of the park to the best of their ability, but the book gets well enough to entice the reader's eyeballs. The "Fear Itself" storyline is adopted in the second season of the online game Marvel: Avengers Alliance.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Comic Book Resources. The New York Times. Retrieved September 21, Weekly Comic Book Review. Comic Shop News December Comic Book Roundup. Retrieved September 29, Daily News. USA Today. Bleeding Cool. MTV Geek. Digital Spy. Comics Bulletin. Avengers Vol. Dracula, Part 1" Fear Itself: Hulk vs.
Dracula 3 — Review". March 17, Page 2 of 2. May 4, June 1, July 6, Force S. The second Brigade followed immediately behind, and the third brigade arrived on the 2nd tide. This method of the assault proceeded according to this plan, would provide for army formations arriving on the Far Shore, with their basic organization intact. If, for example, the "O" landing party had attacked with two R. As it was, each division and each corps was to land during the period of assault, follow up and build up, in accordance with the planned order of battle. The main burden of cracking the German coastal defenses developed on the assaulting army formations which were to land in the order just described, with the assistance, however, of naval and air support to be made available.
The order of events during the initial landings was envisaged in general, as follows:. During the last 40 minutes, before the first wave of infantry hit the beach that is before H-hour , the Navy and the Air Force were to drench the landing beaches with the maximum weight of fire power, employing all manner of ships, craft, and special weapons, in this bombardment;. Leading the infantry onto the beach, DD tanks 1 were to land at H minus 10 minutes; c.
Behind the DD tanks, landing at H-hour, were to be more tanks medium sized , borne in special landing craft, LCT A 's, which were so constructed that the tanks could begin firing while still aboard. Behind the L. A s, and landing at H plus one minute, the first waves of infantry were to be landed in L.
P s, or other very small landing craft types; e. These were to clear paths through the German beach obstacles. H-hour was so timed that the tide would be one to two hours below the outermost row of obstacles. The NCDU were to clear several paths through these obstacles, by working on the exposed open beaches against the time allowed by the rapidly rising tide.
Behind the NCDU's, more infantry, more tanks, light artillery, beach equipment, and all the other accoutrements of war, were to land in successive waves in accordance with the general pattern of the army attack plan described above.
Men, Women and the Renegotiation of British Citizenship During the Great War
The accompanying sketches, taken from the Operation Orders of Force S, show a typical naval deployment for a landing on a two battalion front. These were to give the infantry crossing the open beaches special heavy fire power. The time originally selected for the assault was May There were three reasons for selecting May:. The weather in the channel would normally be unsuitable for amphibious landings on the French coast prior to approximately 15 April; b. It was desirable to open the operation as early in the season as possible, to give the army the longest possible stretch of good weather for campaigning on the far shore; c.
The original target date had therefore been 1 May. When it was decided in March to increase the scale of the assault from a three division to a five division basis, the target date was postponed for a month, as 1 May was too early to permit the assembly, training and preparation of the additional two assault forces. The selection of the time of day for the assault involved the balancing of several requirements.
From the Naval point of view, it was desirable that the sea approach to the enemy shore should be made during darkness but it was also preferable that the assault should be made during daylight. Darkness was required during the approach, to prevent the Germans from employing usual observation for their guns during the period of several hours when oncoming forces, and especially the minesweepers, would be within range of German coastal batteries.
To allow bombarding forces a period of at least 40 minutes of pre H-hour aimed counter battery bombardment; b. To achieve the density of landing envisaged by the army; and c. Give time for clearance of the beach obstacles which the Germans had installed along the beaches. From the army point of view, on the other hand, it was preferable that the main assault should take place just before dawn, in order to obtain darkness during the first crossing of the beaches, and daylight for the capture and exploitations of beach defenses.
Airborne forces could be landed by day or night, but if they were landed by night a quarter moon was required. Gliders required daylight for the take off; dusk or darkness for the landing. It was therefore essential to land the paratroops at night and to land the main glider borne forces in the early hours of daylight.
From the air point of view, daylight was not required for preliminary saturation bombing, but was essential for the beach drenching bombing, required immediately before the assault. The time of assault had also to be established with reference to tidal conditions. From the army point of view, it seemed advisable to land on an incoming tide near high tide with two high tides during daylight, the follow-up forces could be completely discharged before darkness of D-day; and the time required for the soldiers to cross the exposed beaches would be reduced to the minimum.
From the naval point of view, on the other hand, first landings near low tide would permit the first wave of landing boats to beach below the outer most obstacles, and the obstacle clearance parties would then have an c. The timing of H-hour was also affected by the condition of the tide around the Calvados Rocks, which lay off Juno Beach. At low tide, there would not be sufficient depth of water to permit the assault boats to pass over them. A rising tide, and sufficiently high water was required for their passage.
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After taking into account all these factors, it was decided that H-hour should be between one to three hours after extreme low tide, and 30 minutes to minutes after civil twilight dawn. The differences in the gradients of the eastern and western beaches, and the existence or a greater tidal area on the Western beaches which accommodated more rows of beach obstacles, made it seem necessary to set H-hour for different times for the various forces. In the U. Western sector H-hour was set for shortly after the turn of the tide.
British Forces G and S set their H-hour about an hour later, while Force J, which had the Calvados rocks to contend with, set its H-hour an additional 25 minutes later. It was necessary also that D-day should be a day when the conditions, above described, prevailed, following a night with not more than half moon. There would be only six days during the month of June when all these conditions would be fulfilled. These were: 1 the 5th, 6th and 7th of June; and 2 the 18th, 19th and 20th of June.
D-day was, therefore, to be designated on the first of these six days, during which the weather would be suitable for landing. The Navy required a day on which the wind should not exceed Force 3 onshore or Force 4 offshore, when there would be a minimum of swell in the channel with visibility not below 2 miles. Actually, in , during the 18, 19 and 20th of June, the greatest summer storm on record broke.
In view of the promise to Russia to launch an invasion in May, General Marshall had wished D-day to be 31 May or earlier. Tidal-Luna-day break factors would have permitted landings only on the 8th, 9th, or 10th May on the 22nd, 23rd or 24th May. The army required that the weather preceding the landings should be sufficiently dry so that the movement of Heavy Vehicles brought ashore would not be clogged by mud.
It was therefore obvious that the probability of all these weather requirements being met on any one of the six possible days of landing in June was extremely remote. NEPTUNE sailings were required to begin on D minus 6, but as weather could be predicted only 24 hours in advance, the operation would have to be set in motion on the assumption that while a designated day would be D-day, the operation would have to be postponed if the weather at H minus 24 was predicted for D-day as unsuitable. The postponement plan provided that, if the operation were to be postponed for one day or two days, the new D-day H-hour would be promulgated by radio.
All vessels at sea would then backtrack along their previous route of advance. When they had lost sufficient time, they would face around and advance on the new time table. Small craft would, if possible, make for the nearest port. These were designated in advance to avoid confusion in restarting.
Delivery of the postponement signal would be reinforced by destroyers intercepting the routes of advance. In case of a one or two day postponement, personnel and equipment would not disembark. If the operation were to be postponed until the next tidal lunar period, vessels would backtrack to their original mounting ports and disembark personnel but not equipment.
Throughout the operation certain broad principles were to be observed in the movement of the Allied Expeditionary Forces. Among these were:. In the general movement of the allied armies from England, France and later on into Germany, the American forces were to be kept on the right, and the British, on the left.
The American army was to be assembled in western England and were to be loaded into American ships in the western ports of the English south coast.
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The American forces would cross the Channel by the western convoy routes, would. The British army was to be assembled in eastern England and embarked in British ships from eastern channel ports. It would cross the channel through the eastern convoy lanes, would assault the eastern Normandy beaches and would advance inland on the eastern, and later the northern, flank.
During the assault phase, the line dividing the British and American zones in England was at Poole. During the build-up phase it was at Southampton, both forces using the facilities of that port. The assault forces were to be loaded and assembled as nearly opposite the assault beaches, as port capacities in Britain would allow. Follow-up forces were to be loaded and assembled further on either flank, and the preloaded first follow-up force still further out.
After the assault forces had sailed, the build-up would pass through the southern English ports. Each assault force, and its sub-divisions were to be loaded, assembled and sailed in the same east to west order as they assaulted; Force 'U' being in the extreme west; Force 'O' next, then, from west to east Forces 'G', 'J', and 'S', the latter on the extreme east. Each force and sub-division was to be kept together as far as possible, during the loading, assembly and sailing phases.
In preparation for embarkation, the formations, equipment and stores were in general to be assembled in England, in marshalling areas behind the ports from which they were to sail, and in the order that they were to arrive on the far shore. As the build-up progressed, the army could therefore move forward step by step. By D minus 30, the assault formations, scheduled to move in follow-up and build-up convoys, lay behind the ports from the waters edge inland and marshalled in approximately the order they were to arrive on the far shore during the first 30 days.
The general principle to govern the routing of sea borne movements was that all shipping was to skirt the British shoreline toward a converging area Area Z , which was to be due north of the assault beaches, whence it turn southward, across the channel, through specially prepared routes. Within each convoy, ships were to be stationed in the order that they were required to occupy when they arrived off the beaches. During the preliminary stage, which began almost as soon as the COSSAC plan was approved, all possible means, including air and sea action, propaganda, political and economic pressure, and cover and deception, were to be integrated into a combined offensive aimed at softening the German resistance in general and German strength in Normandy in particular.
Diversionary operations and deceptions were to be staged in other areas to divert and contain German Forces away from Normandy. The air force was the principle weapon available, during the months before D-day, capable of being used for offensive operations to reduce the future operational possibilities of the enemy.
During the preparatory phase, the air force, therefore, was to direct its effort towards producing a situation on the continent favorable for the success of NEPTUNE. This was prepared jointly by the three service C's-in-C and issued under the direction of the Supreme Commander. Though later amended in many particulars, it was the basic joint plan on which the plans and orders of the various services were built. It was essential that the fighting value of the German Air Force and its capacity for intensive and sustained operations should be reduced as much as possible before the decisive air battle was joined.
The delay and disorganization of rail reinforcements into the assault area could not be assured, as required by the Army, by the cutting of specific lines during the later stage of the preparatory phase. Many of the essential transportation targets would have been unsuitable for air attack, and it was doubtful if sufficient air resources would be available. Moreover, disruption of specific lines of transport might have disclosed the point of attack.
The only practicable method of achieving this objective was to impose a general reduction on the whole enemy rail movement potential over a wide zone extending northwards from the general line of the Seine. This involved attacking a very large number of rail centers over a considerable period of time, to bring about a general paralysis of the railroad system.
CROSSBOW sites Robot and Rocket Bomb launching sites were also to be attacked in order to prevent these weapons from endangering allied concentration areas, and to prevent them from diverting allied air forces during the course of the invasion. One of the most important tasks of the Allied Air Forces during the Preparatory Phase was the intensification of the offensive against the German Air Force, both in the air and on the ground. The degree of Allied Air superiority over the lodgement area would be dependent to a large extent on the success of these operations.
This offensive was to be divided into two stages:. Concentrated attacks against servicing, repair, maintenance, and other installations, with the intention of reducing the fighting potential of the enemy air forces; b. Long range air penetrations into enemy and enemy occupied territory was to be continued as long as possible, not only to maintain the level of internal disorganization and loss of morale, but also to contain the maximum possible number of German fighters in Northwest Germany.
Air attacks were to be made on enemy supply dumps, M. During the preparatory phase, air forces were also to be employed in:. Attacks on enemy E-boats, Destroyers and U-boats in their bases; b. Air minelaying operations, and c. Between about D minus 3 and D-day, air attacks on the billeting areas of German divisions, available for counter-attack during the initial stages of the assault, would be made as required by the army. Immediately before and during D-day, air attacks were to be made against the command and control centers of the enemy's ground and air forces, and against their communications.
On and from D-day, some proportion of available Allied air effort was to be held in reserve for attacks on opportunity targets, such as troop concentrations, rail and road movements, and to meet unforeseen contingencies. This concentration was to be completed by about D minus 7. Additional Naval forces were to be introduced into the CHANNEL area during this period, to arrive only shortly before D-day, to reduce, as far as possible, the strain on administrative arrangements on the South Coast of England. After being loaded and assembled, the Naval Assault Forces and the Naval bombarding forces were to sail in groups as necessary, from their assembly point towards a general area Southeast of the Isle of Wight Area Z.
Naval escorts and minesweepers were to accompany these groups, increased protection being given to first flight. The hours of daylight, and the distance to be covered, militated against the possibility of misleading the enemy as to the exact location of allied assaults, but the groups were to be so routed, during daylight on D minus 1, that the chance of a correct enemy forecast of the assault plan would be reduced so far as possible. On reaching the enemy mine barrier, minesweepers were to sweep ten passages for the leading groups.
Subsequent groups were to follow the same channels, which would then be marked. About seven miles off the French shore, the L. They would then be in close proximity to the first flight of L. All craft were then to deploy for the assault, subsequently adjusting their movements as necessary, so that the first wave of craft would beach at H-hour. Bombarding ships and support craft would take up their position to support the landings at about the same time. Fighter cover was also to be provided over the assault area at an average strength of ten squadrons i.
The strength of fighter patrols, operating over the beaches and shipping lanes, would however, be varied from time to time as required by the air situation. At least six additional squadrons of fighters would always be available to meet emergencies. This would:. Allow a minimum period of thirty minutes daylight for observed bombardment before H-hour, b.
Make possible the maximum number of vehicles to be landed on the first tide, and c. Permit the first landings to be made below the outermost row of beach obstacles. As H-hour was to be related, both to nautical twilight and to high water, the choice of D-day was dependent on the phase of the moon.
As D-day should be during the full moon period, as opposed to the new moon period, it had to be fixed for the first week of June, weather permitting. D-day, and the time of H-hour for that day, and for successive days to which a postponement would be possible, was to be notified shortly before the operation. Y-day, which was the day on which all preparations were to be completed and the forces ready to sail, was set for 1 June.
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Coast artillery and field batteries were to be engaged by Naval and Air action, starting before H-hour. A joint fire plan was issued listing bombardment targets and priorities. The assault was to be immediately preceded by pre-arranged Naval and Air bombardment of selected points of the beach defenses.
Close support was to be provided at call by Naval and Air Forces. Their action was to be coordinated with the Fire Support Plan, with the object of assuring the early capture of the most dangerous German batteries. For the Army, the object of the main assault was the capture of the towns of St.
The inter-area boundary between British and U. After seizing its beachhead the tasks of First United States Army in order of priority were:. To capture Cherbourg as quickly as possible, and 2. Lo, in conformity with the advance of Second British Army. The over-riding air commitment, in the assault phase, was that of gaining and maintaining air superiority. Subject to this, the maximum possible air effort was to be made available during the night preceding D-day, on D-day, and subsequently as necessary, for the tasks of:.
Assisting the Navy to neutralize coast defenses, 2. One airborne division, under command of First United States Army, was to land in the area behind the Varreville - Carentan beaches with the main object of assisting the seaborne landing. Two airborne brigades, under command of Second British Army, were to land East of the River Orne with the objects of covering the left flank and delaying the arrival of the enemy reserve division from Lisieux. Pathfinder aircraft were to drop key paratroop personnel at selected points during the hours of darkness, and were to mark and prepare the Dropping and Landing Zones for the main forces, which would arrive soon after daylight.
Special fighter cover and special ground aids to navigation were to be provided for these operations. The establishment of army reinforcements on the far shore more rapidly than the enemy could bring his reinforcements into the battle zone, b. The basing of air force components on the far shore, to permit them to establish air fields and other ground facilities with the required speed. The landing by D plus 3 of the minimum land forces required to meet the expected scale of enemy counterattack, would involve massing effectives;.
The First United States Army:- Three Seaborne divisions, plus three or more assaulting tank battalions, and one or two airborne divisions, and 2. The Second British Army - Four seaborne divisions including four armoured brigades, three of which were assault armoured brigades and one airborne division. The attainment of the planned rate of army build-up as shown on the accompanying table. It was also planned to provide the following facilities for Air Forces by the dates shown Stations accompanied by specialised radar equipment for anti-Window purposes; b.
Thereafter, a phased program designed progressively to establish air bases in France. The Navy was required to conduct the shipping program to meet those requirements. Formations were to be landed, on the second, third and possibly fourth tides, from landing ships and landing craft of the Naval Follow-up Force. On D plus 1, the landing of Build-up personnel, vehicles and stores was also to start from other types of shipping. The sailing of all ships and craft during the Build-up was arranged so as:. To land the maximum possible force that could be effective by D plus 3; and b.
To produce thereafter a regular daily lift for personnel, vehicles, and stores and thus to avoid a succession of loading and discharging peaks. The seaborne "lift" available was sufficient to produce a "lift" for five divisions to assault on an eight-R. In addition adequate resources were available for covering forces, minesweeping, and all miscellaneous tasks required of the Navy.
The lodgement area, which was required to contain sufficient port facilities to maintain a force of 26 to 30 divisions, and to enable it to be augmented by re-inforcements at the rate of 3 to 5 divisions per month, was to comprise the Cherbourg and Brittany Peninsula including all that part of France lying westward of a line drawn from Caen to Nantes. Naval Objectives : The naval objective was the safe and timely arrival of the Assault Forces at their beaches, the cover of their landings, and subsequently the support and maintenance, and the rapid build-up of allied forces ashore. The Broad plan of attack :.
To assault from landing ships and landing craft in the bay of the Seine between Ouistreham and Varreville, with 5 divisions attacking on an R. To complete the landing of the first 7 seaborne divisions on the second tide of D-day and the first tide of D plus 1 day. Thereafter to build-up the forces at the average rate of one and one third divisions a day.
Initial army objectives were the towns of Caen, Bayeux, Isigny, Carentan, the airfields in the area, and immediately afterwards, the port of Cherbourg. The next main objective was to be to capture Paris and to clear the enemy from the whole of Southern France. Under him and exercising joint command were three service Commanders-in-Chief,. The attack was to be launched by a Western U. Command of these task forces and of all subordinate formations was to be exercised in accordance with the principle of Unity of Command, which provided that, until the Army was firmly established ashore, command of army formations embarked was to be exercised by the appropriate naval commander.
Kirk, U. Army under Lt. General O. Bradley, U. Assault Force O, with two R. Follow-up Force B, with 1 R. T of the 1st and 1 R. In addition, seven Commando battalions of Force J and two Ranger battalions of Force O were also to assault selected points along the beaches. D-day H-hour : H-hour was to be 40 to minutes after morning civil twilight and 3 to 4 hours before high tide. D-day was to be the first date in June of suitable weather when an appropriate H-hour occurred viz June 5, 6 or 7 and June 18, 19 or D-day was subject to postponement from day to day, up to two days, in each suitable tidal and lunar period.
A decision would be made about the operation owing to weather. Should postponement until the next suitable lunar period i. They were to proceed in escorted convoys along pre-arranged swept channels protected by air and naval covering forces. The sea borne assaults were to be made approximately simultaneously at H-hour, i. Follow-up forces. The first two build-up divisions, one U. Thereafter the Build-up was to be maintained by daily sailings of Personnel and M.
The Build-up was to delivery approximately one and one third divisions per day complete with equipment. In addition each division already ashore was to be supported by the delivery of stores at the rate of tons per day per division. The assault was to be supported by a bombardment force of 7 Battleships, 2 Monitors, 23 Cruisers, 2 Gunboats, 75 Fleet Destroyers, 16 Hunt class destroyers and special bombarding craft.
The majority of the destroyers were also to escort assault convoys. C's were allocated to the Assault Forces and early convoys as escorts. The approach was to be covered by 20 Destroyers and 60 Coastal Craft. Distant cover was to be provided by the R. They would enable stores to be unloaded when the weather prevented discharge over open beaches.
It was hoped to complete their construction by about D plus These shelters were expected to form a lee for the Ferry Craft. The assault and follow-up forces and the first build-up divisions were to load and assemble as follows Attached Forces were to be assembled as follows:- 1. Merchant Vessels were to be preloaded and assembled as follows: 1. In addition, empty M. Ships were to assemble at Southend and Bristol Channel awaiting loading berths; 34 of these ships would arrive in the Solent on D-day. The Approach : The five Assault Forces were to sail from their assembly ports on D minus 1, with the exception of Force U, which was to sail from Devon and Cornwall ports in the evening of D minus 2.
Each British Assault Force would be divided into some 16 groups, in conformity with the order they were required in the assault area; U. Forces were each to comprise about four Groups, depending on the speed of convoy and the tide on which they were required to land. Assault Timetable : H hours. Ten channels would be swept and danned, two being allocated to each assault force. Commandos and Rangers : Commandos and Rangers were to sail with the assault forces; their landings were to take place simultaneously with the Assault as follows:.
One Commando west of Force J to mop up 3. Two Commandos were to stand by to destroy coastal batteries on the Eastern Flank on the night of D to D plus 1 if required. They were to tow Rhino ferries which were to be used to discharge their vehicles. A proportion of the assault force L. As discharge could not be completed on D-Day, a proportion of L.
Follow-up Forces comprised L. L and L. Twenty-four stores coasters were to arrive with follow-up Forces. Subsequent Movements of Assault Ships and Craft : 3. L , except those required to discharge personnel build-up ships, were to return to the U. S were to remain in the assault area to form the Ferry Service. Major Support Craft were to replenish with ammunition in the assault area if required for further bombardment.
Minesweepers were to sweep the assault area and widen the approach channels. Escorts were to be allocated to returning convoys. The landing of Allied Forces in France, subsequent to those carried in the Assault and Follow-up, was styled the Build-up. The whole build-up convoy programme was one of extreme complexity from the Naval point of view, it necessitated the most careful timing in order to maintain the tempo of landing of allied forces and their stores. The build-up plan was designed:. To lift the maximum force in preloaded ships and craft by D plus 3; b.
To produce thereafter a regular lift of approximately 1. To delivery maintainance cargos at the rate of tons per day per division. The Merchant Service included:. A large number of D. When tidal and beach conditions permitted L. Ports to the east of Southampton were to be used in the build-up for British troops and equipment, while ports to the west were reserved for American troops and equipment.
Southampton was to be joint British and U. Convoys of M. Daily return convoys were to be run from France to the Central Sector Isle of Wight area , and from there to ports on the wings with empty ships to be loaded in these sectors. The marching personnel of units loaded in M. Otherwise, units were to sail together from the same hards or ports, even if carried in different convoys. In order to control and coordinate the Build-up program, and to assure that special requirements or changes in the Army's plan could be met promptly, a body composed of representatives of the Joint Commanders-in-Chief, styled B.
War Shipping Administration was responsible for implementing the movements of ships and craft on decisions reached by B. Under B. To assist naval shore authorities in the quick turn round of ships and craft, inter-service bodies styled T. To assist the rapid loading of vessels in accordance with authorized priorities, inter-service bodies called M. O's Movement Control Organization were set up at embarkation points. Their duties were to assemble the formations, equipment and cargo to be shipped at embarkation points and to direct embarkation so as to fulfill the Military Plan.
C 's To control arrivals, discharge and departures of vessels on the far shore, naval authorities styled NOIC's Naval Officers in charge were to be established, at first in ships lying off the beaches and later on the beaches themselves. The Numbers of Ships and Craft in the Build-up arriving in France up till D plus 3 and the estimated sailings from D plus 3 onwards are shown in the following attached tables. To provide a safe passage for the assault forces to the transport area, then 2. To sweep a channel, parallel to the beaches, which would be broadened until it would form a safe anchorage and patrol area.
Flotillas 2 Y. Flotillas 4 Groups of LL Trawlers. During the approach, contact with enemy patrols could be expected but as the following forces would be committed to a narrow passage through heavily mined waters, it was essential that flotillas maintain sweeping formation relying for protection on destroyers, which would be in the immediate vicinity.
During D-day and D plus 1 day, 4 channels about 2 miles wide were to be established by sweeping the water between pairs of approach channels. These channels were to be marked by ocean light-buoys. Bombarding Forces operating on the flanks were each to be provided with a flotilla of Fleet Minesweepers which remained with the bombarding ships throughout the assault. Permanent swept channels to W.
F and E. Battleships and Cruisers were to assemble in the Clyde Eastern Task Force and Belfast Western Task Force and were then to proceed to the Assault Area independently with attached minesweeping Flotillas and a destroyer and frigate escort. The majority of destroyers were allocated as escorts to the Assault convoys during the approach. Bombardment was to be carried out under the orders of the Assault Task Force Commanders, commencing about 40 minutes before H-hour, with the following objects:.
To neutralize coastal defence and inland batteries, especially those capable of bringing fire to bear on the approach channels and transport areas. To destroy beach defences during the final approach and assault. To support the Army after the assault by engaging hostile batteries, enemy formations, or defended areas. When no longer required for bombarding, destroyers were to be used by Task Force Commanders for the defence of the Assault Areas.
Bombarding ships were to return to Portsmouth, Plymouth, or Portland, to replenish ammunition; about two outfits per bombarding ship were to be held in immediate reserve. Spotting for indirect bombardment was to be carried out by:. Assault Battalion. L's and 6 Pinnaces, at the same time as the assaults. Troops were not landed. The threat was to be established by Radio Counter Measures, the use of smoke and sonic warfare. The object was to contain enemy reserves and to draw off enemy naval forces from the assault convoys. The operations were:. Within the English Channel, cover against destroyers, small surface craft and U-boats was to be given by four divisions of fleet destroyers and by Coastal Forces under the control of Commanders-in-Chief, Plymouth and Portsmouth and V.
Dover , operating outside the Assault Area. A further four U. Destroyers provided cover for the exposed flanks of Western Task Force convoy routes. Destroyers and Coastal Forces were to be based and attached to Home Commands as follows:. A maximum of 50 per cent of Coastal Forces was to be Operational each night. Responsibilities : a ANCXF was responsible for coordinating the defence of the assault area from attack. Close Cover : In the Channel, to guard the flanks of assault area, close cover was provided by 8 Fleet destroyers and 24 M.
Continuous Air Cover was to be maintained over the Assault area by day and night. Coastal Command was to maintain continuous patrols in the S. Bombarding warships. Escort vessels waiting for return convoys. Eagle ships for A. Smoke making trawlers. The Task Force areas were divided into sub-areas for defence purposes. The Inshore sub-areas were given lettered defence lines spaced half a mile apart running parallel to the coast. The orders and policies for the defence of the Task Force areas were given code letters.
Each method of defence in each order was given a number. This scheme enabled Task Force Commanders to order quickly the appropriate defence measures for a particular set of circumstances. They would be available for defence purposes by day, and patrol near the static defence lines by night.
The primary defence of the anchorages against surface attack at night was to be by static night defence lines of anchored or slowly patrolling minesweepers, LCG's, LCF's, and PC's. MTB's and PT's were to patrol on the east and west flanks of the assault area. In the event of attack by Walter Boats , a division of Coastal Forces was to be spread in the likely direction of approach and to listen with asdics. A second division was to be concentrated in pairs and to act as striking forces. If W-boats were suspected in the anchorages, Task Force Commanders were to allocate forces to sweep across the suspected area dropping depth charges.
Air Defence : Each force was detailed in "A. Umbrella barrage was to be ordered by Force Commanders over shipping off the beaches if required. Smoke : Assault Force Commanders were responsible for smoke defence in their own areas. Minesweepers and landing craft on the static defence lines were to assist in the smoke defence plan.
Smoke from shore generators under Army Control were also available to be called for through N. C's ashore. Mines : Special new types of ground and moored mines were to be laid, with a proportion of normal types to cloak the use of special types. Other minefields were to become safe at various dates after D-day. Minesweeping gear capable of dealing with the special mines was available in case it should become required necessary to remove allied minefields. Routine laying of standard mines in standard areas till D Laying of special mines by minelayers and aircraft in the Channel and the North Sea.
Special type mines were also to be laid by aircraft in the standard areas in Baltic, Kattegat, Heligoland Bight, Frisian Islands and Biscay ports after D Phase IV D-2 to D Phase V D-1 to D-day. The Commander Advance A. The above figures do not include aircraft of Troop Carrier and Transport Commands, or photographic and Fighter Reconnaissance aircraft.
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The figures above include aircraft required for normal operations, such as the Air Defense of Great Britain. In addition, 5 squadrons were to patrol over the cross-channel routes at all times on D-day, and the same number were to be available as required thereafter. A patrol of ten squadrons was to be maintained over the beaches and assault area.
Three Fighter Direction Tenders converted L. Anti-U boat patrols were to be carried out by 21 squadrons from 19 and 16 groups composed of Sunderlands, Halifax, Liberators and Wellingtons, and by the U. Navy Fleet Air Wing Seven. The anti-shipping strikes were to be carried on by 10 squadrons of Beaufighters, Swordfish and Albacores.
These Patrols were to provide a cover of 30 minutes density in the Area, from the Western limits of the St. This area, known as the " CORK ", was considered wide enough to prevent U boats, which passed through it submerged, from retaining enough battery power to be able to continue operating submerged, after traversing the CORK. One squadron of Wellingtons was detailed for night recconnaissance in conjunction with Coastal Striking Forces. Squadrons of R. Aircraft would operate in pairs, one spotting and one escort; their duties interchangeable.
In addition 3 Squadrons of Mustangs were to be available to carry out a minimum of 80 sorties up till D-day, after which they would return to their normal reconnaissance duties. German, with a small number in Norway and Denmark. The breakwaters, which would enclose an area about 2 miles long by one mile wide, were to be composed of the following units:.
These were ' long, 60' high and vary in size from 2, to 6, tons. These were ft. In the shelter of the breakwater, stores piers for unloading coasters and M. Piers for L. The pier equipment, known collectively as WHALE, consisted of pierheads secured to the bottom by four vertical posts. The pierheads were connected to the shore by roadways supported by floating pontoons. A shallow water area of about 12 blockships which would be placed by D plus 3 to give half a mile of sheltered beach to landing craft. A line of about 25 Bombardons to seaward to give shelter to eight big ships 25 feet draught.
The WHALE piers would lie inside the breakwater and would use the rocky foreshore on which landing craft cannot beach. A special channel through the minefield was reserved for their passage. A regular flow were to arrive daily from D plus 2 to D plus This project consisted of some units, aggregating a million and a half tons, averaging 35 heavy cross channel tows per day.
It required the services of tugs and involved 10, officers and men. They were to serve two purposes:. To provide a sheltered beach for landing craft to use in the event of strong on-shore winds. To provide a refuge for ferry service and other small craft in rough weather.
Centurion , D. Sumatra , H. Durban and F. Courbet : The last named was to be towed across the Channel. The sinking of blockships was to commence p. PLUTO was an operation that was to provide facilities for the supply of gasoline to the Expeditionary Force on the far shores. This was to be done in two ways:. The pipelines were to be completed by D plus 75 and were expected to provide 2, tons daily.
Conum Drums were large floating drums round which the pipe was wound and which unreeled as they "rolled" across the water leaving a line of pipe behind. These were a stern buoy and mooring used for hauling off Rhino Ferries and Coasters which beach, and for preventing them from breaking. A reserve was retained in Spithead from D plus 3.
Nine ton barges were to be towed from Littlehampton to the E. T's and Coasters arriving between D plus 1 and D plus 4. Five miles of causeways were provided. Coast Guard Cutters were alloted, 30 the W. H-hour has been taken as Build-up convoys are referred to by self-evident letters ON13, Appx 9. During day: 50 hauling off buoys laid for coasters. Naval History and Heritage Command. Open for Print. Social Media. Toggle left navigation Nav.
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German Land Forces 1. The German Defense Plan 3. Coastal Defenses, Fortifications and Obstacles 7. At frequent intervals along the coast, often associated with strong points, but always protected by surrounding wire, The following are some of the principles which the Germans followed, in laying out and siting coastal defense positions: a.
German Coastal Batteries Disposition of Garrison Troops and Mobile Forces There were four general types of coastal divisions: a. German Naval Forces In November , German naval forces major vessels consisted of: 3 1. ON 1, Para. ON 1, Appx. VII, Annex K. ON 1, paragraph German Air Forces Tactical Recce. The figures given here have been taken from ON 11, Appx. The German system of coast defense was based on three basic principles: a.
The allied plan to overcome this system of defense, in broadest outline, was: a. Beaches and Lodgement Areas. The governing air considerations were: a. The governing naval considerations were: a. Strategical considerations required: a. Logistic considerations were: a. A study of beaches, within this sector of the coast, showed that: a.
It was obvious, however, that the Pas de Calais area presented obvious and probably insuperable difficulties, such as those indicated below:- a. Anticipated Development of the Land Campaign To advance landward and occupy successively Caen, Cherbourg and the Brittany Peninsula as far as Nantes; The order of events during the initial landings was envisaged in general, as follows: a. During the last 40 minutes, before the first wave of infantry hit the beach that is before H-hour , the Navy and the Air Force were to drench the landing beaches with the maximum weight of fire power, employing all manner of ships, craft, and special weapons, in this bombardment; There were three reasons for selecting May: a.
Plans for Movement of Forces Among these were: a. The American forces would cross the Channel by the western convoy routes, would The Preparatory Phase This offensive was to be divided into two stages: a. During the preparatory phase, air forces were also to be employed in: a. Assault Phase Naval escorts and minesweepers were to accompany these groups, increased protection being given to first flight This would: a. After seizing its beachhead the tasks of First United States Army in order of priority were: 1.
Subject to this, the maximum possible air effort was to be made available during the night preceding D-day, on D-day, and subsequently as necessary, for the tasks of: 1. Build Up Phase The objectives in the Build-up plan were: a. The landing by D plus 3 of the minimum land forces required to meet the expected scale of enemy counterattack, would involve massing effectives; 1. It was also planned to provide the following facilities for Air Forces by the dates shown:- a. The sailing of all ships and craft during the Build-up was arranged so as: a.
Army Forces, Allied Expeditionary Force This total was made up as follows: U. British Present in U. Operationally available In U. Operationally available Infantry Divs. Air Forces, Allied Expeditionary Force Number of Sqdns. Available in U. Naval Forces, Allied Expeditionary Force: Trawlers 18 Y. The Broad plan of attack : 1. Under him and exercising joint command were three service Commanders-in-Chief, 1.
Follow-up forces The materials in A were taken from ON 1. Loading and Assembly 1 The assault and follow-up forces and the first build-up divisions were to load and assemble as follows:- Force Military Loading Point Assembly Point First Br. Build-up Div. ON-4 Program of Assault and Follow-Up Forces Waves 2 to 5 to depart from transport area. Tanks leave departure line yards from beach H - 30 to H Bombardment by warships, and gunfire support craft to begin 1 H - 5 D.
Tanks to beach H - H plus 50 L. R H plus 45 First L. L to beach H plus 60 First L. L beach. Commandos and Rangers : Commandos and Rangers were to sail with the assault forces; their landings were to take place simultaneously with the Assault as follows: 1. Subsequent Movements of Assault Ships and Craft : 3 a. Materials for C to here were taken from ON-7 2. ON 3. ON-9 The build-up plan was designed: a.
Supporting Naval Operations Bombardment was to be carried out under the orders of the Assault Task Force Commanders, commencing about 40 minutes before H-hour, with the following objects: a.
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