This pernicious doctrine was first openly repudiated by Richelieu. As early as , and before he had established his power, he, in an instruction to one of the foreign ministers which is still extant, laid it down as a principle, that, in matters of state, no Catholic ought to prefer a Spaniard to a French Protestant.
To us, indeed, in the progress of society, such preference of the claims of our country to those of our creed, has become a matter of course; but in those days it was a startling noverly. When he wrote his main contribution to political theory, Leviathan , it was in many respects a logical follow-up of earlier works scrutinizing the relation of man to nature, and man to man, working in the tradition Machiavelli had set out.
Hobbes had therefore already built an intellectual structure, rationalizing all phenomena, in the typical Enlightenment manner, ab initio. For Hobbes, the most devastating political situation was the anarchy in the state of nature. In the first part of Leviathan, Of Man, Hobbes sets out his view of greedy human nature and the state of war of all against all when there is no sufficiently powerful state. Essential in this would be to renounce all claims to natural rights, as none exist in the state of nature anyway. Edited with an introduction by C. How God speaketh to a man immediately, may be understood by those well enough, to whom he hath spoken; but how the same should be understood by another, is hard, if not impossible to know.
For if a man pretend to me, that God hath spoken to him supernaturally, and immediately, and I make doubt of it, I cannot easily perceive what argument he can produce, to oblige me to believe it. Temporall and Spirituall Government, are but two words brought into the world, to make men see double, and mistake their Lawfull Soveraign.
It is true, that the bodies of the faithfull, after the Resurrection, shall be not onely Spirituall, but Eternall: but in this life they are grosse, and corruptible. A clear example of how political power took ultimate privilege over religious leadership was the England of Henry VIII. In a dramatic attempt to realize the desired annulment of his marriage, which the Vatican denied him, he declared himself head of the Church of England in Other states made comparable arrangements. With the claim to universal rule abandoned, it was replaced with a claim to a monopoly on territorial jurisdiction and ultimate political power in the capital of that territory, and it is this transition that marks the fundamental divide between the feudal order and modern statehood.
Jouvenel See also: Hall ; and Spruyt Essential, however, to the character of the modern state, is its power ultimately to make, administer and execute the law. By what strange barbarity is it possible that fellow countrymen do not live under the same law? Voltaire saw chaos in the old neighborhoods of Paris and admired the newer quartiers symbolized by the Louvre. Several interpretations have been given to this idea, of course as will be discussed further in chapter 8.
John Locke emphasized, for instance, the inalienable rights of the individual citizens including their right to be represented. Le mal de changer est-il toujours moins grand que le mal de souffrir? Lokin and Zwalve Contrat Social ou Principes du Droit Politique. In the decades to come, they all developed their own national legal codes, completing the development of the modern state. The Dutch thinker and jurist Grotius can be counted among the very first to have embarked on this path.
What is more, a whole people can agree to give up all their rights to an absolute ruler. He goes on to accept a limited number of universal crimes, against which it is the right of other states to act — even militarily. Quoted in: Lokin and Zwalve Hill New York: M. The show of erudition is far overdone, and the reasoning is often ponderous and discursive. Nevertheless, his analysis that the jus gentium of the coming age would have to be on the basis of equality and on secular principles has been of paramount importance and influence.
In this context it is worthwhile to note that he argued that treaties with Christian peoples had the same standing as those made with non-Christian peoples, for instance the Saracens. While the former two had written in the midst of European civil and religious wars, Pufendorf was the first to reflect on the emerging state system in the second half of the 17th century.
Konstruktion und Elemente einer idealistischen Völkerrechtslehre
He analyses this as a series of agreements, between individuals, to form a union and to organize this union in a particular way. Most important for our purposes is the final agreement Pufendorf describes, that which establishes sovereignty and subjection to it. Nussbaum This state, then, lives in a state of nature with other states, as states always primarily care for their self-interest. In this work, Vattel criticizes Grotius and Pufendorf for allowing too much leeway for princes to govern the people as they may please, and defends restraints on royal power and the importance of an elected legislature.
In Book I, chapter IV, par. The sovereign authority is then established only for the common good of all the citizens; and it would be absurd to think that it could change its nature on passing into the hands of a senate or a monarch. The liberty of that nation would not remain entire, if the others were to arrogate to themselves the right of inspecting and regulating her actions; — an assumption Pufendorf book II, chapter 6, par. Pufendorf Book II, chapter 1, par.
Vattel Book I, chapter IV, par. Mahomet and his successors have desolated and subdued Asia, to avenge the indignity done to the unity of the Godhead; all whom they termed associators or idolaters fell victims to their devout fury. Vattel Book II, chapter I, par. II, that I have also discussed above.
Although this is a state of war … it is still, according to reason, better than the fusion of those states by means of a hierarchy of power culminating in a universal monarchy. Laws which are passed for a large area lose their vigour, and such a soulless despotism, after it has hollowed out the germ of goodness, ultimately collapses into anarchy. It was also re-emphasized through the ideas concerning legal unification that the French philosophes articulated.
After the disorder Napoleon had caused, the Vienna Congress restored the European State system and established the Holy Alliance to strengthen it.
Konstitutionalisierung im Völkerrecht
The Holy Alliance was a coalition set up in by Tsarist Russia, Austria and Prussia, the three major continental powers after the battle of Waterloo. Later, France and most other European nations joined, the common aim of the organization being to maintain the continental status quo. However cohesive its social results were, the political record of the organization is poor, and the different member States largely continued to set out for themselves their own political agendas, even if that would result in military confrontation e. Ein philosophischer Entwurf Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, zweiter abschnitt, erster zusatz, par.
Louis Henkin writes, for instance: Sovereignty is a bad word … it is often a catchword, a substitute for thinking and precision. In this chapter, we will have a closer look at it. A treatise. McNair London: Longmans, Bernhardt ed. Volume Four Amsterdam: Elsevier, For it may refer to external relations, establishing a rule of non-intervention; but it also implies that internally, the sovereign has effectively established himself as the highest power. One cannot do business with sovereigns if they cannot enforce agreements at home.
A discussion of sovereignty therefore inevitably leads to an analysis of the internal qualities of the modern state. Indeed, sovereignty and statehood are inextricably linked, doubling the complexity of the picture. There can be no international system of sovereign entities, without those entities possessing the effective governmental control associated with statehood. The general consensus is that four criteria determine sovereign statehood. But then, there is the international component to sovereignty.
External sovereignty leads to questions over recognition and legitimacy that we will have a closer look at further down. He was a French administrative official and nobleman. His main work is Coutumes de Beauvaisis, written in , and printed in Evans ed. Rees, The sovereignty 41 2. Internal Sovereignty As said, internal sovereignty consists in the exercise of effective and independent governmental control, over a population, on a generally marked-out territory.
The most problematic aspect of this is the first criterion: effective and independent governmental control. Questions related to defining a population and a territory, more importantly, are outside the remit of this chapter and will therefore not be taken into account. We will thus focus on effective and independent governmental control. What will actually happen with verdicts of the courts — whether their magistrates have any bearing on the population or not — is not part of his concern. Courts may be unable to make sure that judgments are actually carried out. The most extreme examples of this are formed by a number of mostly post-colonial predominantly African states that have not succeeded in enforcing their laws and maintaining order within their territory.
First series Oxford: Oxford University Press, Dicey 82ff. Kreijen His approach helps to locate, within the governmental structure, the ultimate sovereign point. But he does not define what it is that constitutes effective governmental control itself. Authority may refer to the individual or the institution that has the power of decision in a given dispute call it authority In that sense, authority as authority-1 is relative to the power to decide or to act. However, authority also refers to a feeling of respect or esteem that people may feel for others call it authority Garner ed.
As will be argued below, states confronted with such rival claims would not lose their sovereignty, as long as they maintain effective control. It is clear that Richelieu, when declaring that in matters of state, no French catholic should prefer a Spaniard to a Huguenot, took position against the idea of papal sovereignty, too. This contrasts sharply with the lack of such a strong defense of territorial sovereignty amongst present-day political elites, for instance after Khomeini issued a fatwa with universal validity for all Muslims to assassinate Salman Rushdie, in Cliteur Why do western commentators idolise a celebrity monk who hangs out with Sharon Stone and once guest-edited French Vogue?
If the umpire is suspected of being biased against one of the players; or if the teacher appears not to know the matter he is teaching; or if the policeman beats up or arbitrarily arrests an innocent civilian; in such cases their authority in the sense of being respected or held in high esteem authority-2 may crumble.
Nevertheless, their authority as agents endowed with the power to make decisions or to act authority-1 , is not affected. The tennis player who feels wronged may submit a complaint, the students may write to the school board, or the citizen may sue the police officer — but whether their complaints will affect the authority-1 of the umpire, the teacher or the policeman, is not up to them. This applies to sovereignty generally as well. Naturally, it is very difficult to imagine a state that does not have any authority in the sense of being respected authority-2 by its population.
Effective governmental control is extremely difficult to maintain without the consent of at least part of the population. Even dictatorships have a need for a loyal class of custodes to carry out orders and support the regime. Moreover, in rare cases only have governments possessed the ability to directly intervene with all matters happening on their territory, usually rendering them dependent on benevolent cooperation by other institutions and groups.
To identify the sovereign as such, however, must mean that our understanding of internal sovereignty is not connected to any considerations of natural law. In establishing obedience to its commands, then, as Max Weber argued, the sovereign must monopolize the use of force. It is to legitimacy-1 that Weber intended to refer to, when identifying the monopoly to the use of force in this case. This also means, ultimately, that there is no conceptual difference between a state and a concentration camp.
The guards and rulers of the camp form a government, and the prisoners a population. In such a concentration camp case, then, the guards have a monopoly to the use of force in accordance with the rules laid down by themselves but may be bound by certain limitations too, in which case the concentration camp has an element of the rule of law — see chapter 6.
When a fight breaks out between two prisoners, for example over 18 Thomas Aquinas was already occupied with this problem in his quaestiones, most notably the quaestiones of the Summa Theologiae , and it was famously taken up once again by Hart and Dworkin in the 20th century.
Steven J. An outline of interpretive sociology. Studienausgabe herausgegeben von Johannes Winckelmann. If the camp guards fail to suppress the use of force by the prisoners effectively, some prisoners may come to develop a parallel power center, challenging the power of the guards. It may come to be that the one whose orders are habitually obeyed over time becomes the leader of a gang of prisoners, if the guards continue to fail to take effective action. At such a moment, the internal sovereign becomes divided. The situation in Libya in exemplified this. Colonel Khadafi, who had ruled the country for several decades and had maintained a strong autocratic rule, was challenged by rebels from the East of the country.
After some Western military support, the rebels managed to establish a power base around Benghazi, effectively upholding a new sovereign power again, this has consequences for external sovereignty as well, as will be discussed below. By contrast, as long as failure of the guards or the state to monopolize the use of force remain exceptions, and their commands thus continue to be habitually obeyed, the internal sovereignty continues to reside with them. This refers to the power of the state as the ultimate expression of the government of the polity. But it puts us on track of at least three problems related to internal sovereignty.
Let us first address the decentralization of governing and legislative tasks. Some have argued that the whole concept of sovereignty is for this reason altogether fraudulent. Mertens, However, whether we deal with a unitary or a federal state, however different these two types of states may be,23 and regardless of how many governing tasks may reside within the member states of a federal union, a number of fundamental attributes of statehood are always — and necessarily so — centralized.
These are the ultimate command over the army, and the common defense of borders. This has consequences for external sovereignty too, as will be discussed below, because common defense of borders implies the common conduct of foreign affairs. Ultimate command over the army, moreover, requires the capacity to pay for it, and therefore implies the final say of the central government in some of the taxes to be paid as well. There exists no state, as logically there cannot exist a state, neither unitary nor federal, in which the command over the army is not centralized, and connected with that the conduct of foreign relations and the administration of some of the taxes.
This is illustrated by confederacies. A confederacy is nothing more than an organized structure of unenforceable cooperation between sovereign states. Even the United Nations the Security Council not taken into account could be denoted as such: a form of cooperation between states, which ultimately cannot enforce anything. Another typical example of a confederacy is the Republic of the Seven United Provinces, which existed between and In this political structure, the seven provinces deliberated on matters of common interest, most importantly their common defense, yet all of them retained the right to veto every proposal for collective action, and the central deliberative body, the Estates General, had no direct legislative powers over the citizens of the seven provinces.
Moreover, the provinces retained a right to withdraw, and 22 Cf. Mackenzie, and B. See also Part II, Introduction. In these types of states the decentralized competencies are typically enacted in a centralized law which the centralized legislative is capable of broadening or narrowing. The invention of this type of state is typically associated with the summer of when the representatives of the thirteen former colonies gathered in Philadelphia to found the United States.
A state ceases to exist if it decentralizes or devolves the fundamental attributes necessary for ultimate control. For the rationales of centralization and decentralization are completely opposed. To devolve governing and legislative tasks to a lower level, enabling the different regions within a state to choose different arrangements, is not the same as to transfer those tasks to a higher level, effectively compelling the different regions to accept uniform arrangements.
Precisely why decentralization exists, namely to distinguish legitimate state rule on fundamental activities, from fields of minor importance, is denied by supranationalism; the logic of decentralization is diversity, while that of centralization is uniformity. The larger the centralizing unit, the more oppressive the uniformity will be. No constitutional democracy at present has a monarch whose powers even remotely resemble those Jean Bodin or Thomas Hobbes envisaged for the head of state.
This means that the single sovereign individual or institution, not only symbolizing the whole of the state, but actually acting as its only ultimate agent, may not even exist. As Mackenzie and Chapman write: There may be a constitutional division of functions between legislature, executive and judiciary: or between central legislature and local legislatures: or there may as in the U.
Where is sovereignty ultimately to be found? Huizer, Hoofd en hoogste overheid. De soevereiniteit in Nederland sinds Amsterdam: J. For a comparative perspective: T. Switzerland — is really not a Helvetian confederation but a federation. States are compromises. This could mean that it does not matter anymore where for instance the judiciary is located in- or outside the state : separation is separation. This was the argument that Carl Schmitt disagreed with by stating that sovereignty lies with that person or institution that has the power to bring about the state of exception which even in federations lies with the federal executive.
Many legislative tasks reside with the executive and the immense bureaucratic apparatus presently at its disposal , while modern parliaments primarily form a check on the power of the executive. Parliaments are sometimes burdened with some judicial tasks as well, for example trying members of the executive. Moreover, the members of the judicial branch are usually appointed by the executive or by parliament.
They are expected to be nationals of the state, and can be held in check by the national legislator if their interpretation of the law is felt to exceed its intended margins. Internal sovereignty consists in the exercise of all these functions. In that sense, they are inextricably linked, and such a linkage can only harmoniously continue where there is a similarity of cultural and historical assumptions.
This is not to say, of course, that a government cannot be subject to the law as laid down in the courts. On the contrary, a state may well have such mechanisms as part of its constitution, and no doubt this is a desirable thing. But sovereignty is not an attribute of one body within a state but instead of the state as a whole. This will be discussed in Part II and Part III, where it will be argued that on the supranational level, public opinions cannot really exercise this power — at least not to the extent that they can do this at the national level.
Sandford case of the United States Supreme Court of But what then of already existing supranational entanglements, one may ask, do they make the states that are part of them, less sovereign? States became members of them out of their free will — and could withdraw from them if they so wished. How could those organizations then be an infringement of their sovereignty? The first, the formal meaning of sovereignty, denotes the constitutional independence of a state. The second, the material meaning of sovereignty, denotes the location where political decisions are being taken.
Take as an example of this distinction the articles 93 and 94 of the Dutch constitution, which concern the direct effect of international treaties on Dutch law. Article 93 reads: Provisions of treaties and of resolutions by international institutions which may be binding on all persons by virtue of their contents shall become binding after they have been published. And article 94 reads: Statutory regulations in force within the Kingdom shall not be applicable if such application is in conflict with provisions of treaties that are binding on all persons or of resolutions by international institutions.
Nevertheless, the Dutch parliament retains the ultimate sovereign right to scrap or amend these articles of the constitution, to cancel treaties, or a violation of the Constitutional right to have property following from the 5th Amendment. Robert Bork, The Tempting of America. Hence, the formal or ultimate sovereignty continues to repose with parliament. Formally, the Netherlands remain entirely sovereign, and would only cease to be so if the country lost its power to withdraw from the supranational organizations of which it is a member, or, what amounts to the same thing, loses its right to abolish or amend those articles that declare international obligations superior to national considerations.
This formal or ultimate sovereignty is what people refer to when they say that sovereignty is by its nature indivisible. This kind of sovereignty is indeed like being pregnant: there is no intermediate stage possible. Either a state has the right to withdraw from treaties, or it does not have that right. Either parliament may amend the relevant constitutional commitments, or it may not.
As implied, however, in the previous example, to recognize that sovereignty in the formal or ultimate sense is by nature indivisible is not to say that states cannot engage in far-reaching teamwork. It should only be noted that a state will not cease to be sovereign until it loses its right to resign from its supranational entanglements.
This was ultimately the question that the American civil war was fought over, when the southern American states attempted to secede from the union. A state may even become a member of an institution that may, by majority vote, decide upon the policy to be followed by its members in this case, the permitted trade tariffs , without losing its sovereignty as such, understood in the formal or ultimate sense. They are not exactly the same thing. And that brings us to sovereignty in the material or practical sense.
For while formal or ultimate sovereignty is the principal authority from which, in the last resort, all powers derive, and is, indeed by definition, indivisible, material or practical sovereignty is the competency to decide as long and Laughland Rabkin Thus material or practical sovereignty is there, where the political process is happening — which can be very much divided between organizations. When a state is a member of a supranational institution, apart from the question of its right to withdraw from it, it is, as long as it is a member of that organization, bound by its decisions, even to those with which it may not agree.
Though in the formal or ultimate sense, the member state is sovereign as it may still withdraw, as long as it has not done so it has lost elements of its material or practical sovereignty. This distinction is important for the rest of this book, and it will return later on. External Sovereignty This chapter opened with the observation that part of the reason why sovereignty is such a controversial concept is the fact that internal and external sovereignty are inextricably linked. External sovereignty — the acceptance of a state by others — is linked with the question whether that state successfully upholds internal sovereignty.
Whether or not internal sovereignty is successfully upheld, moreover, may be disputed. States may deny an entity its external sovereignty, as many Arab states do with Israel, for instance; they may also grant external sovereignty to new entities, as happened with Kosovo in On this subject, two different approaches exist. The descriptive or declarative or realist, and the normative or constitutive or idealist. This de facto capacity is then viewed as the only criterion in international law, and so the entity is viewed as a sovereign state.
You do business with whomever you can make deals with. This approach echoes the authority as-the-power-to-make-rules authority-1 approach that we associated in the previous section with Austin and Weber. The descriptive approach thus focuses on effectiveness. Second Edition Clarendon Press, Oxford, It is typically associated with the Congress of Vienna of , where the great powers determined what entities would be granted the status of statehood in post-Napoleonic Europe, despite demands of many more regions and groups to be recognized as such at the time.
Carl Schmitt may be identified as a primary defender of the descriptive approach; Hans Kelsen as a defender of the normative approach. Adam Zamoyski, Rites of Peace. Gad, Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. The structure of international legal argument Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ch. In other words: international law formed an integral part of national law, in his view. Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power.
Knopf, The territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object of military occupation nor of other measures of force imposed by another state directly or indirectly or for any motive whatever even temporarily. An example of policy based on such normative ideas as expressed by article 11 of the Montevideo declaration, is the memorandum that the American Secretary of State Henry Stimson had written to India and China in stating that the United States would not recognize international territorial changes that were brought about through force thereby implying support for India and China against rising Japanese imperial threats.
Another example of the normative policy of the kind endorsed by article 11 is the message that the United States, with eighteen other Latin American states, sent to the governments of Bolivia and Paraguay in August , when hostilities over their i. The message contained the following passage: The American nations further declare that they will not recognize any territorial arrangement of this controversy which has not been obtained by peaceful means 44 Rights and duties of Statehood, Montevideo convention When this truce was finally confirmed in a treaty signed in April , the United States was present as one of the guarantors of the new borders.
Many more examples could be given of how descriptive and normative approaches are brought into play in turns, depending on political opportunity. Northern Cyprus forms a recent case in which the normative approach seems to have prevailed. The region declared its independence from Cyprus proper in and has since — with the strong support of Turkey — realized effective governmental control.
When Kosovo declared itself independent from Serbia in , however, it was instantaneously recognized by most Western states. Yet when later that same year the provinces South Ossetia and Abkhazia declared independence from Georgia, their independence was met with skepticism and recognitions were not forthcoming. Indeed, the distinction between the descriptive and the normative approach is more of theoretical than of practical relevance.
For in practice, international recognition will always follow power. As long as disputes are still not settled, states may uphold principles of legitimacy to press for their desired outcome of the conflict; but when they are settled, and principle becomes a denial of reality, states will, ultimately, always 46 Yokota Mora and J. It has been argued, in this respect, that Kosovo was suffering from such a lack of internal self-government, while this self-government had sufficiently been granted to SouthOssetia and Abkhazia. But the question becomes then: who gets to make these analyses?
Such criteria therefore do not solve the problem, but merely transpose it. We will also see this later on when discussing the dispute over Alsace-Lorraine after the Franco-Prussian war. To conclude, recognition by other states is ultimately dependent upon existing power realities. Effectiveness, therefore, always trumps legitimacy which is also why, in the last instance, classical international law is really a political instrument.
Membership It is at this point that the question arises what kind of social bond, what kind of shared values, culture or loyalties, if any, are necessary within a sovereign state, to make the exercise of power democratically legitimate and indeed even possible. This brings us to the concept of the nation. Elton, England under the Tudors. Third Edition London: Routledge, ff. Now set the teeth, and stretch the nostril wide, Hold hard the breath, and bend up every spirit, To his full height!
On, on, you noblest English, Whose blood is fet from fathers of war-proof! Fathers that, like so many Alexanders, Have in these parts from morn till even fought, And sheathed their swords for lack of argument. Dishonour not your mothers; now attest, That those whom you called fathers did beget you! Be copy now to men of grosser blood, And teach them how to war. And you, good yeomen, Whose limbs were made in England, show us here, The mettle of your pasture; let us swear, That you are worth your breeding, which I doubt not; For there is none of you so mean and base, That hath not noble lustre in your eyes.
I see you stand like greyhounds in the slips, Straining upon the start. The games afoot! Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor eds. For to locate the emergence of national awareness from the 17th century onwards is not to say, of course, that the cultural identity of European states came into existence only in that period. Nor does situating the rise of nationalism in these centuries imply that particular cultural regions may not have had a chauvinistic attitude towards what they would regard as their traditions; or that rising states, as discussed in chapter 1, may not have attempted to increase social unity.
The reasons for the rise of this idea from roughly the 17th century onwards are not difficult to see, since it was also around this time, that the exercise of political power moved away from the regional on the one hand, and the imperial or papal on the other, to the level of the state. We have already discussed the rise of the modern state and the ongoing centralization of its governing powers.
This also meant that closed regions slowly began to open up to larger units. The beginning of industrialization, the growth of cities, dawning secularization, increase in grand oversees projects and trade, were all part of this development. Another development was the use of vernacular as an instrument of literary and official communication. But these developments coincided with an increased participation of the people in their governments.
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Revised Edition New York: Verso, Anyone who thinks that such ancient history is no longer relevant should ponder this. The most successful were the Franks. See also chapter 4. Ever since the American and French Revolutions,6 the democratic ideal has gained momentum and modern sovereign states, at least in Europe, all profess to adhere to it even if they may suffer from serious democratic deficits7. The democratic ideal brought about changes in virtually all aspects of life simultaneously giving rise to an attempt to conserve what was left of preindustrialized, pre-egalitarian life: romanticism8.
The growth of cities, the growth of the population, the increased division of labor, and so on, all contributed to this. The first steam engine railway became operational in , dramatically opening up isolated regions to a larger whole. Another radical change occurred in the field of warfare. The individual peasant or farmer became aware of himself as part of a state, not just as an inhabitant of a particular region or province.
Indeed, all these elements of the increased influence on our lives of the modern state pose the question of membership. What is it that I share with you, from an entirely different region, with perhaps different beliefs and a different ethnicity, that our votes are brought together in the same parliament?
That we have to live under the same law? Meindert Fennema, De Moderne Democratie. Geschiedenis van een politieke theorie Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 7ff. See for instance part II, chapter 5, section 3. An example is its usage in United Nations, an international organization that deals with states, not nations. If the word nation has a meaning of its own, not as a synonym for state, religion, ethnicity, or lifestyle, it is to denote a form of political loyalty stemming from an experienced collective identity, and would thus be of a sociological, rather than a legal, credal, or ethnic nature.
Although a sense of political loyalty is a given of our — settled, political — existence, the expression of this loyalty in terms of nationality is not. Governments are always in need of the political loyalty of their subjects, but this loyalty is not always national in nature. Indeed, national loyalty is in fact a rather recent form of political loyalty, which has not been common throughout most of political history. Many people have been troubled with nationalism as a historical, political and ideological phenomenon, and have disagreed on its proper definition. Literally thousands of books have been written about the subject.
Minogue, Nationalism Maryland: Penguin Books, 19ff. I suggest defining a nation as a community that is both imagined and territorial.
- Last Words.
- Paediatric Forensic Medicine and Pathology, Second Edition.
- El monstruo de los jardines (Spanish Edition).
However, not all imagined communities are also national communities. This is because it is also possible to experience oneself as part of an imagined, non-territorial community. Joseph Stalin, the future Soviet leader, had pointed at the territorial element in his book entitled Marxism and the national question.
Stalin, Works Moscow, vol. II, , quoted in: Teich and Porter eds. For besides the fact that it implies an imagined community, the experience of nationality, I propose, indeed encompasses a notion of territoriality. A nation claims a particular piece of land and declares that it belongs to her. As such, it permits a social and political order that is also a relation among strangers who may have different ethnicities and religions — united as they are in their common commitment to their land.
Depending on the many manifestations of nationality, membership of this social order can be more or less open to newcomers, welcoming them or chasing them away. These approaches to the criteria for national membership, which may differ from one nation to another,21 will be discussed in the next section. For now, we may safely contend that nationality, or the experience of national belonging, consists essentially in a shared political loyalty among a group of people, with two defining characteristics: 1.
Its scale is imagined, allowing membership to be extended to a large group far exceeding the size of the family or tribe; 2. Its claim pertains to a particular territory, contrasting with those forms of membership — for example religious ones —, that are essentially universal instead of territorial. Many African people do not primarily experience a national — imagined and territorial — membership, and their loyalties tend to reach more towards their Marx and Engels Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States.
An enquiry into the origins of nations and the politics of nationalism Colorado: Westview Press , Teich and Porter eds. Tribal loyalty also seems to be the form of loyalty of nomadic people, like, traditionally, Native Americans and Bedouins. What is characteristic for a religious loyalty, moreover, is that while it is imagined, it can easily result in placing religious rules above the rules of the actual political community.
Europe at the time of the Reformation, for example, went through a conflict between religious and national loyalty, expressed through the dispute on ultimate legal authority. Still, however, the experience of loyalty on the basis of ethnic kin is fundamentally different from the loyalty on the basis of shared nationality. Banton, West African City. The Anglican Church, for instance, promotes a religious loyalty, yet connected to the English nation. There would be many more examples of overlapping loyalties.
The purpose here is, however, to distinguish ideal-typical types of loyalty. Indeed, to several observers, they can only be explained properly with this problem in mind, which is also known as the problem of the divine command theory. A national loyalty enables a dramatic enlargement of the scale of political organization as compared to a tribal loyalty.
Welcoming Newcomers In this section I will develop three idealtypical forms of national membership in order to further our understanding of it. The first I would call the universalistenlightened approach, which is that it is not — or hardly — necessary. According to this approach, political organization can entirely be borne by institutions, and the social experience of membership is at best a useful by-product of this, but is certainly not a constituting element.
Then, there is the approach that I would call particularist-romantic, reminding us of the great nationalisms in history. According to this view of nationality, it is necessarily a closed condition; it is impossible to switch from one nation to another, and as a result, foreigners, even those who desire to assimilate, could not be accepted.
The third approach, finally, is that national identity is necessary, but that it can be an open condition; that in principle, nations are indeed closed communities, but that those who wish to belong can become part of the nation through their effort: through integration and assimilation. For analytical purposes, it may be helpful to associate the first approach with the Enlightenment and the universalist ideals typically connected with the French Revolution; the second approach, then, can easily be associated with Romanticism, emphasizing the element of determinism in life.
The universalist-enlightened model of nationality developed in the eighteenth century, and found an obvious expression in the French Revolution. On the contrary: by setting [the people] free of all definitive ties, it radically affirmed their autonomy. Sewell jr. Nevertheless, the focus in his work was hardly on the cultural factors that made French subjects into French nationals. This naturally provoked a reaction.
He continued: I have seen, in my life, Frenchmen, Italians, Russians, et cetera, and I even know, thanks to Montesquieu, that one can be Persian: but a man, I declare that I have never run into one in my life: if he exists, it is certainly without my knowledge. In response to the universal ideals of the Enlightenment, many different thinkers began to define the nation expressly in contrast with the state: as an organic soul, grown through an historical process, entirely disconnected from political organization — of which only those who shared in its blood could be a part.
This happened most notably in the German states, which indeed did not even form such a unified political entity at the time. In this work, Herder criticizes the all too universal outlook on mankind that the Enlightenment thinkers, for example Voltaire, had chosen. Making his argument mostly by ironical observations, Herder writes: With us, God be praised! We love all of us, or rather no one needs to love the other. Translated and edited by Michael N. Forster Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Ioannis D.
Evrigenis and Daniel Pellerin eds. Nachwort von H. Gadamer Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, Take for example the Grimm brothers, who from onwards roamed the country to collect German folk tales, the first collection of which was published in ; or Des Knaben Wunderhorn, a similar collection of tales made available by Achim von Arnim and Clemens Brentano in the same period.
In the winter of , in Frenchoccupied Berlin, Fichte declared that Germany could only defend itself against foreign powers by uniting politically. Herder Safranski, Romantik. And it was more than half a century later before the debate on nationality made further progress. This was triggered by the Franco-Prussian war.
Commencing on July 19th, , this war would last a year, and at the final peace treaty, signed on May 10th, , a united Germany emerged, seizing Alsace and the northern part of Lorraine la Moselle. Two of the most notable participants in defending this seizure were the German philosophers David Friedrich Strauss and Theodor Mommsen.
The first letter appeared in the Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung on August 18th, , the second on October 2nd. Christian Matthias Theodor Mommsen is best known for his research in classics. Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges was an historian. France has throughout its history always been envious of it. In doing so, these Frenchmen developed the conception of nationality that I consider the most helpful for us today. The letter was addressed to the political director of that newspaper, Clemente Maraini. Mulhouse was also the place of birth of Alfred Dreyfus Fustel de Coulanges comes to his conclusions: What singles out nations is not race, nor language.
People feel in their hearts that they are the same people when they have a community of ideas, interests, affections, memories and hopes. That is what makes a fatherland. We speak of the right of France, and the right of Germany. But these abstractions touch us much less than the right of the Alsatians, living beings of flesh and bone, not to obey to a power not agreed upon by themselves. He answers the question posed as follows A nation is therefore a large-scale solidarity, constituted by a feeling of sacrifices one has made and of those one is still prepared to make.
It presupposes a common past; it presents itself nevertheless in the present by one concrete fact: the consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue the common life. This approach finds connection with both the points emphasized by the two extreme positions, yet reduces each of them to proportions where they can be compromised, and so enters a middle ground. This French approach changed, it must be noted, in the course of the s and s. Finkielkraut, The defeat of the mind Kluxen and W. Mommsen, Politische ideologen und Nationalstaatliche Ordnung.
Studien zur Geschichte des Und Oldenbourg, Tombs ed. The blood one carries in his veins when one is born, one keeps that all his life. The individual is dominated by his race, he is nothing. The race, the nation is everything. The originally German-speaking Alfred Dreyfus , who had moved from the Alsace region he was born in Mulhouse into France after it was annexed by Prussia in , had recently become a captain in the French army. Yet in , he was convicted for treason, as he was found guilty of passing French military secrets to Germany.
It quickly became clear, however, that it was unlikely for Dreyfus to have committed this crime, and that the reason for him being convicted lay more in anti-Semitism, as Dreyfus had Jewish roots. Moreover, Dreyfus spoke French with a suspicious German accent, having been raised in the Alsace region.
The anti-Dreyfusards wanted to defend the infallibility of the French army, and to clear France of what they regarded as impure influences. His reasoning was: If we prove that Dreyfus is guilty, the french army as a whole will be strengthened: that is good for France. If on the contrary it will turn out that he is innocent, that would discredit the army and harm the nation. Anti-Semitism, moreover, was to continue to play a dominant role in French national contemplations.
What was the reasoning behind anti-Semitic nationalism? For us, our fatherland is the soil and the ancestors, it is the land of our dead. For them, it is the place where they find their greatest interest. Herzl drew his conclusions from this situation, and went down in history as the founder of a new sort of Jewish nationalism — which has culminated, of course, in a particularly remarkable nation state today, Israel. The second is the radical Romantic, putting all emphasis on historical determinism and race.
And the third is the open yet conditional conception, trying to find a middle road between radical equality and determinist inequality: membership is in principle open to everyone, but requires an effort. Of course, the theorists of the sovereign state, as discussed above, like Bodin and Hobbes, had some concept of national unity in mind.
cosafimasoxi.tk Ebooks and Manuals
They were not drawing the map for a world-government. But they were preoccupied mainly with the organizational apparatus needed to restore political order in times of great social divergence. The great Enlightenment project was to map out what was reasonable for man in general. Evron, Jewish state or Israeli Nation?
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 41ff. They argued that the nation consisted of a homogeneous population and that this homogeneous population had to be the basis of the political organization of the state. The debate over Alsace-Lorraine clearly illustrates this. As has been shown above, in the late 19th century and first half of the 20th century, the Romantic approach to the nation became increasingly important in political discourse.
The term brings about not only intellectual discussion, but also highly inflamed emotions. Words are not really important, however, and there is no intrinsic reason why we should continue to use that contaminated word for the patriotic kind of political loyalty that we associated with Renan and Fustel the Coulanges in the course of the last section of this chapter. Some would thus distinguish here between nationalism and patriotism. Thus it was possible in January for a man of a minority race to become the president of this nation — because Barack Obama was before everything else an American.
Both inherently local, as well as open to people from all different backgrounds, it forms the synthesis of Enlightened universalism and Romantic determinism, and it is realized in the ideal of the tolerant and open nation states based on what I call a multicultural nationalism. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol.
We have seen that sovereignty can be understood in a formal and a material sense: the formal sense denoting the constitutional independence of a state, the material sense denoting the location of the political process: the actual place where decisions are made. Both are implied in every serious understanding of self-government. Nationality contrasts with tribal loyalty on the one hand, and religious loyalty on the other; the former territorial yet unimagined, the latter imagined but non-territorial. A question that lies before us today may be what kind of effort should be demanded from immigrants, and what kind of cohesion should be striven for.
What are the factors that create national loyalty, or national identity, and how wide-ranging may the differences between citizens be, before national loyalty is abandoned and replaced with tribal or religious loyalties? Can Western culture as a whole provide such a loyalty — and is a European nationality therefore feasible? Since it can hardly be said that the Europe of today consists of natural, unchanging and unchangeable nation states, why not create a new one for the whole continent?
On the other hand, even though radical secessionist minorities have continued to exist in many European states, the experience of national membership of the general population seems to remain rather unproblematic in most WesternEuropean countries. If the Vienna peace treaty, the Versailles peace treaty, or the formation of Eastern Europe after the Second World War had been different, then no doubt there would have been different nation states from the ones we have 1 An example is James B.
Minahan, One Europe, many nations. What gives our life its value is that which we have become, not that which we were at birth. Endowment and heritage mean much and yet nothing: the great thing is what we develop out of them. It is not qualities and ideas which make the man, but man who makes something out of his knowledge and his qualities.
That is as true of the individual as of a whole nation. In both, the personality which they have achieved is the decisive factor. Only on this account did achievement and word acquire their intrinsic worth and their original power, and only thus did the Jewish conception of life, and the Jewish estimate of the world, acquire their preeminent solemnity. This has not infrequently been left out of account. Whenever connections between the Bible and the old religious products of other peoples were discovered, or believed to have been discovered, there was always some disposition to deny to the Jewish religion the rights of creation and originality.
It was always the most recent discovery which now really did reveal the beginning of truth, the hitherto unknown origin of knowledge. It is an essentially human inclination to see in magical outlines all which emerges suddenly and in unexpected form, out of some mysterious remoteness. Only the passage of time can teach an accurate valuation. How often in our times, for example, has it been attempted to show that the peculiar originality of the civilisation of Greece was dependent upon some piece of recently discovered antiquity, and by this means to foist upon it a foreign origin.
Here too were at work the same tendencies which can often be observed elsewhere. When in the seventeenth century new philosophies emerged into the world, it became a favourite occupation to compare every one of the great thinkers with an alleged forerunner in order to drag him from his throne. With an abundance of learning men collected together the Cartesians before Descartes, the Spinozists before Spinoza, and therewith it was thought that the genius had been bereft of his genius.
The unessential similarity caused the essential difference to be over-looked. So also the pre- Israelite Israelites were dis- covered again and again, now in Egypt or Syria, now in Arabia or Babylon. And the world is even now not yet quite used up! The latest exploration is not necessarily the last!
Primitive and rudimentary forms have their value for the under- standing of the origin, for the embryological history of religion. But for the purpose of judging and for the actual knowledge of the essence of an historical phenomenon, only the characteristic and classic forms may be considered. Only by following the course of its development can one determine what a religion comprises and what are its vital chords. The very thing, which, in the origin, con- stituted an exception, may frequently emerge in the course of history as the essential, as the most important, element.
The characteristic peculiarity is only brought out with the passing of the centuries. It is a truism that "the child is father to the man", but not until we study its progress into manhood are we able to know what were the distinctive peculiarities of the child. The real significance of the Jewish religion lies in its ascent, in the height which it has reached and maintained, and not in the rudimentary forms out of which it has risen.
The individual detail acquires its character in Judaism either by its having led up to the summit, or by representing the whole in a small part. A moral law found in the Bible is not the same thing as the same law in a cuneiform inscription on a cylinder. From time to time we find some beautiful feature in pictures, the work of tribes of 14 I. Where can we find a Bible , or a line of prophets, or a religious history , like or equal to those of the Israelites? Till that is done we must leave to Israel its unique importance, or, to speak theologically, the possession of Revelation.
Everything in the Hebrew Bible points to the path which the Jewish religion had to follow — from Abraham to Moses, from Moses to Jeremiah, from Jeremiah to the author of the Book of Job. The conception of development , and particularly of develop- ment conditioned by personalities , is indispensable for the under- standing of the origin and growth of the Jewish religion.
The same applies to the understanding of its subsequent history. It is not an inner equality of the periods, but an abiding connection, a continuity between the different epochs, which gives Jewish history its homogeneous character. This character was not under- stood until the principle of development, by virtue of which it had been formed, became known.
Every system of the Jewish religion is necessarily also a history of the religion. Only in its historical totality can Judaism be really understood. The principle of evolution is so essential to it that, even in the two creeds, which derived both directly and indirectly from the Jewish religion, this principle, to a greater or lesser extent, also applies, as a result of their origin.
Christianity has been specially praised for being the "most changing" of religions. But one of the fathers of our modern science of comparative religion has justly pointed out with emphasis that it possesses this virtue only on account of its connection with Judaism. In all cases of evolution there exist stationary elements, which assure equilibrium amidst continuous change, and dynamic forces which impel towards further progress. The distinction between these two qualities may also be designated as that between the authoritative and the free, unfettered factors in religion.
Never- theless, it often occurs that that which has been attained in the course of pressing forwards becomes finally an element of con- servatism. What at first was a bold questioning becomes not in- frequently an obvious truth to a later generation. Here in particular the regular movement of evolution reveals itself. The path of progress runs from paradox to commonplace, from violent oppo- sition to obvious matter of course. In Judaism the static elements consist especially in the existence of a Holy Book. Every definite religious possession, every religious tradition, has a permanent dead weight of its own.
With the old Israelite tradition of the Patriarchs ending in Moses, an historical foundation was laid. How much more true is this then of the Book which, as the Book, binds together the legends of the days of the forefathers, the words of the men of God, and the preachings of the prophets, as evidence of God, so as to preserve them for all generations.
It is in the Hebrew Bible that Judaism has its secure immovable foundation; it is the static and permanent element amid the changing movement of phenomena. It was no longer by paths to which the course of destiny leads that the life of the old religious ideas was conditioned and shaped; they stand now upon the firm ground of their own existence, the spiritual foundation of their history. This foundation had indeed to be won by battle and struggle, but it became on that account all the more definitely an intimate possession.
The historical and religious content was thus not merely attained, but it became the established authority in the changing eras. Pro- phecy and teaching were no passing phenomena or vanishing periods of history. That which they beheld and strove to attain remained the ideal, and that which they demanded became religious duty. It is a common contention that Israelite prophecy was followed by Jewish legalism; the two are regarded as two epochs in contrast and opposition to one another. But in reality the contrast between them is no more or less than between the epoch in which a truth is fought for, and the epoch when the truth is accepted.
No definite change, but an acceptance or an acknowledgment, took place. To the Scribes the Prophets were not mere obsolete predecessors ; they did not feel towards them like a new school of thought towards an old one. Rather they became and remained the proclaimers of eternal truth. Men, so regarded and exalted, whose words become Holy Writ — not merely literature — are never given up; they are not merely men of bygone days.
But it is not the only one. This tradition too, which was at last firmly established in the Talmud, had to fight for recognition; and it too became a conservative power. As far as religious influence, inner power, and influence are concerned, it need scarcely be pointed out that the Talmud takes a lower place than the Bible, which moreover, as divine revelation, enjoys its own incomparable classic position.
But as a conservative factor the Talmud often surpasses it. Intention and destiny assigned to it the significance of con- stituting a protective fence around Judaism. And as such it has been specifically honoured and cherished during lengthy periods of oppression. As the Talmud guarded, so was it guarded itself. For next after the Scriptures, and side by side with them, it prevented the religion of Israel from going astray into strange domains. Both the canonical character acquired by the Hebrew Bible, and the decisive authority attained by the Talmud, became and remained of paramount importance for the purpose of main- taining equilibrium in the history of Judaism and for its assured continuance.
Yet both these would have been and remained mere static powers, but for the driving forces of development. A dynamic element lay in what the Bible was for faith. For to faith it con- tained the word of God ; therefore it was the Word for all genera- tions : each generation had to be able to find in it what was peculiar and immediately present to itself. For a divine revelation is necessarily intended for man as such, and not only for those who live just when it is first delivered; it must tell all of us about ourselves.
The Bible lay so near to the heart that it could not be viewed from the historical standpoint. Never in Judaism did it become an ancient book which was simply read by those who came after it; it remained the book of life, the book for each new day. But each new day brought new things : new cares and also new demands with their moral and religious claims, their connections and implications. For the cares the Bible had to bring consolation, for the demands satisfaction; everything had to be found in it.
And, not least of all, fresh periods taught fresh truths, and with these too the Hebrew Bible had to deal. With each dominating idea it had to come to some understanding; and with every important thought it had to compare, and, where possible, unite itself. When any new philosophy of life was adopted, the Hebrew Bible too had to take on a different meaning, and the ancient word showed a power and wealth of changing significations.
So the Bible itself moved forward, and each period won its own Bible. What remarkable differences there are between what a Philo, an Akiba, a Maimonides, and a Mendelssohn, deduce from the Hebrew Bible! One and the same book, and yet it was in many respects so different to each of them.
As the Talmud has often phrased it, each epoch has its own Biblical interpreters. This is most happily expressed in that wonderful legend of Moses, who heard Rabbi Akiba expounding the Torah, and was unable to recognise it as his own. Men consciously felt that the Bible was always being recreated. Moreover, it is in the nature of every true and great idea to struggle forward to ever greater precision and clarity. It enshrines within itself that power to give and to demand which is essential to progress. Unfinished and unbounded, each creative idea of the human spirit reveals itself to men, and is thus ever able to attract thought unto itself from all sides.
Again and again it asks that men should occupy themselves with it. How rightly to do so is the problem. It is impossible to draw near and close to the Hebrew Bible without feeling this task to be a sort of spiritual necessity. And only he who has felt it has truly let the greatness of this book fill his soul. That which the character of the Hebrew Bible and the changing times demanded soon became conceived in Judaism as a religious i8 I. The necessity for it was grasped, and so it was freely accepted.
Men realized that the teaching of the Lord was no heritage which comes ready made, but rather a heritage which has to be won. Men felt that they owed to their religion the same duties as to all other spiritual possessions. The truths of the Bible were not to be considered as a gift, but rather as something which had first to be conquered. To explore, that means to consider something less as a gift than as a charge. Rigidity, compulsion, restraint, and immutability of tradition cannot be reconciled with such a conception. Faith on mere authority is, therefore, impossible.
The end becomes the beginning, and the solution the problem. This duty demanded, and actually brought it about in Judaism, that the traditionally received doctrine should not be accepted as something completely finished, but as something which should constantly renew itself in the conscience of the community.
Hence the desire to realise the ancient word again and again, to expound it, to take up some fresh attitude, even of contradiction, towards it, to acquire the feeling that it can never come to an end, to follow it just like one engaged in a search. This feeling was favoured in Judaism, particularly in later times, by the fact that the author usually remained in the back- ground of his work, was often even left wholly out of account. If it is the individual person who is listened to, if he stands at the centre, it naturally happens that he becomes a dominating and restraining influence in regard to his own words.
If the idea is considered to be of greater importance than its originator, one can deal with it with less restaint. In this particular connection the form of the Hebrew Bible , the very way in which it is written, is of special importance.
It leaves many things open; it is full of questions, and so impels to further thought. What is only indicated could, and in fact had to, be followed up. Passages which appeared to be contradictory had to be reconciled ; what had been left open had to be filled in. In its capacity as a canon it is the static element — for it is always the same book, ever attracting to itself all religious thinking and searching. But it has been no less a most effective factor for progress, through its importance to faith, through the creative power of its ideas, and through its own peculiar style.
It could be recorded in writing, but no definite limits could be set to it. It kept on work- ing as an important element of freedom and development. Thus it was possible to assume an attitude of independence to- wards everything handed down by tradition and even towards the words of the Bible — an independence the definiteness of which has often been underestimated.
There is too little recognition e. The biblical commandments were compared with one another, and their relative values con- sidered. Attempts were made to establish certain fundamental ideas, under which many other ideas and commands could be grouped. These ideas were discovered now in this word of the Scriptures, now in that : in the behest to love one's neighbour as oneself, in the teaching that man was made in God's image, in the pious conviction of trust in God, and in the knowledge of God as manifested in life.
New criteria were applied to the Holy Book ; men began to examine and to judge it. We can clearly hear it in the injunction that man should circumcise the foreskin of his heart, that he should rend his heart and not his garments, in the saying that love is more acceptable to God than sacrifice, or that the broken spirit is the true offering, or in the teaching that God will put the law into man's inward parts and write it in his heart. This unfettered independence of religious feeling found expression also later on; it is not peculiar to the Gospel.
From the Talmud the same note rings out clearly to us; it 20 I. Then we may hear it often. But I say unto you: he who glances in his lust even at the corner of a woman's heel is as if he had committed adultery with her. But I say unto you: do not search through the Torah , for thus saith the Lord to the House of Israel, seek me, and ye shall live. But I say unto you : if a court puts to death only one man in seventy years, that court is a court of murderers.
But I say unto you in the name of God: let the sinner repent and he shall be forgiven. But after Moses did there not arise in Israel another prophet who spoke thus : only the soul which sinneth shall die? These examples show the way in which religious thought and religious feeling became self-conscious. They illustrate how, at one time, in order to secure the determining answer, a particular phrase in the Bible was opposed by some other, which seemed to convey something deeper and more inward, how, at another time, there was an appeal to the moral conscience itself to give the decision, and how, at yet another time, the nature of the God of love appeared to the enquiring mind as the supreme law, laying down judgment.
All those human and physical qualities which the language of the Hebrew Bible attributes to God were lifted by constant purpose into the spiritual plane. The religious and ethical character of the ancient festivals was emphasized and brought out more distinctly; they were developed and carried forward on lines, traces of which can be found in the old ordinances of the Bible.
Many an old conception was filled with some clearer and richer content. It was almost possible to dispense with every sentence which spoke specially of the divine quality of love; for this very name proclaimed on each page of the Bible that, just as a father has pity upon his children, so the Lord has pity on those who fear Him, that in His wrath He forgets not His love.
In that word of the Bible which originally stood for justice, there came to be found the meanings of equity and benevolence, which were to give justice its true touch, if it is to be a living justice, and the word for the severe virtue of justice ultimately acquired the meaning of almsgiving or charity.
HOSPITALITÄT - Definition and synonyms of Hospitalität in the German dictionary
For it is not the evil person, but rather evil itself, which is condemned. A man of such unbending sternness of faith as Mai- monides was prepared to unite the eternity of the world, if it could be proved, with his biblical Monotheism. But the 22 I. The Jews generally remained quite conscious of their religious rights.
The Jews of the Middle Ages regarded this freedom as a characteristic and distinguishing virtue of Judaism. When a polemical pamphlet of the fourteenth century states that the view that "the chambers of human intelligence are dark, and the understanding with its proofs and deductions can illuminate nothing" is opposed to Jewish doctrine, it only ex- presses the feeling of the times.
Indeed the forces of self- reliance and of intellectual independence were then alive in Judaism to an extent that can probably find no parallel in the religious life of those days. That this should have been so was due to the fact that the elements of authority contained a definite tendency towards further development, since the ancient Scriptures could not become ancient because the command for a constant study of them always brought men back from the past to the present. The very authority itself was not dogmatic.
This struggle for the precise idea, the precise command, the precise law a hundred- headed question without a final answer always began anew. So it was that the Bible remained the Bible, but the Talmud arose after it, and after the Talmud religious philosophy began and continued side by side with the Talmud, and after that mysticism arose and continued side by side with religious philosophy, and so it went on, the old always remaining and the new ever growing up by its side.
Judaism did not affix itself to any particular period so as to finish up with it; never did it become complete. The task abides, but not its solution. The old revelation always becomes a new revelation: Judaism experiences a continuous renaissance. It is this recurring renaissance, this power of regeneration, which gives to the historical life of Judaism its character. Judaism is always awakening and opening its eyes. Each of its epochs was shaped by some particular period during which Judaism dis- covered a world of its own which it longed to possess.
Thus its history is able to gain from both new places and new periods. Since the beginning of the dispersion from Palestine the spiritual life of Judaism has wandered from one territory to another; after leaving old habitations, it always succeeded in providing itself with others. The same thing is true of the succession of the ages, the rise of new epochs ; new days begin, and new ideas arise. Only occasionally, during periods of transition, was the religious past a heavy burden for Judaism to bear.
The Jews were always conscious of possessing a unique history, with all its blessings; they felt elevated and consoled by the consciousness of the divine rule throughout all the centuries of the life of the Jewish people. But as a drag upon, and impediment to, the present, the religious past was seldom felt.
Almost each period was convinced that it possessed a spiritual existence of its own; it felt its religion to be a living reality. The men who trod new paths of thought always believed that they were standing upon the firm ground of Judaism. Few features are so manifest in the religious literature of Judaism as this its freedom from the past. True, there were often tensions between old doctrines and new conceptions, but they were for the most part tensions in which life seeks to expand itself.
Juda- ism preserved its actuality : it lived in the present. It is, of course, true that there were periods, sometimes rather prolonged, which showed signs of weariness, when life appeared to stand still, and not infrequently ideas were put forward which fell flat and were neglected. Nothing could be simpler than to find in one Jewish document or another in any century passages which do not lead up to the ideal. But this does not condemn Judaism and its history, for Judaism has always been able to lift itself up again. It was ever able to re-discover itself and to find its path.
Its true history is the history of a renaissance. Of many peoples and communities it has been said that they had too glorious a past still to expect a future. Even if this judg- 24 I. The ancient prophets walk through the world of Judaism, like living geniuses reawaking from generation to generation. If, therefore, we desire to understand Judaism, it is essential that we learn to understand its Prophets. And the very life of Judaism justifies them: for it was they who gave it its spiritual bent and direction, from which it is true that it deviated at times, but only to return to it in the end.
It was they who stamped its character. What was peculiar to their desire and their belief became and remained characteristically Jewish ; to them belonged all that was left over as the sifted prod- uct of the searching and purifying labour of time. In their thoughts the Jewish people found its goal and its truth. They constructed Israel's history. Above all else, the intuitive and practical character of the attainments of their discernment is a significant feature of the prophets of Israel. Their thoughts, to employ the phraseology of Vauvenargues, emerge from the heart. Nothing with them is in fact the outcome of investigation of any sort or kind.
They do not want to fathom the first condition of all existence, the first principles of all happenings; they stand at an unspeakable distance from every kind of speculation. An ethical urge compels them to think, a compulsion of conscience makes them speak; the irresistible truth overwhelms them. That gives them their simplicity ; all that is deliberate and is the prod- uct of reflection is foreign to them.
They do not speak them- selves, it is some higher, paramount power within them which speaks. The Lord God hath spoken, who can but prophesy? What it comprises is not to be dissected or analysed. If we were able to define it, it would not be what it is: prophetic revelation. Genius, the divine, are unde- finable. The prophets are not merely teachers of their people, men who in times of moral obliquity inculcated what was right and good : they are not merely teachers of ideas to which they or others happened to attain.
However clear and precise what they utter may be, — so clear that it has remained clear for all time, — the source out of which it emerged sprang from that unfathomable 26 I. Their wind did not seek after truth, but the truth took possession of them; their message was not inferred or puzzled out, hut stood out openly to them, having been opened for them. But, nevertheless, their human personality remained, their individuality with its wishing and willing, its seeking and fearing, its fighting and resisting. They did not feel merely passive, as a later faith supposed, the mere objects of a grace which descended upon them; their individuality, their sense of freedom, seeks out a way of its own.
Both are combined in them, namely, the Divine mystery or secret which enters into them, and the human thinking and yearning which emerge from them. Clearly they experience the one as well as the other. They are aware of the miraculous, that power which is beyond them; the future rises before them, and they behold and hear things which stand outside the range of the human eye, the human ear.
But they realize also their own in- dividual souls, they have their part in the decision which is demanded of them, their conscience wrestles with itself; before them lie the paths between which they must choose. Thus the two experiences go on within them simultaneously; they reveal themselves to God, and God reveals Himself to them; God orders and compels them to speak, and they speak and strive with God.
They are the men of God. So nothing evaporates in generalization, everything about them is real , personal and definite, often personal to the point of severity, and definite to the point of harshness. This is as true of their demands as of their words. It is noticeable how the prophets, in wrestling with themselves, wrestle for the right words, how they fight with the language in order that the inexpressible may be ex- pressed ; the richness of meaning often seems to crush them. But they never try to explain any particular phrase or to justify it, there is never an inclination to analyse and to put things in the abstract.
For it is the word of God that speaks out of them and reveals itself to them ; thinking to them has come to mean listening and vision, and the symbol with its metaphor provides them with the final answer. The prophets swear by no conception and are satisfied with none , they despise all phrases and every declamation, in short everything which purports to be finished and complete. Even their own words are to them but words which they happen to employ. That is why they themselves count so much more than their speeches; greater than their word is the personality which stands behind the word, the spirit which seeks expression by the word.
They fought with God, and God fought with them. It is the revelation of the God who stands above all forms and formulae, and not statements of their thoughts, of which their tongues would tell. For the prophets the knowledge of God is thus neither the last link in a chain of thoughts, nor the outcome of intellectual specu- lation. Since they feel what God is to them they carry Him within them. Therefore He is so completely assured to them, so unquali- fiedly certain.
To prove the existence of God would have been to them a sign of utter unbelief, a manifestation of their having lost, and their having been forsaken by, God. The necessity to explain the existence of God and His divine rule is as remote from them as the necessity to prove their own life-consciousness by means of logical reasoning. To them religion is the meaning, the innermost nucleus, of their own existence, not something external or supervened, not something which has been acquired or learned.
It is life from the life of the soul, and as such stands beyond all controversy. Again and again this is stressed, that religion lives in the heart, and is the innermost nature of man. And this conviction became part of the being and soul of the succeeding generations. In several of the psalms, in the Book of Job, in the Book of Kohelet, and in many a passage of the Talmud, are to be found words of defiance, which, in their outspoken character, cannot be surpassed even by atheism; the contra- I. But to use these very words against God and the moral order of the world, or against religion, would be as impossible for the men who uttered them as to commit suicide.
Since belief was thus the life of the soul, since it thus carried within itself certainty and justification, and was independent of all outside support, it was able to strike root deep down in the human heart. The prophets seek to express only what they themselves have experienced, what God means to them at all times, and are indeed able to do so on account of the invincible certainty of intuition.
The prophets rely upon themselves ; they neither chaffer nor compromise, they yield nothing, and allow nothing to be subtracted from the fulness of their demand. This free conviction of inner union with God constitutes the basis of that ethical character which gives to the words of the prophets their peculiar nature, and which has always remained of determining importance for Judaism. Not what God is in Himself, but what He means to man, what He means to the world, is their concern.
They do not attempt to analyse the nature of God any more than the nature of man. Human free-will, responsibility and conscience are to them, as principles of their spiritual ex- perience and of their ethical demand, as much matters of course as the existence and sanctity of God. They do not seek to solve the problems of the universe, but simply to proclaim the relation- ship of God to the world, the Divine beneficence and the Divine will. They do not seek to answer any psychological problems of the soul, but simply to speak of the relationship of the soul to God, of the dignity, the duty, and the hope of man.
The knowledge of God teaches us what man should be; the Divine reveals that which is human. And hence to understand man means to com- prehend that which God gives to him and commands him; it means to comprehend that he was created to be just and good, holy as the Lord his God. The revelation of God and the revela- tion of human morality are thus brought closely together. It is not a revelation of the nature of God which is given to the prophet and through him, but the revelation of God's will and His rule. It is by reason of that which we learn about God that we learn to understand ourselves and to become true men.
The path of righteousness alone leads on to God. The greater our desire to fulfil our true nature, the nearer we come to Him, the nearer He is to us. To seek God, that is to strive after good; to find God, that is to do good. Do God's bidding, and then you will know who He is. Such is the comprehension of God as experienced and taught by the prophets, the way which leads to God.
All which this conception connotes for them is, and remains for them, within the limits of the human, — man's life, his being, and his growth. The knowledge of God is not a knowledge of something which, apart and detached, lies beyond the world of here and now; rather is it something which remains within the sphere of ethical religion; as the knowledge of God's commandment and the will to fulfil it, it is rooted in man. It is the synonym for the morality which can live in every soul as its own law. It is not bestowed as a gift of miraculous grace upon a selected group, but it proceeds 30 I.
Both, the knowledge of God and the love of Him, stand side by side, upon the same foundation, and are used in the same sense. So deep-rooted is this knowledge in the idea of ethical freedom, that man, by virtue of his knowledge of God, stands up over against God. The ethical conscience, this innermost knowledge, can make demands of God, the demands of the man who knows God. He judged the cause of the poor and needy; then it was well with him. Was not this to know me? Religion and life are thus intimately bound up together — religion, which has to be proved through life, and life, which has to be fulfilled through religion.
The latter is brought down upon earth, and the former is exalted to the sphere of the Divine. And so it is that the ground for a conflict betwixt belief and deed is removed : there is no piety but that which has proven itself in the conduct of life, no conduct of life is valid but that in which religion finds its realization.
So all false phantasticism and hocus pocus are kept at a distance. The thoughts of God are unfathomable, they are exalted as high above the thoughts of men as are the heavens above the earth. They are bidden you this very day, and they are straight and pure; there exists a covenant between man and God. The course of life is clearly defined for the pious man, since he knows what he should do; the future speaks to him, because he understands the duty which the coming day may impose upon him.
Knowing what God means to him and what God bids him do, he looks confidently towards the future which will constitute his life. Illuminated by the light of religion, his way lies clear before him. For it is the way he must go, the way which was promised to him. It is worthy of note how decisively the special and peculiar character of religion has thus been preserved. Not a new philoso- phic conception of the world , but a new religious life is to be created and carried through. It is not one of the least essential or im- portant points in the creative work of the prophets that religion should have been conceived so purely, that it has been kept free from all foreign matter, from any admixture of natural philosophy or of gnosticism.
The prophets gave to religion its autonomy. It might almost be said that it is not so much monotheism which constitutes the world-historic importance of the Hebrew Bible, but rather its purely religious foundation. Theoretic questions concerning the beyond are transformed into the certainties of feeling and into claims of conscience. The universe and its phenomena are neither conceptually explained, nor mystically interpreted, but exclusively adjudged in terms of religion. In the place of constructive conceptions and poetical myths stand the moral command and pious trust.
These are the limitations of the prophet, but they are limitations which reveal the master. It is the essential virtue of Israelite thought, of which the prophets were born, and which they in their turn formed and directed, that all pondering and seeking are directed towards man. It is man who stimulates the thinking. The question: what does man need, what is his pain, this question which is wrung from the listening and crying human heart, has seized and constrained Jewish genius; only because of it did this genius demand and receive the revelation of God.
That is why it is impelled by the strong feeling of inner compulsion, by that prophetic spirit which is not to be found outside Judaism. The Israelite genius did not move from nature to man, as later in the case of the Greeks, but it moved from man to nature. Even nature itself talks to the Israelite of man; it shares, either happily or mournfully, in nearness to God and in human sin, in man's joys and in his sorrows; man's yearnings are revealed in nature.
The riddles of the world are heard also in nature, but they are only the under- tone to the riddles in the life of man. In man the world manifests itself, everything has its origin in his soul, and everything leads back to his soul. The world is the world of God, and God is the God of man. Thus they are felt and comprehended, and in feeling so Jewish genius is unique.
How God created heaven and earth is to the prophet a question of minor importance. It is significant to know only that the world, which is filled with His glory, bears witness, throughout its length and breadth, to the Almighty God who is full of love. The vision of a life after death, that world of phantasy, does not appeal to the prophet. If his thoughts should wander into the region from which there is no return, he abstains from conceptions which try to visualize or to describe it.
This inner connection with real life had also the effect of obviating the opposite danger, the danger of conceptual petri- faction. For the representation of the unity of God, and of His attributes, can fall a prey to this very danger by reducing the Divine to a mere collective conception of ideal qualities. Instead of a truly religious relation to God one then gets a scientific in- vestigation of the Divine perfection, and by speculation about religion, or even by faith in such speculation, religion is lost. The prophets keep firmly to this: they bear witness only to that to which their souls bear witness, to that which God means to them in their innermost life.
They teach that which they themselves have experienced: of the God whom man should seek, and who allows Himself to be found by him. This is illustrated by the manner in which the unity of God is mentioned. It is foreign to the prophets to deduce logically, from the interconnectedness and cohesion of nature, the existence of a first cause. But the Divine unity becomes unshakeably certain to them by the inward experience that there is only one justice, only one holiness. God is the one God because He is the Holy One. The conviction of the unity of God thus has its roots in the re- ligious consciousness.
And therefore it is something religious which emerges from it. The attributes of God are realized in the same way. They are not built up conceptually, but brought to man for the purpose of definite moral demands and of ever new strengthening of trust. So with the omnipotence of God : God is the Lord of the whole universe; therefore we are to love the stranger. In the same way, eternity is based upon the ground of religion; it is brought into the life of mankind.
In the same way, all the Divine attributes are linked up with the life of the soul and the commandments. However much some of these attributes lent themselves to the temptation of subtle speculation, their religious character was always main- tained. With definite certainty it was also preserved in the Oral Law by making all problems about the attributes lead up to ethical commands.
You say, God is just, then be you also just. You say: God is full of lovingkindness in everything He does ; so be you also full of lovingkindness. Just as there was no ground for a conflict between belief and life, so there was none for a conflict between faith and knowledge. As it does not exist in the former instance because religion has to be realized through life, it cannot exist in the latter case because religion is not to be proved by means of knowledge. Religion can never become a branch of a definite body of knowledge, and therefore can never be called in question by any definite body of knowledge.
Since it rests upon no axiom, it can be undermined by none. Its freedom remains secured, and it is unassailable by all the movements of scientific knowledge. It is significant that the astronomical structure of the world, as now accepted, has been received by Judaism without protest, even without any feeling of inconsistency.
The old systems began to crumble, and their end was watched without concern ; for none of this was Judaism responsible.
- Tokyo #2: Hunt To His Death?
- immanuel kant nuova Manual.
- Hunter Lost: War for Evron.
- Far from the Maddening Girls And The Transgression of Andrew Vane!
- Related Content.
- De tres. ninguna (Spanish Edition)?
This autonomy is the heritage of the prophets. All the features of the Jewish religion show it to be a creation of the prophets, for it is not conceptions and their meaning, but man and his life and his conscience, which constitute its character. The religious documents of the Hebrew Bible, however much the author retires behind his work, are not really books, but confessions, testimonies of individual religious seeking, revelations of very definite personalities.
A religious style was created by them, and here, if anywhere, it can be said that the style is the man. Who the man may be is frequently but little regarded, but wherever distinct personality can make itself felt, it does so. Hence it is that the Hebrew Bible is so fragmentary, so undogmatic and unsystematic; no chain of conclusions, no proof of the result connects the single links, there are no finished formulae to do the linking; it is all as unsystematic as man himself.
Hence it is also so incomplete, so full of questions, and leaves so much over; many things are merely indicated, others only incidentally ex- pressed, and this or that seems to be entirely absent. It is as incomplete as man himself rightly is. Hence it contains an unanalysable residue of its own, a something which is not to be worked out, or squeezed into sentences, which can be grasped and felt only with holy awe, like some music which has never fallen on human ear.
It is a residue which goes beyond all know- ledge and cleverness, in which every true man finds his innermost personality. Hence the lasting freshness of the Hebrew Bible, its youthfulness, something which will neither fade nor perish, something which, ever new, is at all times a new experience. The religion of the Bible is therefore, so to say, more than the Bible itself, and Judaism more than its religious documents.
But beneath it all lies the whole fugue, the whole confession : religion. He who wishes to hear and is able to hear, may hear it. Merely to select sentences and to put them together does not in itself prove an understanding of the I. It is not words which have to be explained, or sentences to be expounded, but it is men who have to be understood.
Many commentaries on the Bible, not to mention the interpretations of the Oral Law, remain so singularly remote from the Bible, because they regard it as though it were simply a collection of writings for grammatical and philological exercises. The approach to the finest things in the Bible does not lie through a sharp intellect or through wide reading, or through formulae, but only through reverence and love. Their fullest meaning is not obtained by what they say. What is best in Judaism, better far even than its teachings, is to be found in actual living men. Wherever there prevails that modern tendency to ascertain the value of a religion with the slate pencil, there it is scarcely possible to do justice to Judaism and to the Hebrew Bible.
The Hebrew Bible does not speak three dozen times about the Father in heaven, and Judaism does not talk one hundred times over about the goodness and the love of God. They carry more in their hearts than on their lips, and so they get scant mercy from the masters of numbers, the arithmeticians of religion. Never has Judaism found complete self-expression in mere words. There have been periods — and these not the worst — when some religious, and often some quite unlikely, meaning was found in every word of the Scriptures, but to know and be at home with the mere words did not guarantee a possession of anything religious.
It is in a detachment from the mere word, in a spiritual apprehension, that the renaissance, to which Judaism so constantly awoke, is deeply rooted. Conception, word, and phrase can be handed down with pedantic precision, but with the personal and the human there must always be some inner contact and connection. The personal must recreate itself in the soul, as through a spiritual rebirth. Every system of thought is intolerant, and breeds intolerance, since it fosters self-righteousness and self-satisfaction — it is significant that the most ruthless of inquisitors have grown out of the circle of systematists.
A system fixes its focus of vision at a certain definite range. And thus it prevents the growth of fresh formations of its own truth. The prophetic word, on the other hand, as a living and personal confession of faith, which cannot be circumscribed by demarcation, possesses breadth and boundlessness. It has a freedom, the extent of which cannot be anticipated, which carries within itself the seed of revival and development, and so becomes inevitably, again and again, in- corporated into present and actual life.
Every true personality becomes embodied in history. With no single prophet is the fabric of the Jewish religion completed, any more than it began with any single one; Jewish prophecy points back into the past, and on into the future. That is where it differs essentially from other religions, which regard as the beginning and the end of their prophetic period the one Gotama Buddha, the one Zoroaster, the one Mohammed; their most important development ends at their beginning.
In Israel the master is followed by a train of masters, the great one by a line of his peers. None of them gives forth the whole, none of them represents the whole. The richness of the religion is not contained in a single one, or even in several of them. To com- pleteness and perfection only a system, at most, can lay claim, but never a human being. The whole content of Judaism truly lies in its unended and unending history. But the incomparable importance of the prophets, indeed of almost every one of them, nevertheless remains.
They are not indeed mediators of salvation, but they are mediators of religious truth, vehicles of revelation. In religion they represent the classical era which can and should bear fruit again and again. As has already been said, their achievements have not, or ever can, be- come obsolete, or just part of the past. We too look up to them. Since their day every religious experience has been a revival of what those men experienced. They discovered, and whoever comes after them can only rediscover. From the very moment when a genius makes his appearance there can almost only be disciples and adapters.
The old discovery can be rediscovered in new forms, but the living element in them is the old spirit, and I. Whether the prophets consciously meant to convey by their speeches all that we find, or can, or ought to, find in them is a question of minor importance. It matters not what its author intended the word to mean at the moment ; what really matters is what actually lies in it. The strength of genius lies in its creative power; almost unconsciously the genius creates truths which go further than he himself meant. His effect is always greater than his intention, and what he actually says is always more than he really intends to say.
That which is to him a limited metaphor may become for us an eternal symbol, something of the richest meaning to us, but which for him had only one meaning. That distinguishes creative genius from ingathering talent. Here again is revealed the truth that the prophets are more than their words. This, and many another statement here, may, perhaps, appear to be apologetic. But how can one speak of certain things without being apo- logetic? Indeed, to understand certain things means to admire them. What was contained in the religion of the prophets has remained the property of Judaism; therein lie the determining elements of its being.
Characteristic boundary lines can be drawn. Judaism is a religion which seeks verification in life and finds its answers in the union of life with God. In religion all men are to be on an equal footing; religion is to be a common possession for all. In the depths of the soul of the prophet there dwells indeed his special secret, and he may and indeed must apprehend what to everybody else remains a closed door, or wholly non-existent.
But this his possession, and his right to it, is to him but a duty, a gift, and a commandment to proclaim what, prior to all others, he has heard, to announce what, prior to all others, he has seen. But it was never considered to be a special piety which could be claimed by him alone, which was reserved for him exclusively. He has a mission, for which God created and chose him, but not a special rung of religion, upon which he may stand.
Related Immanuel Kant - Der zweite Definitivartikel zum ewigen Frieden (German Edition)
Copyright 2019 - All Right Reserved